India and China have agreed to disengage from their prolonged border standoff in the western sector of the India-China Himalayan border. This breakthrough occurred on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS summit, marking a potential turning point in the strained relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. The tensions, which have been simmering since a deadly clash in June 2020, have tested the limits of both nations’ military and diplomatic patience.
This clash in the Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020, was the deadliest encounter between the two sides in decades, leading to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops. Since then, both nations have maintained a high level of military deployment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border, leading to fears of a wider conflict in the volatile region.
India and China’s border tensions are rooted in their unresolved territorial disputes, primarily in the western and eastern sectors of the Himalayan border. The western sector, particularly the region around the Galwan Valley, has been a flashpoint for decades. However, the recent tensions escalated significantly in the summer of 2020 when the two countries’ troops engaged in a brutal hand-to-hand fight at high altitudes.
While such skirmishes had occurred before, this incident was particularly alarming as it was the first time in decades that fatalities were reported. The Galwan clash intensified the already delicate relations, leading both nations to strengthen their military presence in the region.
Behind this military standoff, however, lies a broader geopolitical struggle, driven by India’s increasing closeness to the United States and China’s determination to maintain its regional dominance.
China’s primary grievance with India began to solidify after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. Modi’s government sought to strengthen its ties with the United States, marking a noticeable shift in India’s foreign policy. This pivot became particularly clear as India signed several defense agreements with Washington, effectively cementing its status as a U.S. partner in South Asia.
Beijing viewed these agreements as part of Washington’s broader “China containment policy,” an idea that was central to former President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy during his second term. In response, China sought to pressure India into refraining from aligning too closely with the U.S. By 2016, the geopolitical chessboard was becoming increasingly tense.
In August 2016, India signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S., allowing for greater military cooperation between the two countries, particularly in logistical support for each other’s armed forces. This move alarmed China, leading it to escalate tensions at the Doklam tri-junction, where the borders of Bhutan, China, and India converge. The standoff at Doklam in 2017 was a significant episode in Sino-Indian relations, serving as a precursor to the eventual confrontation in Galwan.
Despite the growing tensions, both nations engaged in high-level diplomacy to manage their differences. India’s then-foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, made several trips to Beijing, reassuring his Chinese counterparts of India’s commitment to resolving disputes peacefully.
These diplomatic efforts culminated in the first informal summit between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan in April 2018. The summit was seen as a successful attempt to reset relations, with both leaders agreeing on a range of measures to prevent border flare-ups. However, the fragile truce would not last long.
India’s deepening ties with the U.S. continued to irk China. In September 2018, India signed another critical defense agreement with the U.S., the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). This agreement further consolidated the military partnership between the two democracies, raising concerns in Beijing.
Despite a second informal summit between Modi and Xi in Mahabalipuram in October 2019, relations deteriorated rapidly. While the leaders discussed various issues, the meeting failed to produce any concrete solutions to the growing divide between the two nations. China’s President Xi Jinping, likely frustrated by India’s continued tilt towards the U.S., issued a veiled threat during a visit to Nepal shortly after the summit, warning against attempts to “split China.”
The simmering tensions exploded into violence in the summer of 2020. On June 15, a deadly confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley shocked the world. The battle, fought without firearms due to long-standing border protocols, involved brutal hand-to-hand combat using makeshift weapons such as clubs and stones. The result was the death of 20 Indian soldiers, while China did not disclose the number of casualties on its side.
This incident sparked a wave of nationalist fervor in both countries, particularly in India, where the media, often aligned with the Modi government, launched an aggressive anti-China campaign. However, despite the public outrage and military posturing, both countries recognized the need to avoid further escalation.
In the months following the Galwan clash, both sides held several rounds of military and diplomatic talks, seeking to de-escalate the situation. While some disengagement occurred, the standoff persisted, and the high-altitude border region remained heavily militarized.
Amid the border tensions, India continued to strengthen its relationship with the United States. In October 2020, India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), the fourth foundational defense agreement between the two nations. This agreement, along with the earlier General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), signed in 2002, effectively formalized India’s military partnership with the U.S.
Modi’s government, confident in its close relationship with then-U.S. President Donald Trump, anticipated significant economic and technological benefits from this alliance. However, the expected influx of American investment never materialized. In fact, major U.S. companies such as Ford, General Motors, and Harley-Davidson exited the Indian market, citing an unfavorable business environment.
India’s hopes of becoming a manufacturing hub for American companies, such as assembling Apple’s iPhones, also faced setbacks. Reports of high rejection rates and contamination concerns derailed what could have been a successful venture. As a result, the economic benefits that India hoped to gain from its alignment with the U.S. remained elusive.
Meanwhile, trade with China continued to grow despite the political and military tensions. This economic interdependence highlighted the reality that while India needed China for its economic growth, China did not have the same level of dependence on India.
Over time, it became clear to Modi’s government that the economic benefits of aligning with the U.S. were not materializing as expected. Moreover, the geopolitical costs were becoming apparent. India, once a dominant player in South Asia, saw its influence wane as neighboring countries gravitated towards China. Additionally, the U.S. conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOPS) in the Indian Ocean in April 2021, which sparked strong backlash in India, despite the two nations’ partnership.
India’s strategic autonomy was increasingly being called into question as it struggled to balance its relationships with the U.S. and China. The U.S. also exerted pressure on India to distance itself from Russia, particularly in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict. Despite this, India continued to purchase Russian oil and maintain its defense ties with Moscow, underscoring its commitment to pursuing an independent foreign policy.
In recent months, as the U.S. and Canada have increased their pressure on India to distance itself from China, there has been a noticeable shift in India’s approach. Modi’s government, now more aware of the limitations of its U.S. partnership, appears to be recalibrating its foreign policy.
The disengagement agreement reached at the 16th BRICS summit is a testament to this shift. India’s recognition that its economic development depends, at least in part, on stable relations with China marks a significant departure from its earlier confrontational stance. By prioritizing economic cooperation over military confrontation, Modi’s government is signaling a new phase in its foreign policy.
