The long-heralded strengthening of India-U.S. defense ties has hit a rocky patch as India’s major deal with U.S.-based General Electric (GE) Aerospace for fighter jet engines fails to meet delivery deadlines. The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) modernization goals, centered around the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A, face critical delays due to GE’s failure to deliver the F404 engines. This setback not only slows India’s defense upgrade but also raises concerns about the reliability of the U.S. as a defense supplier amid India’s evolving strategic priorities and global ambitions.
India’s recent decision to penalize GE has ignited broader discourse on the limitations of U.S.-India defense cooperation. Despite years of diplomatic and trade negotiations aiming to boost defense synergy, this engine delay and other historic reliability concerns with U.S. defense providers question the viability of American suppliers in India’s defense sector.
In August 2021, India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) signed a $716 million deal with GE Aerospace for the delivery of 99 F404 engines intended to power the LCA Mk1A, a key indigenous aircraft expected to strengthen India’s air defenses. Seen as a pivotal step in U.S.-India defense relations, the engine contract was expected to bolster India’s self-reliance in defense manufacturing while speeding up the IAF’s fleet modernization.
However, despite high expectations, GE has missed successive delivery deadlines, leaving HAL unable to supply the LCA Mk1A on schedule. Initially set for delivery in February 2024, the first Mk1A is now unlikely to be operational until at least November. India, frustrated by these delays, has opted to impose financial penalties on GE under the terms of the contract, a decision indicative of India’s resolve to hold its defense partners accountable. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh have raised concerns directly with U.S. officials, and while GE has now promised to begin deliveries by March/April 2025, HAL has been forced to make contingency plans involving used engines for initial LCA Mk1A models.
This recent debacle is not the first time India has questioned its reliance on U.S. military support. Since independence, India has preferred Moscow’s reliable supply of arms while observing Washington’s strategic favoritism toward Pakistan. The 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, for example, saw Pakistan deploy U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter jets against India. Even as recently as 2019, Pakistan’s use of U.S.-provided F-16s during the Balakot airstrikes reinforced lingering doubts in Indian defense circles about the neutrality of U.S. defense suppliers.
India’s skepticism of U.S. defense deals extends beyond past conflicts. After India conducted its first nuclear tests in 1998, Washington led a coalition imposing strict sanctions that impacted India’s economic growth and technological access, a period which France and Russia stood with India, filling critical defense and technological gaps. Today, as a response to GE’s delayed deliveries, French company Safran has proposed co-developing a new engine with India and even offered technology transfer options — a stark contrast to GE, which is reportedly hesitant to fully share its technology.
The U.S. hopes to expand its influence in Indian defense with an anticipated contract for 114 Medium Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA), valued in the billions. Lockheed Martin and Boeing, two American defense giants, are competing with their F-21, F/A-18 Block III Super Hornet, and F-15 EX models against rivals such as France’s Dassault Rafale and Sweden’s Saab JAS-39 Gripen. The F-21, an India-specific evolution of the F-16, is touted by Lockheed as a formidable and versatile aircraft with features just below those of the 5th-generation F-22 Raptor.
However, despite Lockheed Martin’s specific tailoring of the F-21 to appeal to Indian requirements, IAF veterans remain unconvinced. Past U.S. diplomatic maneuvers have not been forgotten, and the F-21’s lineage — derived from the F-16s used by Pakistan — has tempered enthusiasm within the Indian defense establishment. Furthermore, although India’s growing political and economic clout has spurred U.S. interest, the engine delays with GE have undermined its standing. Additionally, India’s hesitancy to work with the U.S. on highly sensitive and frontline aircraft systems continues to weigh on its decision-making process.
This history of reliability and allegiance has led India to approach the MRFA contract cautiously, as it assesses whether the U.S. or European providers can offer better long-term value and strategic alignment.
While U.S. suppliers compete for Indian contracts, Russia has consistently delivered on defense contracts since India’s post-independence era. Following India’s military setbacks in the 1962 war with China, the IAF purchased MiG-21 jets from the USSR, marking the beginning of India’s reliance on Russian equipment. Since then, Russia has remained India’s leading defense partner, supplying advanced fighter jets, submarines, and missile systems despite political or economic pressures from other Western countries.
With the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s economic strain has caused some production delays, but its willingness to share defense technologies and engage in joint-production projects has fostered a relationship of trust with India. Today, Russia remains one of the few nations willing to offer India complete technology transfer on certain systems, making it a reliable source for defense platforms not only as a buyer but as a developer of defense technology.
India’s ongoing deliberation on the MRFA contract highlights the competitive edge that France and the U.S. now seek. With the French Rafale already winning the MMRCA contract in the past, India’s recent positive experience with Dassault Aviation and the Rafale fleet boosts its prospects in MRFA, though the IAF’s preference has shifted slightly toward fifth-generation aircraft or those close to it. Safran, a leading French aero-engine company, has gone a step further by offering India ownership of the engine technology developed through bilateral collaborations. This offer aims to support India’s ambitions for “strategic independence” in defense manufacturing and export.
The geopolitical alignment between India and France has deepened in recent years, fueled by common interests in a multipolar world order, Indo-Pacific security, and a growing defense trade. French officials regularly remind India of their unwavering support through turbulent times, such as the 1998 sanctions and the Kargil conflict, during which France provided consistent support to India’s military.
The IAF currently operates at a reduced capacity of 31 fighter jet squadrons — a significant gap from the government-mandated minimum of 42. This reduced squadron count limits India’s operational capability, making the acquisition of 114 MRFA aircraft an urgent priority. Since the 2016 acquisition of 36 Rafales, India has experienced pressure to ramp up its fighter strength to counter neighboring threats, especially as China rapidly expands its military capabilities.
The government’s hesitation in making swift decisions is partially due to the controversies surrounding the direct purchase of Rafales, which became a politically charged topic. To avoid repeating this experience, the government is now weighing two procurement options: a government-to-government deal or a lengthy tender process. Both come with their advantages and risks; the government-to-government route would expedite delivery timelines, but it requires strong backing from India’s bureaucracy and political sphere.
The delay in GE’s engine delivery has accelerated India’s resolve to attain self-reliance in defense technology. Recent policy reforms now support domestic defense production, including the liberalization of foreign direct investment in the defense sector, while also encouraging partnerships with Indian firms. Initiatives like the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India) vision encompass defense self-sufficiency, calling for an industry ecosystem in which India can independently develop, manufacture, and service defense platforms.
Should India opt to bypass U.S. defense suppliers for the MRFA contract, it will likely prioritize technology transfer agreements that promote domestic production. The strategic pivot towards indigenous capabilities reflects a wider shift away from dependency on international partners with conditional alliances.
