Indonesia’s renewed pursuit of the KF-21 Boramae fighter programme reflects a carefully calibrated effort to resurrect a previously strained defence-industrial partnership with South Korea, following a quiet but consequential alignment between President Prabowo Subianto and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung at the October 2025 APEC Summit. At that meeting, both leaders signalled political intent to resolve long-standing obligations through a reduced yet operationally credible acquisition of sixteen KF-21 Block II fighters, marking a shift from aspirational commitments toward deliverable outcomes.
That high-level political convergence translated into concrete defence-industrial negotiations on January 7, 2026, when Air Commodore Jon Ginting, Head of Programme and Evaluation at Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence Defence Logistics Agency, chaired a closed-door meeting in Jakarta with senior representatives from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI). The discussions were explicitly centred on structuring a financially viable pathway for a squadron-sized purchase of sixteen aircraft as the foundation for reviving Indonesia’s participation in the programme.
According to officials familiar with the talks, discussions focused on expectations that South Korea would extend an export credit facility through the Export-Import Bank of Korea, creating a financial structure capable of supporting both Indonesia’s remaining programme obligations and the acquisition of new fighter jets. This formulation underscores Jakarta’s intent to convert past liabilities into tangible combat capability rather than symbolic participation in a high-profile development programme.
The proposed acquisition of sixteen KF-21 Block II fighters—sufficient to form a complete TNI-AU operational squadron—reflects a deliberate recalibration away from ambitious force-structure planning toward credible near-term deterrence within an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific air domain. For Indonesia, whose defence modernisation ambitions have repeatedly collided with fiscal constraints, the Block II pathway offers a mechanism to restore industrial credibility while injecting advanced multirole capability without the prohibitive lifecycle costs associated with fifth-generation stealth aircraft.
Regionally, Indonesia’s revival of the KF-21 partnership has been closely watched. The Philippines has signalled exploratory interest in the Boramae as a potential future multirole fighter option amid its accelerating airpower recapitalisation and the strategic imperative to counterbalance growing pressure in the South China Sea without incurring the political and financial costs of fifth-generation platforms. Malaysia has likewise emerged as a prospective observer, with defence planners quietly assessing the aircraft’s 4.5-generation capability, export financing flexibility, and technology-transfer potential as a longer-term complement or successor to existing Hornet and Su-30MKM fleets under Kuala Lumpur’s phased combat aircraft rationalisation strategy.
The KF-21’s positioning as a 4.5-generation platform allows Jakarta to bridge the widening capability gap between legacy Su-27/30 and F-16 fleets and the emerging fifth-generation ecosystems proliferating across East Asia and the Western Pacific. This revival also aligns with President Prabowo’s broader strategic narrative of restoring Indonesia’s regional military stature amid escalating maritime disputes, intensifying airpower modernisation among ASEAN peers, and growing great-power competition along key sea-air corridors.
Crucially, by anchoring the revived partnership around a defined aircraft purchase rather than abstract development stakes, Indonesia signals a transition from political symbolism toward measurable operational outcomes that strengthen both national defence readiness and bilateral defence-industrial trust.
The KF-21 Boramae programme itself originated from South Korea’s long-standing strategic imperative to reduce reliance on imported combat aircraft while preserving alliance interoperability. Initially conceived under the KF-X designation in the early 2000s, the project was intended to replace ageing F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fleets that no longer met contemporary survivability requirements. By 2010, the programme evolved into a multinational framework when Indonesia joined as a development partner, committing approximately ₩1.6 trillion—around USD 1.17 billion—in exchange for a 20 percent stake and the planned procurement of forty-eight aircraft, designated IF-X for the TNI-AU.
Under the original structure, South Korea retained 60 percent programme ownership, with KAI holding 20 percent, creating a model that combined state backing, industrial execution, and selective technology sharing aimed at nurturing indigenous aerospace ecosystems without breaching export-control constraints. Technically, the KF-21 was designed to occupy a deliberate performance-cost niche, delivering supersonic performance, advanced sensors, and network-centric warfare compatibility at a unit cost substantially below that of fifth-generation platforms such as the F-35.
Programme milestones validated this approach. The first prototype was unveiled in April 2021, the maiden flight took place on July 19, 2022, and provisional combat suitability was achieved by May 2023, signalling transition from experimental development into production-ready maturity. Serial manufacturing of Block I aircraft commenced in July 2024, with deliveries to the Republic of Korea Air Force scheduled from March 2026 following an initial order of forty aircraft. The broader roadmap envisages eighty Block II fighters entering service by 2032.
The KF-21’s propulsion architecture, centred on twin General Electric F414-GE-400K engines assembled domestically by Hanwha Aerospace, enables a maximum speed of Mach 1.81 and a combat radius exceeding 1,000 kilometres. These parameters are optimised for sustained regional operations rather than short-range point defence, reinforcing the aircraft’s export appeal as a scalable multirole platform rather than a narrowly specialised interceptor.
Indonesia’s participation, however, has followed a non-linear trajectory shaped by ambition, fiscal stress, and shifting political priorities. Early engagement included the establishment of a joint research centre in Daejeon in 2010 and the deployment of PTDI engineers into core design and structural workstreams by 2011. At its peak, more than one hundred Indonesian engineers were embedded within the programme, reflecting Jakarta’s strategic objective of leveraging foreign collaboration to accelerate domestic aerospace competence.
By 2019, however, Indonesia had accumulated arrears exceeding ₩300 billion, amid broader unpaid obligations exacerbated by domestic budgetary pressure and later by the economic shock of the COVID-19 pandemic. Speculation regarding Indonesia’s withdrawal intensified in 2020, though reaffirmations in December 2020 and February 2024 preserved nominal participation while postponing structural resolution of financial commitments.
The partnership faced its most acute political strain during 2023–2024, when Indonesian engineers were investigated for allegedly attempting to leak sensitive KF-21 technical data. Although the case was resolved through non-indictment in May 2025, the episode temporarily eroded bilateral trust and reinforced concerns in Seoul regarding programme security.
A decisive recalibration emerged in August 2024, when Indonesia’s financial obligation was reduced to ₩600 billion—approximately USD 439 million—lowering Jakarta’s programme stake to 7.5 percent while South Korea absorbed the shortfall to preserve production continuity. This restructuring was formalised in June 2025 at the Indo Defence Expo & Forum through a memorandum reaffirming Indonesia’s intention to acquire forty-eight aircraft and retain PTDI participation, even as practical execution lagged behind political signalling.
The current emphasis on a sixteen-aircraft squadron purchase reflects a pragmatic shift toward feasibility. The January 7, 2026 meeting marked a pivotal inflection point, with discussions centring on structured financing via the Export-Import Bank of Korea to address both residual obligations and the acquisition of Block II aircraft. The proposed export credit facility offers a mechanism to transform deferred liabilities into immediate capability, reducing upfront fiscal burden while aligning repayment schedules with aircraft delivery and operational integration milestones.
Operationally, sixteen aircraft represent a full TNI-AU squadron, enabling coherent training, maintenance, and deployment cycles while complementing existing fleets without imposing excessive sustainment complexity. The selection of the Block II variant is strategically significant, expanding the KF-21’s mission envelope beyond Block I’s air-superiority focus into true multirole functionality suited to Indonesia’s dispersed archipelagic environment.
Block II integrates a broader weapons ecosystem, enhanced mission systems, and expanded strike capability across air, maritime, and land domains. Planned armament includes beyond-visual-range missiles such as MBDA’s Meteor, precision-guided munitions, stand-off systems like SPEAR, and anti-ship weapons relevant to Indonesia’s maritime security requirements. Sensor fusion combining AESA radar, infrared search-and-track, and integrated electronic warfare provides the situational awareness necessary for contested electromagnetic environments.
With a ferry range approaching 2,900 kilometres and internal fuel capacity of around 6,000 kilograms, the aircraft is optimised for Indonesia’s vast maritime approaches and dispersed basing architecture. Indigenous subsystem development in South Korea, particularly in radar and electronic warfare, has reached roughly 65 percent localisation, reducing vulnerability to external technology denial and enhancing export resilience.
In aggregate, Indonesia’s re-entry into the KF-21 programme through a disciplined Block II acquisition strategy illustrates how calibrated defence partnerships can recover from political friction to deliver durable military and industrial dividends. By prioritising credibility, deliverability, and operational relevance over headline numbers, Jakarta signals a maturing approach to defence acquisition in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific security environment.
