In South Asia’s security calculus, India has officially surpassed Pakistan in the number of operational nuclear warheads, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 2025 Yearbook. This marks the first time in recent years that India has edged ahead of its long-time rival, underscoring a quiet but consequential shift in the subcontinent’s nuclear balance.
As of January 2025, SIPRI estimates that India possesses approximately 180 nuclear warheads, up from 172 in the previous year. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal remains steady at around 170 warheads, suggesting a pause in its expansion or a strategic decision to consolidate existing capabilities. This reversal in nuclear parity between the two South Asian rivals places India slightly ahead, both numerically and in terms of qualitative technological advancements.
The yearbook attributes India’s gains not merely to an increase in warhead numbers but more significantly to its aggressive modernization of delivery systems, integration of “canisterised” launch platforms, and likely incorporation of MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle) technologies into its long-range missiles.
One of the most consequential shifts identified by SIPRI is India’s sustained investment in canisterised missile systems, a class of weapons designed for rapid deployment and increased survivability. These systems store nuclear warheads pre-mounted in sealed containers, dramatically reducing launch preparation time and allowing for quick retaliation in a crisis.
“India’s new ‘canisterized’ missiles, which can be transported with mated warheads, may be capable of carrying nuclear warheads during peacetime, and possibly even multiple warheads on each missile, once they become operational,” the SIPRI report stated.
The Agni Prime, or Agni-P, represents a new generation of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), designed to replace older Agni-I and Agni-II systems. Developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the missile boasts a range of 1,000–2,000 kilometers, covering key regional threats including Pakistan and southern Chinese regions.
Built using composite materials, and featuring enhanced propulsion systems and digital guidance, the Agni-P is lighter, faster, and more accurate than its predecessors. Most critically, its canister-based design allows for near-instantaneous launch, enhancing India’s nuclear force survivability and shifting its deterrent posture from reactive to proactive readiness.
While Agni-P strengthens regional deterrence, it is the Agni-5 that represents India’s strategic leap into long-range nuclear capability and advanced delivery technology. With a reported range of over 5,000 kilometers, the Agni-5 brings entire China, Europe, and even parts of northern Africa within India’s nuclear reach.
More importantly, the Agni-5 is suspected to be MIRV-capable—a characteristic previously reserved for the world’s most advanced nuclear states such as the U.S., Russia, and China. MIRV technology allows a single missile to deploy multiple warheads, each programmed to strike distinct targets. This not only maximizes destruction per missile but also overwhelms missile defense systems by complicating interception algorithms.
While Indian authorities remain silent on the operational status of MIRV-equipped Agni-5 variants, DRDO’s recent missile tests and SIPRI’s analysis suggest that the program is nearing full operational integration.
India maintains a stated doctrine of “credible minimum deterrence”, which focuses on ensuring second-strike capability and strategic autonomy, rather than engaging in a numerical arms race. However, the evolution of India’s delivery systems suggests a shift towards greater flexibility, readiness, and technological parity with more advanced nuclear powers.
According to SIPRI, this modernization does not indicate a departure from India’s doctrine but rather an adaptation to emerging threats, particularly in a region where both Pakistan and China are expanding and diversifying their nuclear arsenals.
Pakistan’s nuclear posture in recent years has emphasized tactical nuclear weapons and short-to-medium range missiles. The Nasr (Hatf-9), a battlefield nuclear missile system, and the Ababeel MIRV-capable missile represent Islamabad’s approach of maintaining parity and deterring both conventional and nuclear threats from India.
Despite India’s modest lead in warhead count, Pakistan continues to focus on asymmetrical strategies, relying on speed, geography, and rapid deployment to ensure survivability. However, SIPRI’s findings suggest Pakistan’s expansion may have plateaued, at least temporarily.
This stability in numbers, juxtaposed with India’s advancement in delivery systems, raises concerns about a potential doctrinal shift in Islamabad—possibly lowering the threshold for nuclear use in the event of an Indian conventional military operation.
While India’s advancement has garnered regional headlines, SIPRI’s report underscores that the most dramatic nuclear expansion is occurring in China. Beijing’s nuclear arsenal grew from 500 warheads in 2024 to an estimated 600 by January 2025, with forecasts indicating a sustained pace of 100 new warheads annually.
Even more concerning is China’s construction of 350 new ICBM silos, spread across desert regions in the north and mountain ranges in the east. These developments indicate a fundamental shift in China’s nuclear posture, from a minimal deterrent to a potential nuclear peer competitor of the U.S. and Russia.
“Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many ICBMs as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade,” the SIPRI report warned.
Still, SIPRI projects that even if China reaches 1,500 warheads by 2035, this would still constitute just one-third of the current arsenals held by the U.S. and Russia, who together possess about 90% of the world’s nuclear stockpile.
While India’s and China’s arsenals are growing, the world’s two nuclear superpowers—Russia and the United States—have kept their total warhead numbers relatively stable through 2024. However, both are actively engaged in modernization programs, including hypersonic missiles, low-yield tactical warheads, and nuclear-capable autonomous drones.
The SIPRI report warns that if the New START Treaty, the last remaining arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia, expires in February 2026 without replacement, it may trigger a new strategic arms race with global repercussions.
The regional nuclear triangle of India, Pakistan, and China is increasingly complicated by territorial disputes, conventional military tensions, and missile deployments along contested borders such as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the LoC in Kashmir.
India’s latest deployments provide both a deterrent signal and a diplomatic challenge. Its canisterised systems and MIRV potential will likely prompt recalibrations in Pakistan’s planning and increase anxiety in Beijing, especially as India’s missile ranges stretch deeper into Chinese territory.
From a strategic standpoint, India’s developments may enhance stability by reinforcing second-strike capabilities. However, they also raise the risks of miscalculation, especially in fast-moving military crises where early warning systems and escalation control are fragile or underdeveloped.
Dr. Arvind Thakur, a former adviser to India’s National Security Council, noted:
“India’s current trajectory reflects a long-standing desire to secure itself against a two-front threat, not to challenge global nuclear balances. The expansion is modest in warheads but ambitious in delivery systems, reflecting changing threat perceptions rather than doctrinal upheaval.”
Conversely, Sarah Khan, a nuclear scholar at Islamabad’s Strategic Studies Institute, warned:
“India’s acquisition of MIRV-capable systems, even in small numbers, will inevitably be viewed in Islamabad as a shift from minimal deterrence to warfighting capabilities—potentially lowering Pakistan’s own nuclear thresholds.”
SIPRI’s 2025 report illustrates a clear strategic rebalancing in South Asia. While the numerical edge India now holds over Pakistan is marginal, the qualitative advancements in mobility, survivability, and strike precision are more consequential. As India steps deeper into the ranks of technologically sophisticated nuclear powers, the region’s deterrence architecture becomes more complex and potentially unstable.
