- Low-cost, 4.5-generation capability and the fight for export share
In a global fighter-jet market that is increasingly bifurcating between ultra-expensive stealth platforms and lower-cost multirole warplanes, the light and “medium-weight” 4.5-generation segment is seeing renewed interest. In that battleground, India’s home-grown Tejas Mk2 is being positioned as a challenger to the established export champion, Sweden’s Gripen E. One side has decades of export wins and NATO interoperability; the other is indigenous, cost-competitive and backed by a national drive for self-reliance. Whether India can convert ambition into export orders will depend on a mix of technology, cost, diplomatic reach and timing.
The global geopolitical environment — with rising regional tensions, budget constraints among many air forces, and a drive for local production or technology transfer — is creating demand for capable yet affordable fighters. Many nations find the Big-Ticket stealth options out of reach, and turn instead to “good enough” 4.5-gen platforms with flexibility, lower operating cost and upgrade potential.
Into that space the Tejas Mk2 intends to make a splash. India’s defence-industrial policy of Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) adds the strategic dimension: success would not only bolster the domestic aerospace sector, but also position India as a fighter-export power. Meanwhile Saab’s Gripen E has already carved a niche: its export deals, proven operational history and cost-effective model give it a solid head start.
Gripen E: The incumbent in the light combat segment
The Gripen E is the latest single‐engine, delta-wing, canard‐equipped multirole fighter developed by Saab AB of Sweden:
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Maximum take-off weight (MTOW) ~16,500 kg.
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Hardpoints: 10 external stations.
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Broad weapons compatibility including advanced NATO air-to-air & ground attack munitions (e.g., MBDA Meteor missile) and with an open-architecture design for future growth.
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Costs: Unit cost estimated broadly in the range of US$70-120 million (depending on configuration) in recent export discussions.
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Operational cost per flight hour for the variant claimed to be relatively low (in the region of US$4,000-5,000 in some analyses) compared to peers.
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Strong export traction: for example, Colombia is set to sign a contract for up to 18 Gripen E/F jets in October 2025 (≈ US$1.9 billion) to modernize its air force.
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Rapid sortie/turnaround capability: Saab claims the design allows for very short mission-turnaround times (10-20 minutes) thanks to its maintainability and support ecosystem.
In sum: Gripen E offers a tested export model, strong logistics and support track record, and credible cost-performance trade-off. For many air forces who must balance budget and capability, it has become the “smart buy”.
Tejas Mk2: India’s challenger enters the fray
Meanwhile, India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) together with the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) are pushing the Tejas Mk2 (also called Medium Weight Fighter or MWF) into the 4.5-gen export segment. Salient features:
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The Tejas Mk2 is built upon the original Tejas LCA series but ups the ante: larger airframe, close-coupled canards, more powerful engine (GE F414-INS6) and advanced indigenous avionics.
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Prototype rollout is scheduled for late 2025 (Nov-Dec) with first flight targeted in Q1 2026.
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Payload: Sources suggest a maximum weapons payload around 6,500 kg (≈ 6.5 tonnes) across multiple hardpoints.
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Indigenous content: Initially projected around 82 %, with longer-term goal exceeding 90 % once licensed production of engine and major systems achieve depth.
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Digital manufacturing: HAL is adopting 3D modelling, laser scanning and advanced manufacturing processes for the Mk2, signalling an upgrade in production maturity.
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Support for indigenous weapons: Integration of Indian munitions (e.g., the Astra air-to-air missile and future BrahMos-NG) is being factored in.
In short, the Tejas Mk2 aims to present a compelling package: good performance, high indigenous content (important for export buyers that want local technology value), and lower unit/operating cost relative to many Western fighters.
Side-by-side comparison: Mk2 vs Gripen E
| Parameter | Tejas Mk2 (claimed/target) | Gripen E (published) |
|---|---|---|
| MTOW / size | ~17.5 t (≈17,500 kg) (widely cited though not fully official) | ~16,500 kg |
| Payload capacity | ~6.5 t (≈6,500 kg) across ~11–13 hardpoints (some reports) | ~5,300-7,200 kg depending on configuration; hardpoints: 10 |
| Hardpoints | ~13 (in some sources) — higher number of stations allows flexibility. | 10 hardpoints. |
| Engine | GE F414-INS6 (India) ~98 kN thrust target. | GE F414G ~98 kN thrust. |
| Avionics & Sensors | Indigenous Uttam AESA radar (GaN-based), indigenous EW suite, local cockpit & architecture. | Raven ES-05 AESA, advanced IRST, open-architecture, combat-proven. |
| Price (unit cost target/estimate) | Estimates in press suggest ~US$70-75 million for Mk2 (Indian industry claims) — though not formally confirmed. | Estimates ~US$80-100 million (depending on configuration) for Gripen E. |
| Operating cost per flight hour | Indian claims suggest lower cost; public figure of ~$3,500/hour is cited in some Indian-media reports (though not independently verified). | Published analysis suggests ~$4,000-5,000/hour (some sources) for Gripen E. |
Observations:
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On paper, the Tejas Mk2 can claim a payload advantage and slightly higher take-off weight, which gives more flexibility.
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The price differential is potentially in India’s favour: a lower unit cost and lower operating cost may attract budget-constrained buyers.
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On the other hand, the Gripen E brings maturity, export track record, logistics-support infrastructure and a well-understood performance envelope. These are non-trivial qualification points for many air forces.
What gives Tejas Mk2 its competitive edge?
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Cost-effectiveness: If India can deliver the aircraft at ~US$70-75 million and keep operating costs low (≈US$3,500/hour claimed), that is a very attractive envelope for many countries.
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Payload and flexibility: With higher take-off weight and more hardpoints, Tejas Mk2 can carry a broader mix of weapons — including heavy standoff missiles (future BrahMos-NG) and indigenous air-to-air missiles (Astra) — tailor-made for emerging air forces.
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Indigenous content and offset appeal: For export customers who want local industrial participation, India’s “Make in India” ecosystem and the ability of HAL to involve private firms (Tata, Adani etc) could be a strong selling point.
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Geopolitical alternative: Nations wary of Chinese or Russian aircraft might see the Tejas as a viable “third way” — an indigenous Indian alternative with Western-engine compatibility, creating better political comfort.
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Modern manufacturing: HAL’s adoption of digital manufacturing, 3D design and increased local supply chain maturity (for Mk2) suggests it may avoid some of the earlier teething issues of the Mk1 programme.
What challenges lie ahead for India?
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Development/validation gap: Tejas Mk2 is still in prototype phase, with first flight slated 2026. Until that is completed, ballistic testing, weapons integration, certification and initial operational clearance (IOC) will take time. For export customers looking for immediate delivery, that is a weakness.
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Perception of “vaporware”: Many potential buyers are cautious about selecting a platform that has not yet entered service or has limited operational experience. Exports often favour proven types.
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Export controls & engine bottleneck: While the Mk2 is powered by a U.S. GE F414 engine, this introduces U.S. export-licence risks. For full export freedom, India will need to progress its indigenous GTRE Kaveri 2.0 engine programme to avoid dependency.
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Support & logistics footprint: One of the Gripen’s strong selling points is its global support network, quick turnaround and high sortie rate. India must build comparable service capability for export customers — MRO hubs, supply-chain guarantees, spares support — or risk being seen as weak on sustainment.
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Domestic production scale & timely execution: India must ramp production and deliver on schedules. If delays replicate the earlier LCA programme’s issues, buyer confidence may erode.
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Export market competition: It’s not just the Gripen E – there are other 4.5-gen contenders (upgraded F-16s, MiG-35, perhaps future KF-21 etc). India must differentiate convincingly.
Which buyers might gravitate towards the Tejas Mk2 and how can India position the offer?
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Emerging air forces in Asia, Africa, Latin America – Countries with modest budgets, needing multirole capability, interested in local manufacturing/offsets, and wary of twin-engine high-cost platforms.
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Countries seeking alternative to Chinese/Russian hardware – On account of politics, interoperability or maintenance concerns, India can pitch Tejas as a “Western-engineered” but Indian-owned option.
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Buyers needing cost-effective fleet expansion – Lower acquisition cost + lower operating cost = attractive economics.
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Nations wishing for maximised local value-add – India can offer local production, technology transfer and supply chain participation, which may be a distinct advantage over some OEMs who offer less offset.
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Smaller air forces with limited infrastructure – If India ensures that support, spares and training come bundled effectively, Tejas might appeal.
For the Tejas Mk2 to translate promise into export orders, India needs a clear, export-focused strategy. Key elements:
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Secure the engine-licence issue: Ensuring that the GE F414 supply and licensed production in India is robust and that future buyers can export and operate without undue U.S. licence risk. Simultaneously, accelerate indigenous engine (Kaveri 2.0) to reduce reliance.
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Scale production domestically: The recent Indian government deal for additional Tejas Mk1A jets (97 more) helps build production lines and supplier base, which can then flow into Mk2. Scaling line capacity sends a strong signal of manufacturability.
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Offer local manufacturing/offsets: Partner with private Indian firms (Tata, Adani, L&T) to offer export customers co-production or local assembly, which mimics what Saab offered with Brazil’s Embraer partnership.
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Aggressive marketing and diplomatic outreach: Indian government must support HAL in export campaigns through lines of credit, financing arrangements, diplomatic guarantees and trade diplomacy.
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Build full lifecycle support offering: Clearly articulate MRO hubs, spares-logistics, training, mission-planning support and upgrades. The “turnaround every 10-20 minutes” maintenance claim of the Gripen is a benchmark to beat.
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Timing and demonstration: Completion of prototype, flight testing, weapons integration and initial production must proceed without major delays. The first few export winners will hinge on delivered performance more than brochure numbers.
If India hits its targets (unit cost ~US$70-75 million; operating cost ~US$3,500/hour; payload ~6.5 t; MTOW ~17.5 t; local content >80 %), the Tejas Mk2 could undercut the Gripen by perhaps 10-20 % in acquisition cost while offering slightly higher payload. That differential, multiplied across a fleet of 20-40 aircraft, becomes significant for budget-constrained air forces.
On the flip side, if development delays slip, costs creep upwards, or support/maintenance ecosystem is weak, then the “discount” advantage may vanish — and buyers could prefer the safer, proven Gripen E. History tells us that for defence exports, reliability, support and logistics often matter more than headline performance. India must avoid the trap of offering promise without proven performance.
India’s geopolitical positioning allows the Tejas Mk2 to be marketed not just as a plane, but as a symbol of defense independence. For customers wary of Chinese or Russian suppliers — either because of interoperability concerns or political ties — an Indian-built fighter powered by a Western engine (GE F414) can be positioned as a strategic hedge.
Moreover, the boost to India’s aerospace-defence industry will further the Make in India narrative. If export orders roll in, it becomes a significant symbol of India transitioning from importer to exporter in a high-technology domain.
If everything goes well, the Tejas Mk2 could secure a meaningful share of the global light-combat aircraft market by the mid-2030s. It will likely not dethrone the heavyweights (F-35, Rafale, Eurofighter) but it could capture dozens of export orders — especially in the 20-40 aircraft class deals.
For India, this represents a multi-billion-dollar opportunity: domestic production costs, export revenue, supply-chain multiplier effects and technology spill-overs. For HAL and India’s aerospace ecosystem, a successful export campaign could create full-scale fighter-manufacturing supply chains for decades.
Nevertheless, the clock is ticking. Gripen E already has export momentum and brand strength. India must keep to schedule, keep costs in check, deliver credible performance and build export credibility quickly. The first export win will matter more than any paper specification.
The contest between Tejas Mk2 and Gripen E is more than just a fighter-plane duel. It represents a shift in how mid-tier air forces procure capability: balancing cost, flexibility, industrial participation and strategic independence.
India’s Tejas Mk2 comes with some strong fares on its side — cost, payload, indigenous value, export appeal. But the war for market share will be decided in the domain of performance, delivery, support and buyer confidence. If India pulls it off, it will mark one of the most significant breakthroughs in its defence-industrial history.
