As India advances negotiations for 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA), likely through a Government-to-Government agreement for the Dassault Rafale, a crucial distinction in software access has emerged. While the Indian Air Force (IAF) is expected to gain significant operational control over the aircraft’s software ecosystem, it will not receive the full “source code” traditionally associated with combat aircraft.
Instead, Dassault Aviation is likely to provide API (Application Programming Interface)–level access, keeping exclusive control over the Rafale’s core combat kernel. This approach represents a pragmatic compromise between India’s demand for operational independence and Dassault’s need to safeguard its proprietary technology.
Under this arrangement, India will gain access to the “application layer” of the aircraft’s software. Indian engineers will be able to interface with the Rafale’s systems to integrate domestically developed weapons and sensors. However, the aircraft’s “combat kernel”—the central brain responsible for flight safety, sensor fusion, and threat response—remains a sealed system controlled by Dassault.
This marks a departure from older platforms like the Mirage 2000, which featured monolithic fire-control systems. In those legacy jets, modifying one element often required deep intervention across the entire system. By contrast, the Rafale employs a modern, distributed avionics framework called the Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU), which partitions critical flight and mission logic from other applications under ARINC-653 standards.
This architecture allows Dassault to offer India a controlled “sandbox.” Through these interfaces, the IAF can integrate its own systems—such as the Astra Mk2 and Mk3 air-to-air missiles, Rudram anti-radiation missiles, and locally developed smart bombs—without altering the core software that governs flight dynamics or fuses sensor data.
However, the Rafale’s fusion engine—the software that merges data from the RBE2 AESA radar, the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, and optronic sensors into a single tactical picture—remains off-limits. The logic that determines how the aircraft identifies and reacts to threats is considered Dassault’s “crown jewel” and has never been shared with export customers, even European allies.
For the IAF, the deal ensures “operational sovereignty” but not “software sovereignty.” Operational sovereignty allows India to independently select which weapons to carry and modify mission data libraries to suit local conditions, without needing French permission. Software sovereignty, however, remains restricted: India cannot alter the fundamental algorithms controlling radar tracking, electronic warfare, or sensor fusion, and any structural change would still require Dassault certification.
This limitation previously complicated the Indian Navy’s request to integrate the indigenous Uttam AESA radar on the Rafale Marine variant. Replacing a core sensor would have required opening the fusion kernel—something Dassault was unwilling to do.
The 114-jet deal is expected to be centered on the Rafale F4 standard, which features a software-defined architecture emphasizing connectivity and networked operations. In this setup, API-level access is critical: it allows India’s Rafales to communicate with national assets, such as Netra AEW&C aircraft and ground-based radars, while remaining integrated into the global Rafale ecosystem for safety, maintenance, and updates.
Ultimately, while India will not own the “brain” of the Rafale, negotiated API access gives it full control over the “limbs.” This ensures rapid deployment of indigenous weaponry and sensors on a foreign platform, balancing national operational independence with Dassault’s need to protect its intellectual property.
