The establishment of Indonesia’s National Defence Council (NDC) marks one of the most significant early policy moves under President Prabowo Subianto’s leadership. In a changing regional security environment and a world increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, the formation of this new council signals both ambition and urgency. But while the creation of the NDC is a good start, it comes against the backdrop of deeper challenges facing Indonesia’s defence strategy — challenges that require more than institutional reshuffling.
In January 2024, a presidential decree formally established the National Defence Council. According to this decree, the NDC is a non-structural body tasked with providing the president with strategic advice on defence matters and crafting policy recommendations for safeguarding Indonesia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security.
What makes the NDC especially relevant is its focus on geostrategy, geopolitics, and geo-economics — areas that reflect the complexity of today’s security challenges. This role is larger than traditional defence concerns. It places the NDC squarely at the intersection of domestic security, regional stability, and Indonesia’s positioning in a competitive global environment.
Significantly, the 2024 decree replaces the older 1999 National Resilience Council (Wantannas), which leaned heavily on internal security and police involvement. The new NDC, in contrast, puts defence — and by extension, the Indonesian military (TNI) — at the core of its structure and responsibilities.
The idea of an NDC isn’t new. In fact, it was mandated over two decades ago by Indonesia’s 2002 Law on National Defence. Yet, until Prabowo’s decree, it remained unrealised. Its delayed formation points to the often-slow evolution of Indonesia’s defence bureaucracy, where overlapping responsibilities, unclear mandates, and civilian-military divides complicated reform.
The NDC is designed to overcome those obstacles. It functions as a strategic ‘melting pot’ — integrating military expertise with civilian perspectives. In doing so, it offers an opportunity for a more balanced and holistic defence policy process.
This is essential for Prabowo’s wider goals. The NDC is expected to work closely with the Ministry of Defence, especially in producing a long-overdue update of Indonesia’s Defence White Paper — a key document that outlines defence policy, threat perception, and capability planning.
Indonesia’s last Defence White Paper was published in 2015, under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). At the time, it framed defence policy around Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum vision — a strategy that positioned Indonesia as the nexus of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
But almost a decade later, that vision has largely faded. More importantly, the 2015 white paper’s threat assessment only projected to 2020, making it deeply outdated in today’s vastly different global security environment.
The global landscape has since changed dramatically:
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China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea
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The intensifying US-China rivalry
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Russia’s war in Ukraine
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The resurgence of armed conflicts in Gaza
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Growing non-traditional threats, including cyber warfare and misinformation
Indonesia’s defence strategy cannot afford to be trapped in a pre-2020 worldview.
President Prabowo Subianto, a former general himself, has made clear that the military will play a central role not only in defence but also in domestic development.
The clearest evidence of this is Prabowo’s flagship Free Nutritious Meals program and the expansion of state-backed food estates — both heavily reliant on the military’s logistical capacity and territorial command structure.
In February 2025, the Indonesian Army announced the establishment of five new territorial commands (Kodam) and around 100 territorial battalions. These new units are framed as part of a food security initiative, but they also expand the TNI’s reach deep into civilian life.
Such moves are controversial. Critics argue they blur the lines between military and civilian spheres, raising fears of creeping militarisation in governance.
Further intensifying these concerns is the recent amendment to the 2004 TNI Law, passed despite widespread opposition.
Key revisions include:
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Expansion of military roles in non-combat operations (Military Operations Other Than War)
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Authorization for active-duty military personnel to hold civilian positions in up to 15 ministries
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Extension of TNI retirement age
These changes alarm civil society groups, academics, and human rights activists. They warn of risks to democratic oversight, civilian supremacy, and institutional accountability. The worry is that Indonesia may be moving backwards toward the New Order model, where the military was deeply embedded in politics and governance.
Amid these debates, Prabowo has remained committed to modernising Indonesia’s defence apparatus. His focus is to move beyond the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) target — a longstanding framework that aimed to achieve a baseline level of defence readiness.
Yet, progress has been slow. As of early 2025, the MEF had only reached 65 per cent of its target, despite being launched in 2010. Now that MEF has officially concluded, Prabowo’s government is promoting a new framework: the Optimum Essential Force.
The challenge ahead is significant:
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Upgrading ageing weapon systems
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Acquiring next-generation military technology
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Enhancing Indonesia’s defence industry capabilities
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Integrating cyber security and emerging threat responses
Indonesia’s defence industrial base must evolve, not only to meet traditional threats but also to confront non-traditional risks like cyber attacks, digital espionage, and artificial intelligence-driven warfare.
Any credible defence strategy for Indonesia must give priority to the South China Sea. Despite Indonesia not being a claimant state, China’s expansive nine-dash line claims overlap with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands.
As tensions rise, Indonesia faces a delicate balancing act:
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Asserting its territorial rights
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Avoiding direct confrontation with China
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Maintaining its policy of strategic autonomy
At the regional level, the next Defence White Paper must also address:
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Increasing risks in the Taiwan Strait
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The volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula
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The growing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific
Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN centrality will be crucial in this context, especially as great power rivalry escalates.
The white paper must also engage with global conflicts shaping the security environment:
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The Russia-Ukraine war has already upended global energy, trade, and military supply chains.
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The Israel-Palestine conflict continues to draw regional and global attention, with potential spillover effects.
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Emerging security partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad are reshaping strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia, with its tradition of non-alignment and experience in international mediation, has an opportunity to offer diplomatic leadership. But this will require a defence strategy that is adaptable, realistic, and attuned to global complexities.
While the formation of the NDC is a positive step, its ultimate success will depend on how it operates in practice. Will it merely serve as an advisory body without real influence? Or will it become an engine for transforming Indonesia’s defence strategy?
The NDC must avoid becoming another layer of bureaucracy. Instead, it should:
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Foster close coordination between civilian policymakers and the military
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Integrate insights from academia, think tanks, and civil society
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Ensure transparent and accountable defence policymaking
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Lead the formulation of a new, forward-looking Defence White Paper
Indonesia stands at a pivotal moment in its defence and security trajectory. President Prabowo Subianto’s early reforms — including the establishment of the National Defence Council — offer both opportunities and risks.
If managed well, the NDC could revitalise Indonesia’s defence policymaking, bringing it in line with contemporary threats and regional realities. But this will require balancing military involvement with civilian oversight, integrating new technologies, and crafting a defence white paper that speaks to the challenges of today — not just the ambitions of yesterday.
Indonesia’s ability to navigate this complex security landscape will shape not only its own future but also the strategic balance of Southeast Asia in the years to come.
