India’s potential acquisition of Russia’s Su-57E fifth-generation stealth fighter, as New Delhi demands the integration of its own indigenous radar and mission systems—an ultimatum that has reportedly unsettled Moscow’s defence establishment and sparked intense behind-the-scenes negotiations. At the heart of the disagreement is a silent but sharp rebuke of Russia’s prized fighter jet technology and the growing assertion of India’s defence self-reliance doctrine.
India’s insistence on replacing the Russian-made N036 “Byelka” AESA radar system with the indigenously developed Uttam and Virupaksha GaN-based radars is being interpreted by Russian analysts not merely as a technical requirement, but as a subtle rejection of Russia’s aerospace primacy in the global arms market. According to multiple defence insiders, the demand is rooted in India’s confidence in its own radar technology and a broader strategy aimed at gaining full control over mission-critical systems—a lesson hard-learned from past procurement struggles.
At the centre of the technical standoff lies the divergence between Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) and Gallium Nitride (GaN) semiconductor technologies in Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar design. The N036 “Byelka” radar, currently fitted on the Su-57, is GaAs-based—a relatively mature technology offering adequate capabilities but facing inherent limitations in terms of power efficiency, heat management, and frequency agility.
Indian defence experts, however, argue that GaAs systems like Byelka are increasingly being eclipsed by the thermal resilience and raw power output of GaN-based radars. GaN’s higher breakdown voltage and energy density enable radar systems to operate at higher temperatures, deliver longer detection ranges, and resist electronic countermeasures—key attributes in contested airspace.
“The Byelka is a good radar for its generation,” noted a DRDO official familiar with India’s AESA programs. “But for fifth-generation combat, especially in the Indo-Pacific where contested electromagnetic warfare is guaranteed, we need better performance. GaN gives us that edge.”
India’s Uttam AESA radar, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and now deployed on the Tejas Mk1A, along with the new Virupaksha radar under testing on the upgraded Su-30MKI “Super-30” platform, both use GaN technology. These systems offer not just technical superiority, but also serve India’s larger objective: autonomy in warfighting capability.
India’s experience with the French Rafale program has significantly shaped its current stance. Despite paying nearly €7.8 billion for 36 aircraft, India continues to face software-related restrictions, with Dassault Aviation and Thales refusing to provide full access to source code for the RBE2 AESA radar and the Modular Mission Computer (MMC). This has obstructed integration of Indian-made weapons like the Astra Mk1 BVRAAM and Rudram anti-radiation missiles.
Senior Indian Air Force (IAF) officers have quietly voiced frustration over the Rafale’s closed architecture, which limits mission flexibility and delays the indigenisation roadmap. A former IAF chief described the situation bluntly: “We bought an excellent aircraft but locked ourselves out of making it truly ours.”
Against this backdrop, India’s demand for complete source code access and system-level integration rights in any future fighter acquisition—especially the Su-57E—is not negotiable. The experience with Rafale has become a cautionary tale.
To counterbalance India’s firm demands, Russia has responded with a surprisingly open hand. Moscow has reportedly offered complete source code access to allow Indian integration of its GaN-based radars and avionics into the Su-57E export variant. The move is a significant departure from standard Russian arms export policy and underlines the stakes involved.
In a press statement, Russian Ambassador to India, Denis Alipov, stated:
“This aircraft (Su-57E) is very competitive, and we are offering not only to sell it, but also to collaborate on production. We are ready to transfer technology and develop the necessary industrial facilities. Besides, we are open to configuration changes based on India’s requirements. This is a very attractive proposal.”
Russia’s state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, went further in March by offering to repurpose India’s existing Su-30MKI production lines—originally established for license-building over 222 aircraft—for Su-57E production. A TASS report quoted Rosoboronexport officials confirming that manufacturing could begin rapidly if India agrees to proceed.
This approach aligns well with India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) doctrine, which seeks not only to reduce dependency on foreign arms but to build sovereign defence ecosystems. Licensed local production would bolster India’s industrial base, reduce lifecycle costs, and support long-term sustainment.
The cornerstone of India’s integration plan is the Super-30 upgrade program, aimed at transforming its Su-30MKI fleet into near-fifth-generation fighters. Upgrades under this program include GaN-based radars, Indian EW suites, new mission computers, and advanced weapons integration—all of which India now wants to see reflected in the Su-57E variant offered for export.
According to sources in the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the long-term vision is to create seamless interoperability between Su-30MKI Super-30s, Tejas Mk1A/Mk2, and the Su-57E—thereby creating a unified air combat ecosystem with common sensors, mission systems, and munitions.
Weapons integration is a key focus area. India is pushing to equip the Su-57E with homegrown armaments like:
- Astra Mk1/Mk2 BVRAAMs
- Rudram-series anti-radiation missiles
- SAAW (Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon)
- BrahMos-NG, a miniature supersonic cruise missile under development
- New AI-assisted target recognition and electronic warfare tools
Russia’s acceptance of these modifications will determine whether the deal proceeds, especially as New Delhi seeks not just a fighter but a strategic enabler with full mission flexibility.
Complicating Russia’s offer is the unspoken but undeniable presence of the American F-35A. While Washington has not officially placed the F-35 on the table, there have been quiet signals through diplomatic and industrial channels that the option remains open—particularly in the context of growing US-India strategic ties under the QUAD and Indo-Pacific frameworks.
The F-35 offers unmatched battlefield network integration and proven stealth, but with significant strings attached. India would likely receive a limited configuration with restricted software access—precisely the kind of arrangement that New Delhi is now keen to avoid.
“It’s not just about which aircraft is more stealthy,” said a senior Indian MoD official. “It’s about who gives us control—control over code, weapons, data, and upgrades. That’s the dealbreaker.”
For Russia, India’s potential Su-57E deal is more than a commercial transaction. It’s about preserving its influence in the global arms market and maintaining a strategic foothold in South Asia—especially as China, India’s chief adversary, continues to expand its fleet of indigenous fifth-generation fighters like the J-20 and FC-31.
If Russia fails to secure the Su-57E deal with India, the setback would be significant, not just in terms of revenue, but prestige. India has long been one of Russia’s largest arms clients, and its pivot away would send ripples through Moscow’s defence-industrial complex already under strain due to sanctions and Ukraine-related isolation.
Moreover, a successful Su-57E deal with Indian-made systems could pave the way for a unique hybrid export model, where Russia becomes a platform provider while India supplies critical subsystems to third-party customers—marking a shift in the global arms export dynamic.
India’s posture in the Su-57E negotiations marks a broader strategic shift—from passive buyer to demanding co-developer. As technologies like GaN-based AESA, software-defined avionics, and AI-enabled combat systems become more central to air superiority, nations with advanced R&D ecosystems will increasingly demand integration rights and software sovereignty.
In the Indo-Pacific theatre—home to the world’s most contested airspaces—this shift could become the norm. The future of combat aviation may no longer be about who builds the best jet, but who allows the buyer to own and control it.
India’s Su-57E saga is more than a defence deal—it is a declaration of independence in the digital battlespace. By insisting on the replacement of Russia’s radar with indigenous GaN-based systems and demanding full source code access, India is signaling that technological sovereignty is the new currency of strategic power.
Whether Russia yields fully to India’s demands or America makes a surprise move with the F-35, the message is clear: the age of off-the-shelf fighter acquisitions is ending. For future great powers, control over sensors, data, and code will define supremacy in the skies.
