India’s defence self-reliance goals, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov on June 26, 2025, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Qingdao, China.
What set this meeting apart from the multitude of bilateral discussions in the multilateral gathering was not merely its timing—amid rising tensions across South Asia and East Asia—but the language of the official press release. Described pointedly as “one of the most important recent meetings between the leaders of the two nations,” the statement emphasized mutual efforts to bolster defence production and modernize aerial platforms, particularly within the context of the recently concluded Operation Sindoor.
This unusually explicit tone underscores a critical inflection point in India-Russia defence cooperation, especially as New Delhi navigates a more contested regional airspace, faces dual-theatre threats, and intensifies its push for strategic autonomy in defence manufacturing.
Operation Sindoor, while officially undisclosed in its entirety, is believed to have been a high-tempo, short-duration combat engagement in the western theatre. The operation highlighted key vulnerabilities in India’s aerial warfare architecture—most notably the absence of a long-range air-to-air missile capability matching that of the Chinese-origin PL-15 employed by the Pakistan Air Force.
Reports suggest that during simulated or real-time engagements, Indian Su-30MKI fighters struggled to achieve missile lock or outrange adversarial platforms, as the PL-15 boasts engagement ranges exceeding 200 km. This operational shortfall galvanized Indian planners to prioritize the acquisition and integration of weapons such as the Russian R-37M, known in export markets as the RVV-BD.
The R-37M, with its touted range of over 300 km and hypersonic endgame velocity, represents a formidable response. Its compatibility with existing Russian-designed airframes such as the Su-30MKI adds further urgency to India’s pursuit of a swift induction and potential local manufacturing.
India’s approach toward its long-time strategic partner Russia has evolved significantly. What was once a supplier-consumer relationship is now morphing into a co-development framework—a transformation driven by both geopolitical necessity and domestic ambition.
This year’s Aero India 2025 saw Russia formally offer the RVV-BD missile for sale to India, proposing joint production under the “Make in India” banner. Significantly, the offer includes provisions for deep technical collaboration and potential export to third countries, positioning India not just as a customer, but as a regional hub for missile manufacturing.
Earlier, in March 2025, Russian state arms export agency Rosoboronexport (ROE) publicly confirmed discussions with India over joint development of advanced guided aircraft munitions. The goal is twofold: to reinforce India’s aerospace deterrence capabilities and to reduce pressure on Russia’s domestic defence-industrial complex amid ongoing commitments in Ukraine and elsewhere.
ROE highlighted that joint development models are rapidly replacing traditional arms export paradigms. According to its projections, co-development agreements will account for nearly 40% of global defence transactions by 2030—double their current share. In this transformation, India and Russia are recognized as pioneers.
At the heart of the renewed India-Russia military convergence lies the Su-30MKI—India’s air superiority workhorse. More than 270 units of this multirole fighter serve with the Indian Air Force (IAF), and despite being over two decades old, the airframe remains formidable with the right set of upgrades.
Russia has reiterated its commitment to help India modernize the Su-30MKI fleet under the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiative. The roadmap includes integration of next-generation avionics, radar systems, electronic warfare suites, and advanced weaponry—all to be implemented by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved the Su-30MKI block upgrade program in November 2023. Designed in two phases, the upgrade will first focus on radar and mission systems, followed by flight control and survivability enhancements.
Among the most ambitious components is the integration of the Virupaksha AESA radar, a cutting-edge Active Electronically Scanned Array system developed by India. With over 2,400 GaN-based transmit/receive modules, the radar is designed for long-range detection (up to 600 km), simultaneous multi-target engagement, and resistance to jamming.
Complementing this radar will be a new indigenous IRST (Infrared Search and Track) system and an electronic warfare suite capable of jamming or spoofing enemy radars and missiles. These upgrades are expected to elevate the Su-30MKI to 4.5+ generation standards, improving survivability and lethality against emerging aerial threats.
The Radar Conundrum: OEM Collaboration vs Indigenous Integration
While the domestic development of the Virupaksha radar is a triumph of Indian engineering, integrating it onto a legacy platform like the Su-30MKI without support from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) presents technical and logistical challenges.
Modern radars must interface seamlessly with onboard avionics, flight controls, weapons management, and navigation systems. Without access to the source code or deep-level software architecture of the aircraft, integration becomes a painstaking process.
Globally, OEMs are often unwilling to share proprietary software. Dassault Aviation’s reluctance to provide India with source code access for the Rafale—hindering third-party sensor integration—is a well-known case. Russia, however, has historically been more flexible in this regard.
This openness makes Russia a critical partner in ensuring the Virupaksha radar is successfully integrated and validated. Additionally, Russian cooperation could pave the way for interim solutions, such as modifying the existing N011M Bars radar to accommodate the RVV-BD missile before the full upgrade program is complete.
Beyond radar integration, the IAF is also exploring network-centric warfare capabilities. By enabling the Su-30MKI to receive targeting data from airborne early warning systems (like the DRDO Netra or Israeli Phalcon) or ground-based S-400 batteries, the aircraft can deploy long-range missiles such as the RVV-BD without needing onboard radar lock.
This would effectively convert the Su-30MKI into a networked missile truck, extending its engagement envelope and increasing combat flexibility. The system would be particularly potent when paired with AEW&C aircraft that can detect low-observable targets and feed real-time targeting data to frontline fighters.
Such interoperability is crucial in modern air warfare, where kill chains are increasingly disaggregated and multi-platform.
India’s decision to co-develop long-range air-to-air missiles with Russia aligns with its broader ambitions. With indigenous platforms like the LCA Mk.2, TEDBF (Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter), and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) on the horizon, a common arsenal of advanced weapons becomes essential.
Ensuring the RVV-BD or a derivative is compatible with the Virupaksha and Uttam radar families would allow India to standardize long-range missile doctrine across all platforms—legacy and next-generation. This would streamline logistics, enhance operational flexibility, and reduce dependency on external supply chains.
India has already demonstrated this approach with its Astra missile series. The Astra Mk.1 is operational, while the Astra Mk.2 and Mk.3—intended to match or exceed the PL-15 and even the R-37M—are under development. However, these programs are several years from operational deployment, and a collaborative effort with Russia could serve as a critical stopgap, while also accelerating indigenous learning curves.
India’s deepening technological cooperation with Russia comes at a complex time geopolitically. Russia remains embroiled in its Ukraine conflict and faces increasing isolation from the West. In this context, India’s enduring partnership is of immense value to Moscow.
For New Delhi, however, the rationale goes beyond historical ties. With China becoming more assertive and Pakistan’s air force increasingly reliant on Chinese platforms and missiles, India must quickly shore up its aerospace combat edge.
At the same time, India’s growing partnership with the United States, France, and Israel shows that its defence diplomacy is fundamentally multi-aligned. India is not choosing sides but rather seeking capabilities from wherever they are available, provided they align with national interests.
The Su-30MKI upgrade and missile co-development are central to India’s effort to build an indigenous ecosystem of military technology that blends external expertise with domestic innovation.
Over the next five years, India’s Su-30MKI fleet is likely to undergo a rolling transformation. Initial batches will receive interim upgrades, including RVV-BD missile integration via modified Bars radar systems, possibly with Russian help. Concurrently, HAL will work on integrating the Virupaksha radar and other Indian systems into future aircraft blocks.
Simultaneously, local production of long-range missiles, whether RVV-BD or Astra Mk.3, will begin under joint ventures. If successful, India could become a regional supplier of air-to-air missiles, altering the defence industrial landscape in South Asia.
With Operation Sindoor serving as a wake-up call and geopolitical realities pushing nations toward greater self-reliance and regional cooperation, the Singh-Belousov meeting in Qingdao may well be remembered as a pivotal moment in shaping the future of Indian airpower.
India’s defence modernization journey, particularly in air combat, has reached a critical crossroads. The synergy between Indian self-reliance goals and Russian technical expertise—especially in high-end air-to-air missile systems and Su-30MKI upgrades—offers a rare opportunity to leapfrog into the next era of warfare.
