The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is the newest fifth-generation fighter fielded by the United States and its allies, yet on paper it looks oddly unimpressive when judged by one of the most intuitive measures of air combat performance: speed. With a published maximum of around Mach 1.6, the F-35 is slower than its fifth-generation predecessor, the F-22 Raptor, and slower than a wide range of fourth- and 4.5-generation fighters that remain in frontline service around the world.
From the F-15 Eagle and its advanced F-15EX variant to the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, and even older Cold War-era designs like the F-14 Tomcat, many fighters can outrun the Lightning II with ease. Russian and Chinese designs, including the Su-35, Su-57, MiG-35, and J-20, also boast higher top-end speeds. In a straight-line dash, the F-35 is frequently the slowest aircraft in the comparison.
That apparent weakness has fueled years of criticism and misunderstanding about what the F-35 is, what it was designed to do, and how modern air combat is actually expected to unfold.
On paper, the comparison is stark. The F-35’s top speed of Mach 1.6 translates to roughly 1,200 miles per hour. By contrast, the F-22 Raptor is rated at Mach 2.25, the F-15 Eagle and F-15EX exceed Mach 2.5, and even the F-16 Viper can push past Mach 2.0. Russia’s MiG-35 and Su-35, powered by large, high-thrust engines optimized for speed and maneuverability, sit comfortably above Mach 2.2.
A snapshot of publicly available performance data illustrates the gap:
- F-35 Lightning II (5th gen): Mach 1.6
- F-22 Raptor (5th gen): Mach 2.25
- F-15 Eagle / F-15EX (4.5 gen): Mach 2.5+
- F-16 Viper (4.5 gen): Mach 2.05
- F-14 Tomcat (4th gen): Mach 2.3
- F/A-18 Super Hornet (4.5 gen): Mach 1.8
- Eurofighter Typhoon (4.5 gen): Mach 2.0+
- Dassault Rafale (4.5 gen): Mach 1.8
- J-20 Mighty Dragon (5th gen): Mach 2.0+
- Su-57 Felon (5th gen): Mach 2.0+
- Su-35 Flanker-E (4.5 gen): Mach 2.25
- MiG-35 Fulcrum-F (4.5 gen): Mach 2.23
Measured purely by top speed, the Lightning II is the clear laggard.
The explanation lies in the F-35’s design philosophy. Speed was never the primary requirement. Instead, the Joint Strike Fighter program prioritized stealth, multirole flexibility, affordability relative to specialized platforms, and the ability to replace a wide range of legacy aircraft across multiple services.
Those requirements forced trade-offs. Internal weapons bays, essential for maintaining low radar cross-section, impose volume and drag penalties. The aircraft’s shaping, optimized to scatter radar energy rather than minimize aerodynamic drag, is less conducive to extreme supersonic flight. Thermal management constraints, driven by sensitive avionics and stealth coatings, also limit sustained high-Mach operation.
The situation becomes more complex when the three F-35 variants are considered. The F-35A conventional takeoff and landing model, the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing “jump jet,” and the F-35C carrier variant share between 70 and 90 percent commonality, but their structural and aerodynamic differences are substantial.
The F-35B, for example, incorporates a shaft-driven lift fan and swiveling exhaust nozzle, adding weight and complexity that inevitably affect performance. The F-35C features larger wings and reinforced landing gear to handle catapult launches and arrested recoveries at sea. Designing a single family of aircraft to satisfy the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy meant accepting compromises that a single-role interceptor like the F-22 never had to make.
When compared with the premier fighter platforms of most air forces, the F-35 often emerges as the slowest jet in the lineup. Even within the inventories of the United States and its allies, the Lightning II is far from a “hot rod.” Yet it continues to replace aircraft such as the F-16, F/A-18, and in some roles even the Eurofighter Typhoon as older fleets age out.
This apparent contradiction highlights a fundamental shift in air combat doctrine. Speed, altitude, and raw maneuverability were once decisive. Today, information dominance increasingly outweighs kinematic performance.
The F-35 program, managed by the Joint Program Office, has become the most expensive military procurement effort in U.S. history. That investment did not buy the fastest or most agile airframe. Instead, it delivered a flying sensor and data-fusion platform designed to operate deep inside contested airspace.
Judging the F-35 by dogfighting metrics alone is inherently misleading because it assumes a tactical scenario that modern air forces work hard to avoid. In a close-in engagement where speed, thrust, and sustained turn rate dominate, the F-35 would indeed be at a disadvantage against many opponents.
Real-world air combat, however, is increasingly decided long before aircraft reach visual range.
Even legacy platforms, including Iran’s aging F-14 Tomcats, may retain impressive raw performance. But performance alone does not determine outcomes when one side can see first, shoot first, and disengage before the other side is even aware of the threat.
This reality was illustrated in a widely discussed training encounter last year when a German Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoon faced an American F-35A. In a visual-range engagement, the highly maneuverable Typhoon dispatched the F-35 without much difficulty. The result was unsurprising—and largely irrelevant.
Under operational conditions, the F-35 would likely have detected and engaged the Typhoon from beyond visual range, firing missiles without ever being seen. Closing to the merge is essentially a worst-case scenario for the Lightning II, not the situation it is optimized to handle.
Another frequent misunderstanding is the idea that the F-35 was meant to supersede the F-22 Raptor. It was not.
The F-22 remains the apex air-dominance fighter in U.S. service, designed specifically to hunt and destroy enemy aircraft in highly contested environments. Its combination of speed, supercruise, stealth, and maneuverability has no direct peer.
The F-35, by contrast, was envisioned primarily as a replacement for the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. The F-16 itself was never the most capable aircraft of its generation. It complemented heavier fighters like the F-15 and F-14, trading raw performance for affordability, numbers, and flexibility.
In that sense, the F-35 follows the same lineage. Just as the F-16 was overshadowed by the F-15 in speed and range, the F-35 is overshadowed by the F-22 and advanced F-15 variants in kinematic performance. The strategic doctrine surrounding the Lightning II does not demand superiority in those areas.
The most important attribute of the F-35 is not its engine or airframe, but its electronics. The aircraft represents a doctrinal shift often described as moving from a “dogfighter” mentality to a “digital quarterback” mentality.
During the Cold War, fighter pilots focused on energy management, positioning, and visual identification. Victory depended on altitude, speed, and the ability to out-turn an opponent. Even as beyond-visual-range missiles emerged, centralized control remained the norm, with large airborne early warning aircraft directing fighters from afar.
The F-35 turns that model on its head. It is designed to function as a distributed sensor node, gathering, processing, and sharing vast quantities of data in real time. Instead of simply firing its own weapons, the F-35 identifies targets, prioritizes threats, and cues other platforms to take the shot.
Four F-35s operating together form a networked “daisy chain.” If one aircraft detects a target, every aircraft in the formation instantly shares the same track, from the same fused sensor picture. An F-35 can slip close to an enemy radar site or aircraft, remain electronically silent, and pass targeting data to an F-15EX, a Navy destroyer, or a ground-based missile battery hundreds of miles away.
Those platforms launch the weapons. The F-35 remains unseen.
Traditional air warfare doctrine relies heavily on airborne warning and control aircraft such as the E-3 Sentry, built on a Boeing 707 airframe. These aircraft provide powerful radar coverage but at a cost. Their emissions are unmistakable, making them highly visible targets.
In a conflict with a near-peer adversary, AWACS aircraft would be prime targets for long-range missiles carried by Chinese and Russian fighters, some designed specifically to hunt high-value airborne assets from well over 200 miles away.
The F-35 does not replace AWACS in a one-for-one sense, but it distributes the sensing function across the force. Instead of one massive radar orbiting far from the fight, multiple stealthy sensors operate closer to the threat. Four small eyes ten miles from the target can be more survivable—and more informative—than one giant eye a hundred miles away.
A key enabler of this concept is the F-35’s AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare suite. Unlike traditional radars, the system can detect and geolocate enemy radar and radio emissions passively. The aircraft does not need to “ping” a target to find it, allowing it to build an accurate picture of the battlespace without revealing its own position.
The jet’s Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) acts as a secure, high-speed network connecting F-35s to one another. Sensor fusion combines inputs from radar, infrared search and track, electronic support measures, and off-board sources into a single coherent display for the pilot.
Six distributed infrared cameras provide full 360-degree coverage, allowing pilots to effectively see through the aircraft’s structure. The system automatically tracks aircraft, missile launches, and ground threats, reducing workload while increasing situational awareness.
At the same time, the F-35 can jam and degrade enemy sensors, creating corridors of relative safety for less stealthy fourth-generation aircraft to follow.
In this environment, raw speed becomes a secondary consideration. A faster aircraft that is detected first is at a disadvantage. An aircraft that can see without being seen controls the engagement, regardless of whether it can outrun its opponent.
If the F-35 encounters a threat it cannot safely engage, doctrine dictates that the problem is handed off to another asset. An F-22 may be tasked to destroy hostile fighters. A ship or ground unit may fire long-range missiles. The Lightning II’s job is to find, track, and enable—not necessarily to chase.
The F-35’s relatively modest top speed is not an accident or a failure. It is a reflection of a deliberate shift in how air power is conceived and applied. The Lightning II is slower than many fighters because it is carrying something far more valuable than excess thrust: information.
In future conflicts, dominance is less likely to be determined by who flies fastest and more by who understands the battlespace first and best. By that measure, the F-35 is not lagging behind the world’s fighters. It is redefining the race altogether.
