In an unprecedented revelation that has shaken India’s defence establishment and strategic community, Captain Shiv Kumar, the Indian Navy’s Defence Attaché to Indonesia, has openly acknowledged that the Indian Air Force (IAF) lost multiple fighter aircraft in a high-risk operation against Pakistan on the night of May 7, 2025. The candid admission, delivered during a closed-door seminar in Jakarta on June 10, confirmed what many analysts had long suspected but the Indian government had declined to publicly acknowledge.
Speaking at a regional defence seminar titled “Analysis of the Pakistan–India Air Battle and Indonesia’s Anticipatory Strategies from the Perspective of Air Power” hosted by Universitas Dirgantara Marsekal Suryadarma, Captain Kumar said, “I may not agree that we lost so many aircraft, but I do agree we did lose some aircraft.” His carefully worded concession, while stopping short of validating Pakistan’s full claims, lent legitimacy to widespread reports of Indian air losses.
More startling was the material presented alongside Kumar’s 35-minute address. Presentation slides displayed during the seminar reportedly confirmed the loss of three Rafale fighters, one Su-30MKI, and one MiG-29—a devastating blow for any modern air force, let alone one which touts technological superiority over its rivals.
The losses occurred during an Indian retaliatory strike targeting terror-linked infrastructure inside Pakistan. The mission, executed under intense political oversight and strategic calculation, was in response to rising intelligence inputs on cross-border militant networks and their potential threat to Indian national security.
According to Captain Kumar, the losses were not due to platform failure or pilot error. Instead, they stemmed from operational constraints imposed by India’s civilian leadership. “The Indian Air Force lost fighter jets to Pakistan on the night of May 7, 2025 only because of the constraint given by the political leadership to not attack the military establishment or their air defenses,” he explained.
This admission has triggered an intense debate in Indian policy circles about the cost of strategic restraint. With a history of carefully calibrated military responses to provocations from Pakistan, New Delhi had once again opted for a limited action doctrine, instructing the IAF to avoid hitting Pakistani military assets in order to prevent escalation, especially given the nuclear backdrop of the India-Pakistan rivalry.
However, this directive may have inadvertently left Indian fighters exposed. As they penetrated Pakistani airspace and released precision-guided munitions on suspected militant camps, they became vulnerable targets for Pakistan’s radar-guided interceptors and surface-to-air missile batteries—elements that were left untouched due to India’s restrictive rules of engagement.
Pakistani military sources suggest that their Air Force (PAF), already on high alert, swiftly transitioned from a defensive to offensive posture. Once Indian jets were detected violating airspace and launching munitions, the PAF’s Deputy Chief reportedly issued a full “destroy” command—a shift from mere deterrence to active engagement.
By the time the Indian strike packages began exfiltration, Pakistani JF-17s and F-16s had already scrambled, supported by a web of air defence systems and early warning radars. Although Islamabad has claimed to have downed six Indian jets, including Rafales, Indian officials have publicly denied this figure, citing national morale and ongoing intelligence reviews.
Nevertheless, Captain Kumar’s verified account from Indonesian soil has confirmed that losses did occur—bringing into sharp relief the tension between political caution and military efficacy.
Military analysts quickly pointed out the glaring strategic oversight: no Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) mission preceded the Indian strike. In modern aerial warfare, SEAD is fundamental to any deep-penetration air campaign. It ensures a safe corridor by disabling or destroying enemy radar, surface-to-air missile sites, and command centers.
By choosing not to neutralize Pakistan’s Integrated Air Defence Network (IADN), India effectively ceded the upper hand. Pakistani fighters and ground defences were able to coordinate and strike back with devastating precision. “Sending Rafales into contested airspace without clearing the area of threats is like playing chess without your queen,” remarked Air Commodore (Retd.) Vivek Choudhury, a former IAF strategist.
Recognizing the cost of their cautious approach, Indian defence planners moved quickly. Within 72 hours, the IAF was authorized to revise its rules of engagement. According to Captain Kumar, the new operational doctrine allowed for direct targeting of Pakistani military installations.
“So we first achieved suppression of enemy air defences, and then that’s why all our attacks could easily go through using BrahMos missiles,” he said. The emphasis on BrahMos—India’s supersonic cruise missile developed jointly with Russia—marked a transition to standoff precision warfare. Deployed from air, land, or sea platforms, BrahMos missiles allowed Indian forces toengage targets deep inside Pakistani territory without venturing into contested airspace.
Flying at nearly Mach 3 and capable of ranges exceeding 400km, BrahMos has emerged as a lynchpin in India’s long-range strike strategy. On May 10, just days after the initial losses, BrahMos missiles were used extensively against Pakistani airbases and logistics hubs in the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions.
However, this new approach came at a heavy cost. Each BrahMos missile is estimated to cost USD 3 million (approximately ₹25 crore). As many as 12 were believed to have been fired in two waves, making it one of India’s most expensive single-day aerial engagements in recent history.
Yet for Indian strategists, this expensive lesson underscored a broader point: Air superiority cannot be achieved under peacetime constraints. In conflicts involving high-speed jets, radar lock-ons, and layered defence systems, hesitation is fatal.
India’s May 7 engagement with Pakistan comes at a geopolitically sensitive moment. China has intensified its military-technological support to Pakistan, most notably through the JF-17 Thunder program and ongoing discussions to supply J-31/J-35 stealth fighters.
Indian analysts warn that any tactical or operational insights gained by the PAF from May’s confrontation could find their way into Chinese war games along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas. The fear is not unfounded. China has increasingly adopted joint doctrine principles, and Pakistan serves as a valuable proving ground for new concepts.
India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), meanwhile, has accelerated efforts to deploy next-generation air combat systems, including the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stealth fighter and expanded Tejas Mk1A squadrons. But experts caution that no amount of technological overmatch can substitute for clear political-military alignment in crisis scenarios.
The seminar in Jakarta wasn’t just a footnote to an Indo-Pak conflict; it was a strategic mirror for the entire Indo-Pacific. For the Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Udara (TNI-AU) and other Southeast Asian air forces, the episode offers a sobering case study in modern airpower employment.
Indonesia, like many ASEAN states, must navigate the complex matrix of internal political oversight, budgetary limitations, and external threats—particularly in the context of an increasingly assertive China in the South China Sea. Captain Kumar’s presentation triggered a flurry of questions from Indonesian air planners on how to conduct deterrence operations without inadvertently inviting escalation.
Regional analysts from Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines—some of whom attended remotely—reportedly echoed the need for air doctrine that balances deterrence with political flexibility.
Back in India, the fallout has been intense. Media outlets, while constrained by official secrecy, have begun asking pointed questions. Opposition parties have demanded accountability, accusing the government of “needless opacity” and endangering national security through indecisive leadership.
Former Air Vice Marshal Kapil Verma wrote in a widely shared op-ed, “We cannot continue to fight modern wars with Cold War-era doctrines. The time for ambiguity is over. Our military must be allowed to act, not asked to calculate political optics mid-flight.”
The episode has also sparked renewed discussion on establishing a National Security Council Command Authority (NSCCA) with clearly defined wartime roles for civilian and military leadership, akin to the U.S. model.
Ultimately, the May 7 air engagement will be remembered not just for its tactical outcomes, but for its strategic implications. It exposed the fragility of air dominance when constrained by political caution. It laid bare the risks of engaging in punitive strikes without first achieving SEAD. And it highlighted how even elite platforms like Rafales are vulnerable in the absence of doctrinal clarity and unrestricted execution.
Captain Shiv Kumar’s honesty—delivered thousands of kilometres away in Indonesia—may mark a quiet turning point in how India handles the intersection of politics and airpower. In an age of fifth-generation warfare and integrated kill chains, decisiveness is the new deterrent.
