In a move that signals both urgency and pragmatism, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has issued a detailed Statement of Work (SoW) seeking to outsource critical portions of the Tejas Mk2’s development—specifically electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC) testing, and the design, simulation, placement, and certification of its antenna systems. The contract is for a three-year period, bringing in private sector defence electronics firms to share a workload that is technically demanding and time-sensitive.
HAL’s aim is to avoid the certification delays and integration headaches that have plagued earlier variants of Tejas, and to accelerate induction of the Mk2 into the Indian Air Force (IAF). This move is closely aligned with the government’s Atmanirbhar Bharat policy that promotes self-reliance in defence manufacturing. The implications of this outsourcing are broad: engineering, scheduling, national security, and capability building.
Below we explore what this entails: the technical challenges, historical context, strategic motivations, possible risks, and the likely impact on India’s aerospace ecosystem.
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The Tejas Mk2 is envisaged as an upgraded, 4.5-generation Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), with more powerful engines (GE F414), more internal volume, greater payload, improved aerodynamics (including canard surfaces), enhanced avionics, EW, and mission systems. It is intended to follow on the Mk1 and Mk1A versions.
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The IAF depends increasingly on Tejas Mk1A to fill gaps in its fleet, but past delays in production, certification, and subsystem integration—especially avionics, radar, and electronic warfare suites—have delayed deliveries.
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EMI/EMC certification and antenna integration have been known problem areas for modern combat aircraft globally, as the density of sensors, emitters, and communications links has increased. In earlier Tejas versions, HAL and DRDO have sometimes had to choose imported components due to certification delays. For example, in Mk1A, HAL reportedly moved to Israeli systems over delays in DRDO’s own Uttam AESA radar and EW suite.
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Mutual interference: Radar, data links, mission computers, navigation, jammers, IFF etc., must all coexist without interfering with each other.
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External threats: Resilience to jamming, EMPs, lightning, other electromagnetic disturbances.
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Physical constraints: The shape of the aircraft (airframe geometry, placement of metal / composite parts, fuselage shape, ground planes) distorts antenna radiation patterns; improper placement can reduce performance or even blind communication/navigation under certain flight attitudes.
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Certification and standards: Without satisfying international and military standards (e.g. MIL-STD-461, RTCA/DO-160 and others), both airworthiness and operational safety are compromised; also, previous delays in obtaining approvals have pushed back delivery schedules.
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Time and cost overruns: Physical prototyping, repeated tests, redesigns are expensive. Virtual modelling, simulations, early validation help reduce iterations.
Based on what is publicly known, HAL’s Statement of Work covers several tightly interconnected tasks:
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The contract requires private firms to carry out rigorous testing under standards such as MIL-STD-461 and RTCA/DO-160. This includes:
- Conducted emissions (power lines, internal power systems)
- Radiated emissions and susceptibility (radar, jammers, external sources)
- Lightning effects, transients, grounding, shielding etc.
- Testing on mockups and full-scale systems before flight, and in-flight validation.
- Using advanced computational electromagnetics (CEM) tools, 3D modelling, material property characterisation (conductivity, dielectric constants) to simulate antenna behaviour in situ.
- Predicting how the fuselage, wings, canards, intake ducts, etc., distort or block signals, shadowing, multipath, reflections.
- Determining optimal positioning physically (blade, dorsal, ventral, wingtip etc.) balancing performance, maintenance access, stealth, structural constraints.
- Then validating predictions with physical testing (e.g. near-field/far-field pattern measurements, chamber testing, flight trials).
- Periodic checks of antenna performance during maintenance at IAF bases.
- Use of portable scanning equipment (anechoic chamber-like, near-field scanners, etc.) to monitor performance degradation (due to wear, damage, environmental factors).
- Possibly integrating predictive maintenance tools (AI, trend-analysis) to anticipate failures or degradations.
- Three‐year engagement.
- Milestones are likely aligned with prototype rollout, static and flight tests, certification, and readiness for induction.
By bringing in private firms to share the burden of EMI/EMC and antenna design, HAL is:
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Reducing bottlenecks in certification: earlier variants of Tejas reportedly delayed due to integration or certification of radar & EW components. Outsourcing reduces HAL’s internal workload and allows specialized firms to focus.
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Increasing parallelism: tasks that might have cascaded (i.e. antenna placement after structural configuration, then pattern verification) can be overlapped more effectively if private partners are involved concurrently.
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Leveraging specialized expertise: Some private firms may already have labs, simulation tools, shielding expertise or measurement chambers. This avoids HAL having to build or scale everything in‐house.
Atmanirbhar Bharat, Defence Ecosystem Growth
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This outsourcing supports self‐reliance: new capabilities in the private sector for high‐end defence electronics, EMI/EMC, RF simulation, antenna measurement labs etc., are being developed.
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Improves supplier base: firms that win this contract will gain experience, possibly hire talent, invest in facilities, which boosts overall capacity for future projects (AMCA, UAVs, EW systems, radars, etc.).
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Encourages technology transfer & specialization, especially in areas like virtual prototyping (CEM), AI‐based predictive maintenance, and high precision RF measurement.
While the move seems well-directed, there are several technical, managerial, and strategic challenges:
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Not all private firms will have past experience handling full-aircraft EMI/EMC certification or integrating with defense grade standards. Achieving MIL-STD etc. is non‐trivial, especially for supersonic aircraft flying at high altitudes, exposure to extreme environmental conditions.
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Labs need to be calibrated, shielded, measurement uncertainties characterized. Mistakes or lax performance can lead to costly rework or unsafe behavior.
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Different systems from different vendors must still integrate seamlessly. Poor interface management (mechanical, electrical, software) can undermine performance even if individual components pass tests.
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In particular, the interactions between radar, antenna, EW suite, mission computer, navigation systems etc. require not just RF compatibility but also power supply, grounding, EMI suppression in power/harnesses.
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Certification is often outside the sphere of control of development: external standard bodies, airworthiness authorities (like CEMILAC in India), regulatory clearances all can slow things.
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Past experience (e.g., with Uttam radar, etc.) shows that even indigenous systems can be ready technically but get hung up in bureaucratic or procedural delays. HAL’s move is meant to anticipate that, but success will depend on smoother regulatory coordination.
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Outsourcing always carries risk of cost overruns if scope changes, delay in deliverables, mismatch of expectations. HAL and MoD will need strong oversight and tight contract management.
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Intellectual property, confidentiality, security classification (given EW and radar work) will need to be tightly managed with private firms.
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Tejas Mk2 has ambitious timelines for prototype, flight test, certification, full operational capability. Any delays in EMI/EMC or antenna development can ripple into overall project schedule.
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Also, external dependencies such as engine supply (GE F414), subsystem supplies, materials etc., remain potential risk areas.
HAL—and the wider DRDO/IAF ecosystem—has seen similar issues previously:
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The Uttam AESA radar, developed by DRDO (with Bharat Electronics Ltd.), had at various points been reported as technically ready, but its integration/ certification was delayed. This led HAL to consider or actually procure foreign systems for Mk1A aircraft to ensure delivery timelines.
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Similarly, past aircraft variants worldwide (in India and elsewhere) show that insufficient EMI/EMC testing early can cause late‐stage integration surprises (radar cross-interference, communication dropouts, susceptibility to jamming, etc.).
Thus, HAL is likely drawing on lessons: do the heavy EM modelling, simulate, test early, involve domain experts, outsource where feasible.
India already has several firms with relevant capabilities that may bid or be capable of bidding on this contract:
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Defence electronics firms: companies such as Paras Defence & Space Technologies, Data Patterns, Ananth Technologies etc., that have experience with avionics, radars, embedded systems.
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Specialised RF/EMI labs: companies like EM Electronix, Arihant Electricals etc., which already list MIL standards compliance and EMI/EMC competence.
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RF measurement, chamber, absorbers, shielded‐room companies: those that build anechoic chambers, RF absorbers etc., e.g., JV Micronics. System integrators / simulation software houses that can do computational electromagnetics (CEM), 3D modelling, radiation pattern simulation.
These firms will need capacity upgrades (scale, certification ability, security clearance etc.) to meet defence’s stringent requirements.
Why now?
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The geopolitical environment is pushing India to accelerate its defence readiness. With neighbourhood tensions, the need for air power and avionics / EW superiority is heightened.
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Tejas Mk2 is one of India’s major upcoming platforms, and delays translate into capability gaps in the IAF. Early induction matters.
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There is recognition that India’s defence-industrial complex cannot scale if every subsystem is done centrally (by HAL/DRDO) without private sector involvement.
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Regulatory and bureaucratic reforms in recent years, from incentives to Defence Production Policies, push easier private sector participation, co-development, co-manufacturing, and faster clearance.
National security also demands robust EMI/EMC and antenna performance. In modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum is a contested and warfare domain (jamming, spoofing, electronic attack). An aircraft that cannot resist interference or that leaks signals, or whose antennas are badly placed (leading to blind spots), is vulnerable.
To know whether this initiative will work as intended, observers should track:
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Milestones being met: prototype rollout, pre-flight tests, antenna pattern verification, certification deadlines. If delays creep, that may signal problems.
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Quality of private sector participation: labs, simulation results, alignment with standards, how private firms perform under contract. Also how well they integrate with HAL’s internal divisions (airframe, avionics, EW, mission systems).
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Regulatory / certification bottlenecks: CEMILAC, DRDO’s test wings, MoD approvals. Whether there is coordination to ensure timely certification.
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Cost overruns and contractual clarity: clear scope of work, deliverables, penalties for non-performance.
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How this builds sustainable capability: after the contract ends, whether firms retain labs, talent, and can contribute to future projects (say AMCA, UAVs, EW systems, export markets).
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Operational feedback when first units are delivered: whether IAF squadrons report EMS/EMI/antenna issues, whether maintenance (antenna alignment, performance drift) becomes a pain point or is well managed.
If successful, HAL’s outsourcing could become a model for other systems. Some of the potential outcomes:
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Faster, smoother project execution for ensuing platforms (Tejas Mk2A, AMCA etc.), because much of the EMI/EMC work will have matured and capacity will exist in private sector.
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Export credibility: Aircraft certified to recognized international and military standards with proven performance in antenna, EW, radar, etc., are more credible to foreign buyers.
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Cost savings over time: virtual simulations, pre-validation, less rework and fewer flight test surprises cut down cost.
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Stimulate innovation: private firms may introduce better simulation tools, measurement methods, predictive diagnostic tools, and modular antenna design that could benefit many aerospace applications.
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Security concerns: Working with private firms in high-sensitivity domains (radar, EW) increases concerns about IP protection, supply chain security, leakages. Contracts will need to ensure the highest security classification, vetting, oversight.
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Talent development: New engineers, RF specialists, antenna designers, EMI/EMC test engineers will get higher exposure and skill development; academic institutions may respond by adapting curricula.
HAL’s decision to outsource EMI/EMC certification and antenna systems work for Tejas Mk2 is a strong signal of course correction: acknowledging that large, modern combat aircraft cannot be built in serial fashion without leveraging private sector specialization, virtual prototyping, early testing, and strict adherence to standards.
While technical risks and schedule pressures remain, this move—if well-managed—could help overcome the delays that have dogged earlier versions of Tejas, reduce cost and risk, build domestic capability, and ensure the Mk2 variant is inducted into IAF service with confidence.
