Iran has wasted no time in reconstructing its air defence infrastructure following widespread damage inflicted by Israeli precision strikes in June 2025. The sudden and intense confrontation between the two regional adversaries has not only deepened the geopolitical divide but also tested the resilience and preparedness of Iran’s defence-industrial base.
According to Defah Press, Iran’s official military news agency, the Islamic Republic has successfully restored key components of its air defence grid through the rapid deployment of pre-positioned, domestically manufactured systems. The restoration effort has been described by Iranian officials as a strategic and symbolic move that underscores Tehran’s capacity to recover from high-impact military setbacks.
In a rare moment of military candour, Major General Mahmoud Mousavi, deputy for operations of the Iranian army (Artesh), publicly confirmed that Israeli strikes had inflicted damage on parts of Iran’s layered air defence network. Speaking to domestic media, Mousavi acknowledged, “Some of our air defences were damaged—this is not something we can hide—but our colleagues have used domestic resources and replaced them with pre-arranged systems that were stored in suitable locations in order to keep the airspace secure.”
His remarks carried dual significance: they validated the severity of the Israeli strike package while simultaneously asserting the Iranian military’s ability to recover without foreign dependence. Analysts viewed this declaration as a calculated balance between transparency and deterrent signaling.
The June 2025 escalation marked a critical juncture in the Israel-Iran shadow war, which has historically been waged through proxies, sabotage operations, and cyberattacks. For the first time in over a decade, Israeli fighter jets—reportedly F-35I “Adir” stealth aircraft—penetrated deep into Iranian airspace in a coordinated, multi-wave operation.
Targets included high-value radar stations, command-and-control bunkers, and long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Satellite imagery released days after the strikes showed extensive crater patterns near Iranian missile bases in Isfahan, Yazd, and the perimeters of the Natanz and Fordow nuclear enrichment facilities.
The Iranian response was unprecedented in scale. Over 300 projectiles—including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and loitering munitions—were launched at Israeli targets, testing the effectiveness of Israel’s integrated air and missile defence triad: Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-3. Although the Israeli systems performed well under pressure, the confrontation showcased a new Iranian doctrine—one that accepts the risks of open-state conflict to advance strategic objectives.
In the aftermath, Tehran launched an internal mobilisation effort to replace the damaged defences, tapping into a nationwide inventory of reserve systems. These were stored in hardened underground facilities, in line with Iran’s long-standing doctrine of strategic redundancy.
Among the systems reportedly brought out of storage and now redeployed were:
- Bavar-373: Iran’s most advanced domestically produced long-range SAM system, comparable in purpose—if not in performance—to Russia’s S-300 or even S-400. It uses Sayyad-4B missiles, offering a reported engagement range of 300 km and a ceiling of up to 30 km.
- 3rd Khordad: A mobile medium-range air defence platform credited with shooting down a U.S. Global Hawk UAV in 2019. It uses the Taer-2B missile and can simultaneously engage multiple threats.
- Talash: An integrated system using Sayyad-2 and Sayyad-3 missiles with effective ranges between 120 and 150 km, capable of targeting both cruise missiles and tactical aircraft.
- Mersad and Raad: Short-range and point-defence systems derived from reverse-engineered U.S. and Russian technologies, providing final-layer coverage against drones and low-flying threats.
Iran’s ability to draw from this extensive, locally built arsenal is being hailed by state media as a victory for the Islamic Republic’s decades-long investment in indigenous defence production, particularly since arms imports were severely curtailed following the 1979 Revolution and subsequent sanctions.
One of the key reasons behind Iran’s swift rebound is its practice of dispersing air defence assets and storing backup systems in concealed and hardened sites across the country. This redundancy is central to Iran’s A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) strategy, aimed at deterring advanced Western or Israeli air strikes on its critical infrastructure.
While Israel succeeded in temporarily degrading Iranian air surveillance capabilities, the damage appears to have been only partially effective in denying Tehran its operational readiness. Iran’s ability to quickly pivot to alternative systems reflects careful planning and a military culture shaped by decades of anticipation of external strikes.
This model mirrors Cold War-era Soviet practices of layered defence and reserve positioning, wherein critical warfighting capabilities are shielded from first strikes and can be redeployed rapidly under duress.
Despite Iran’s public declarations of restored air sovereignty, many independent analysts remain cautious. Key questions linger over the condition of Iran’s high-value radar arrays and electronic warfare infrastructure, which are not as easily replaced as launchers or mobile SAM batteries.
“Radar arrays like Me’raj-4 or long-range surveillance platforms take years to perfect and build, especially those capable of detecting stealth platforms like the F-35,” said Farzin Nadimi, a military analyst at The Washington Institute. “Even if launch systems are restored, degraded radar coverage means Iran’s detection grid remains vulnerable to another round of precision airstrikes.”
Some experts also believe the Israeli attacks were not merely punitive but part of a broader reconnaissance campaign designed to map Iranian radar blind spots and catalog emitter signatures for future engagements.
Interestingly, the Iranian recovery effort has shown no signs of new foreign-supplied hardware. No evidence suggests that Russia or China rushed new shipments to aid Tehran, underscoring Iran’s growing autonomy in building and fielding its own advanced military platforms.
This independence has long been a point of pride for the Iranian military establishment. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has repeatedly promoted the doctrine of “defensive self-sufficiency,” which he sees as a bulwark against foreign domination. In this context, the swift replacement of destroyed assets serves not only a tactical purpose but also fulfills a powerful ideological goal.
From an Israeli perspective, the success of the airstrikes may have temporarily knocked out key components of Iran’s integrated air defence network—but the rapid recovery raises difficult strategic questions. If Iran can absorb such an assault and reconstitute within weeks, any gains from a “shock and awe” first strike may be ephemeral.
For U.S. planners, the episode offers a cautionary tale. While Iranian air defences remain inferior to NATO standards, they are becoming increasingly sophisticated, layered, and resilient. Any future confrontation—particularly one involving U.S. carrier strike groups or B-21 bomber penetrations—would require careful planning to neutralise this growing defensive lattice.
Iran’s growing arsenal of long-range drones and hypersonic missiles adds further complexity, creating a dynamic where even a heavily degraded Iranian force can inflict considerable damage during retaliatory operations.
The June confrontation and its aftermath are already reverberating across the broader region. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen have all expressed solidarity with Iran, hailing its resilience as a sign of Axis resistance strength.
Iran’s quick military recovery may embolden these proxies, who see in Tehran a model of steadfastness under pressure. It may also influence Iran’s calculus in arms transfers to allied forces, particularly as it continues to export drones and missile technology to theatres like Syria, Gaza, and beyond.
Moreover, Arab Gulf states—especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia—are watching with concern. The unfolding drama reinforces their own investments in Western-made air defences, while also opening new conversations around regional anti-missile collaboration, potentially under the aegis of a future Abraham Accords framework.
As the dust settles, one thing is certain: the tempo and scale of Israel-Iran hostilities have reached a new, dangerous level. The veil of plausible deniability has been lifted, and both sides are now openly engaging in direct, kinetic confrontations.
For now, Iran’s reconstructed air defences remain untested. Whether they can withstand another high-intensity Israeli air operation—or even a coordinated Israeli-American campaign—remains an open question. But by demonstrating its capacity to rearm and redeploy under pressure, Tehran has delivered a message of preparedness and defiance.
