For decades, Russia has rivalled Western countries for the title of the world’s top arms exporter. From fighter jets and tanks to submarines and missile systems, Russian weapons have historically appealed to countries seeking advanced military capabilities without the political strings and high price tags often associated with Western defence sales.
Three key advantages have traditionally defined Russian arms exports: relatively advanced technology, fewer end-user restrictions, and lower upfront costs. These factors allowed Moscow — and earlier the Soviet Union — to secure a dominant position in arms markets across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
Yet, while Russian weapons often appear cheaper at the point of purchase, growing evidence suggests that long-term costs, reliability issues, and maintenance burdens can significantly erode their perceived value. India’s decades-long defence relationship with Moscow — culminating in the troubled acquisition of the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya — offers a cautionary tale.
The affordability of Russian arms compared to Western alternatives has long been one of Moscow’s strongest selling points. For example, the American fifth-generation stealth fighter F-35 carries a flyaway cost of roughly $80–90 million per aircraft, while its lifetime maintenance and operating expenses have made it the most expensive fighter jet ever produced.
By contrast, the base price of Russia’s fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter has been estimated at around $40–50 million — nearly half the cost. Similarly, Western fighters such as the French Rafale and the American F-16 are generally more expensive than Russian platforms like the Su-34 or Su-35, while the US M1A2 Abrams main battle tank costs considerably more than Russia’s T-90 MBT.
Analysts attribute this pricing gap to a mix of design philosophy, production methods, and state backing. Russian defence manufacturers often benefit from government subsidies and prioritise ruggedness and mass production over high-end customization.
Western analysts have also pointed out that Russia frequently modernises and upgrades Soviet-era platforms rather than pursuing “clean-sheet” designs that require massive research and development investments. Avoiding high R&D costs allows Russian arms makers to offer systems at lower initial prices.
Volume production plays an equally important role. Russian defence industry planners have historically emphasised scale, spreading costs over large production runs. In fact, some NATO officials have publicly urged the United States to adopt similar scaling strategies to reduce the prices of American arms exports and remain competitive in global markets.
India’s reliance on Russian arms dates back to the Cold War, when ideological differences and political mistrust limited New Delhi’s access to Western weapons. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as India’s primary arms supplier, delivering MiG-21 fighter jets and laying the foundation for a defence partnership that deepened over decades.
Even after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia remained India’s largest arms supplier. Some of the most advanced systems in India’s inventory are Russian in origin, including the Su-30MKI multirole fighter, the S-400 air defence system, and T-90 tanks.
However, cracks have begun to appear in this relationship. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2025, Russia’s share of Indian arms imports declined from 55% during 2015–2019 to 36% in 2020–2024. The report noted that India is increasingly shifting its arms procurement towards Western suppliers, particularly France, Israel, and the United States.
Cost, it turns out, is not just about the sticker price. Indian Air Force veteran and military commentator Air Marshal (Retd.) Anil Chopra has highlighted that Russian platforms often incur higher lifecycle costs than initially anticipated.
“It is well known and well-analysed that while the initial cost of Russian platforms is nearly two-thirds of that of Western platforms, the life-cycle costs of many Russian platforms overtake those of Western platforms at a later stage,” Chopra explained.
He pointed to a comparative analysis conducted by the Indian Air Force between the Mirage-2000 and the MiG-29, both inducted around the same time. According to Chopra, Russian platforms often require more frequent component replacements, longer repair cycles, larger spare inventories, and fewer flight hours between overhauls. Historically, Russian fleets have also recorded lower serviceability rates in Indian service compared to their Western counterparts.
These concerns were magnified dramatically in one of India’s most ambitious naval acquisitions.
In the early 2000s, India faced a pressing strategic dilemma. Its sole aircraft carrier at the time, INS Viraat, was rapidly ageing, and New Delhi was acutely aware that aircraft carriers are critical tools of maritime power projection.
India explored global options, but the United States, France, and Italy — the only countries producing aircraft carriers at the time — offered ships that were far beyond India’s budget. Russia, by contrast, appeared to present a bargain.
The vessel in question was the former Soviet carrier Baku, later renamed Admiral Gorshkov. Commissioned in 1987, the ship was a hybrid design — part heavy missile cruiser, part aircraft carrier — armed with SS-N-12 anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and deck guns.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia inherited the carrier, but a boiler-room explosion in 1994 left it sidelined. By 1996, it was mothballed. In the mid-1990s, Moscow offered the damaged ship to India as a “gift.”
The catch was substantial. India would have to pay for a comprehensive refit, modernization, and the purchase of compatible aircraft such as the MiG-29K. For Russia, the deal promised revenue through upgrades and aircraft sales; for India, it appeared to be the only viable route to sustaining a carrier capability.
In January 2004, after years of negotiations, India signed a formal agreement. While the hull itself was transferred at no cost, the refit at Russia’s Sevmash shipyard was priced at $974 million.
India soon discovered it had underestimated the scale of the task. The 44,500-ton ship had been sitting idle for years and required extensive work to transform it into a full-fledged STOBAR aircraft carrier.
The conversion involved lengthening the flight deck to over 900 feet, installing a ski-jump ramp, new deck elevators, arrestor wires, radars, propulsion boilers, and completely rewiring the vessel. All 2,700 compartments across 22 decks were to be renovated.
Sevmash, however, was primarily a submarine-building yard with limited experience in aircraft carrier refits. By 2007, delays became unavoidable. Worse, Russia informed India that the project would cost more than twice the original estimate — nearly $2.9 billion.
By 2008, Sevmash claimed the carrier was only 49% complete and demanded an additional $2 billion, arguing that a new carrier would cost $3–4 billion at “market price.” With nearly $1 billion already sunk into the project, India had little leverage.
Diplomatic tensions flared. India accused Russia of deliberately underestimating costs to secure the contract and then exploiting New Delhi’s dependence. In 2009, Russia sought another $700 million, while sea trial costs alone ballooned from $27 million to $550 million.
By 2010, India agreed to a revised refit cost of $2.35 billion, excluding aircraft. Estimates of the final bill, including fighters and associated systems, range between $2.9 and $3 billion.
The carrier was eventually delivered in November 2013 — five years late — and commissioned as INS Vikramaditya in 2014.
What began as a “free” acquisition ultimately became one of India’s most expensive naval projects, underscoring a hard lesson: Russian arms may appear inexpensive upfront, but hidden costs, maintenance challenges, and monopoly pricing can dramatically alter the equation.
The experience prompted a strategic rethink in New Delhi. India accelerated diversification of its arms suppliers and invested heavily in indigenous defence production, most notably with the domestically built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.
As Russia faces mounting sanctions, production constraints, and battlefield losses in Ukraine, its reputation as a reliable and economical arms supplier is increasingly under scrutiny. For buyers like India, the Vikramaditya episode remains a reminder that in defence procurement, cheap can sometimes prove very expensive indeed.
