Southeast Asia’s aerial power: Indonesia is reportedly preparing to acquire 42 second-hand Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets from China. Simultaneously, Jakarta has signaled renewed interest in resuming its long-frozen contract with Russia for the Su-35 Flanker-E, indicating a comprehensive reconfiguration of its air combat capabilities.
While Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence has not officially confirmed the purchase, the defense intelligence platform Alert 5 recently reported that an official announcement could be made at the upcoming Indo Defence and Expo 2025 in Jakarta this June. If finalized, this acquisition would mark Indonesia’s first operational procurement of Chinese combat aircraft, breaking a decades-long preference for Western and Russian platforms.
The reported deal for 42 J-10C fighters comes amid growing regional security concerns and Indonesia’s strategic desire to modernize and diversify its air force. The J-10C’s reputation has surged following its reported combat successes in the India-Pakistan skirmishes over Kashmir, where Pakistani J-10Cs allegedly downed several Indian aircraft, including three Rafales, using the PL-15 beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile.
These unverified claims have fueled both intrigue and anxiety among regional defense circles. Despite Indian denials, the possibility that Western-made aircraft could be vulnerable to Chinese missile systems has forced many nations, including Indonesia, to reassess their procurement strategies.
In parallel, Jakarta is considering reviving its contract with Russia for 11 Su-35 fighters, a deal initially signed in 2018 for approximately US$1.14 billion. The contract was placed on indefinite hold in 2020 due to geopolitical pressures and potential U.S. sanctions under the CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). However, Russian Ambassador to Indonesia Sergei Tolchenov recently stated that the deal remains active, noting, “The contract has never been cancelled. It is still active. We will resume negotiations someday.”
The Chengdu J-10C is considered a premier 4.5-generation multirole fighter. It features an AESA radar, modern electronic warfare systems, and China’s advanced WS-10B engine. The aircraft is equipped with a digital glass cockpit, a sophisticated mission computer, helmet-mounted sights, and infrared search and track (IRST) systems. Its aerodynamic design, notably the delta-canard configuration, allows for superior maneuverability and high angles of attack, making it suitable for both air superiority and strike roles.
What sets the J-10C apart, however, is its integration of the PL-15 BVR missile. With a reported range exceeding 200 kilometers, the PL-15 is seen as a formidable challenge to Western analogs like the AIM-120D and Meteor. The missile’s use of an active radar seeker and datalink mid-course updates allows it to strike targets at extreme distances, even in contested electromagnetic environments.
The J-10CE, the export variant marketed to nations like Pakistan and potentially Indonesia, was a centerpiece at the recent LIMA 2025 airshow in Langkawi, drawing attention from analysts and procurement officials. According to China’s state-run defense exporter CATIC, the fighter is a cost-effective alternative to Western jets with fewer geopolitical strings attached.
In contrast, the Russian Su-35 remains one of the most capable non-stealth fighters globally. Known for its long range, thrust-vectoring engines, and high payload capacity, the Su-35 excels in air superiority missions. Its Irbis-E radar, a powerful passive electronically scanned array (PESA), can track targets at extended ranges, while its extensive weapons load and supermaneuverability make it a formidable adversary.
If Indonesia moves forward with both acquisitions, the result will be a diverse, heavily armed fighter fleet that spans Russian, Chinese, and Western technologies. Jakarta already has contracts for 42 Dassault Rafales from France, with the first six scheduled for delivery in 2026. This diversification serves multiple goals: it reduces dependency on any one supplier, strengthens geopolitical leverage, and maximizes capability through platform variety.
However, such an approach also presents integration challenges. Operating three distinct fighter types with different logistical, training, and maintenance demands could strain Indonesia’s defense infrastructure. Yet, officials appear willing to absorb these challenges in exchange for strategic flexibility.
This shift may also reflect growing frustration within Indonesia’s military leadership over perceived Western reluctance to transfer critical technologies or support autonomous defense policies. Chinese and Russian vendors, in contrast, are often more open to industrial offsets and local production agreements.
Pakistan’s publicized use of the J-10C in Kashmir has undeniably influenced regional perceptions. While details remain murky and politically charged, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar claimed that five Indian jets, including three Rafales and one Mirage 2000, were destroyed by PL-15E missiles fired from J-10Cs. India has refuted the claims, and no conclusive proof has emerged. Nevertheless, the story has taken on a life of its own, reshaping threat assessments across Asia.
At the LIMA 2025 event, Chinese officials were quick to capitalize on this momentum, positioning the J-10CE as a proven combat platform. Videos, simulations, and dramatic recreations of the Kashmir skirmish were used to attract buyers, especially those in the Non-Aligned Movement or countries seeking high-end fighters without entangling alliances.
Indonesia’s possible procurement of Chinese and Russian aircraft comes as the Indo-Pacific region witnesses intensifying great-power competition. The U.S. continues to deepen security cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, while China expands its military footprint in the South China Sea.
For Jakarta, these dynamics heighten the need for a more self-reliant and robust air force. The introduction of the J-10C and potentially the Su-35 could significantly elevate Indonesia’s deterrent capabilities, offering a credible threat to regional aggressors.
Moreover, Indonesia’s move could inspire similar recalibrations by neighboring countries. Malaysia, which has also expressed interest in the J-10C, may accelerate its decision-making. Vietnam, traditionally reliant on Russian gear, could watch closely how Indonesia navigates the complexities of Chinese and Russian integration.
The Indo Defence Expo in June could be a watershed moment. If Indonesia announces the J-10C deal, it will signal a tectonic realignment in Southeast Asia’s defense procurement landscape. The potential revival of the Su-35 deal would add further weight to this transformation.
Beyond the immediate tactical benefits, these acquisitions suggest a deeper strategic recalibration. Indonesia appears to be embracing a multipolar defense philosophy—one that prioritizes flexibility, deterrence, and a wider array of international partnerships over strict alignment with any one bloc.
Whether this approach leads to greater regional stability or new fault lines remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: Indonesia is no longer content to be a passive observer in the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. With the J-10C and Su-35 in its arsenal, Jakarta is preparing to assert itself as a central player in the contest for air superiority in Asia.
