Iran Weighs J-10C Fighter Acquisition from China as Prolonged Su-35 Delays from Russia Test Tehran’s Patience

J-10C Fighter

Iran is reportedly evaluating the acquisition of the Chinese-built J-10C “Vigorous Dragon,” a 4.5-generation multirole fighter jet that has recently surged into the international spotlight. Nicknamed the “Rafale Killer” by regional analysts after its alleged battlefield successes, the J-10C could mark a dramatic shift in the Islamic Republic’s aerial strategy amid ongoing geopolitical turbulence and military pressure.

This growing interest comes on the heels of unverified yet widely circulated reports claiming that Pakistan’s J-10C fighters—equipped with the powerful PL-15E beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile—shot down three Indian Rafale jets during a four-day aerial skirmish last month. While New Delhi has officially denied the losses, the incident has nonetheless elevated the J-10C’s profile on the global stage and sparked intense debate within military aviation circles.

Now, Iran’s reported consideration of this Chinese fighter could reshape the regional aerial balance in profound ways.

The speculation surrounding Iran’s potential acquisition gained traction following Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh’s visit to Qingdao, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The SCO—co-founded by China and Russia—has long served as a platform for strategic coordination across Eurasia. It includes not only Iran and China, but also military powers such as India, Pakistan, Russia, and several Central Asian republics.

While the summit focused publicly on regional cooperation, the private sidelines of such events often serve as fertile ground for defence diplomacy. Nasirzadeh’s meetings reportedly included high-level Chinese defence representatives and aerospace executives. Sources close to Iran’s defence procurement apparatus suggest that preliminary discussions over the J-10C’s pricing, delivery timeline, and technology transfer provisions may have taken place behind closed doors.

Iran’s pivot toward the J-10C stems, in part, from mounting dissatisfaction with the status of its Su-35 acquisition deal with Russia. Originally intended for Egypt, the Su-35 “Flanker-E” fighters were diverted to Iran after Cairo backed out under pressure from the United States through the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

In late 2023, Iranian state-affiliated media, including Tasnim News, announced that a deal for several dozen Su-35s had been finalized. The aircraft—equipped with the powerful Irbis-E radar and supermaneuverable AL-41F1S engines—was hailed as the future backbone of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). But over a year later, none have arrived.

Moscow’s repeated delays have frustrated Iranian officials. The situation has been further complicated by Iran’s growing military involvement in the Ukraine war, where Iranian drones and, more recently, ballistic missiles have been deployed in support of Russian operations. While Russia has offered these aircraft in exchange for Iran’s support, geopolitical complications and logistics bottlenecks have stalled deliveries indefinitely.

This delay has forced Iran to reassess its procurement pipeline—and the J-10C has emerged as a compelling alternative.

Developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, the J-10C is the most advanced variant of the J-10 family and has seen considerable upgrades in avionics, sensors, and propulsion. Unlike its earlier counterparts, the “C” model incorporates an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, digital fly-by-wire systems, and a Chinese-made WS-10B turbofan engine.

The J-10C’s design is based on a canard-delta configuration, allowing for enhanced agility and short takeoff distances—key features in Iran’s mountainous operational environment. But what truly sets the jet apart is its compatibility with the PL-15E missile.

The PL-15E is China’s export version of its next-generation BVR missile, co-developed with Russian input and reportedly designed to outperform the American AIM-120D. With an estimated range of 145 km (for the export variant), and equipped with an advanced AESA seeker and datalink capabilities, the missile significantly enhances the J-10C’s lethality in first-shot/first-kill engagements.

The recent and still unconfirmed air confrontation between India and Pakistan has put the J-10C into a new light. Pakistani media, citing military sources, claim that PAF J-10Cs successfully downed three Indian Rafales, a Su-30MKI, a Mirage 2000, and a MiG-29 during a four-day border flare-up earlier this year. If true, these events would constitute the most devastating blow to India’s frontline fighter fleet in recent history—and would serve as a major propaganda victory for Chinese-made air platforms.

India has categorically denied these losses, while international observers remain cautious due to a lack of independent verification. However, the perception of battlefield success—especially in the Global South—has had a profound impact. At the 2025 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) in Malaysia, the J-10CE (the export variant of the J-10C) was one of the event’s biggest attractions.

Chinese media outlets, including the Global Times, reported that the fighter jet attracted widespread attention from military delegations across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. “Pesawat pejuang J-10CE… menjadi tumpuan utama,” the Global Times wrote, noting the intense interest in the platform following its alleged combat record.

Iran’s air force currently relies on a patchwork of outdated aircraft, including the U.S.-built F-4 Phantom II and F-14 Tomcat, and the Russian MiG-29—many of which are over 40 years old. Despite extensive maintenance and periodic upgrades, these platforms offer limited capability in modern, networked warfare environments.

The acquisition of the J-10C would not only represent a generational leap in Iran’s air combat capabilities, but also diversify its defence partnerships beyond Moscow. This is critical given the increasing unpredictability of Russian deliveries and Iran’s rising tensions with the West.

Additionally, Beijing is less encumbered by geopolitical red lines than Russia. Unlike Moscow, which has to contend with Western sanctions over Ukraine and manage relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia, China operates with a more flexible diplomacy matrix. This makes it easier for Iran to procure advanced systems through Chinese suppliers without attracting immediate retaliation or delays.

Should Iran proceed with a purchase of the J-10C, it would significantly alter the aerial balance of power in the Middle East. Israeli and Saudi defence planners, who have long counted on Iran’s limited ability to conduct offensive air operations, would have to revise their assessments.

The J-10C, especially when equipped with PL-15Es, would enable Iran to project credible air superiority in contested areas like the Strait of Hormuz or Iraq-Syria air corridors. This could also embolden Tehran to take more assertive stances in its regional operations—particularly in supporting Hezbollah, the Houthis, and its network of Shia militias across the region.

Additionally, Iran’s move could spark an arms race in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are already modernizing their fleets with F-15EXs and Rafales, may seek even more advanced systems—potentially fifth-generation platforms like the F-35, or even new systems under development like the British-led GCAP or the American NGAD.

Israel, which operates F-35I “Adir” stealth fighters, may respond by expanding its procurement or deepening its air defence integration with regional allies such as Jordan, Greece, or even Saudi Arabia under the Abraham Accords framework.

For China, the potential sale to Iran would represent more than just a commercial success—it would be a strategic statement. The global arms market has traditionally been dominated by the United States, Russia, and France. But with the J-10C, the FC-31 stealth fighter, and the J-20A entering export-ready phases, China is positioning itself as a major player in the military aviation space.

The J-10C’s export to Pakistan and potentially Iran strengthens Beijing’s geopolitical hand in both South Asia and the Middle East, regions where the U.S. has historically maintained dominance. It also furthers China’s Belt and Road ambitions by creating dependencies through defence and dual-use technologies.

By equipping Iran with a frontline multirole fighter, China can effectively create another foothold in the Gulf—pressuring U.S. naval dominance and complicating Israeli air superiority.

For Iran, the choice between the Su-35 and the J-10C is emblematic of a broader shift in its strategic alignment. While Russia has long been a defence partner of necessity, China offers a more scalable, flexible, and potentially less politically entangled relationship.

Iran’s decision will ultimately depend on several factors: technology transfer terms, delivery timelines, cost, and the geopolitical calculus of aligning more deeply with China versus remaining dependent on Russian systems.

But one thing is becoming increasingly clear—Tehran is no longer willing to wait in the shadow of failed promises and delayed deliveries. If current trends hold, the “Rafale Killer” may soon be flying in the colours of the IRIAF, redefining what Iranian airpower looks like in the second quarter.

As regional powers watch closely and military analysts parse satellite images and procurement statements, the J-10C’s future in Iran remains undecided—but no longer implausible. For a nation long burdened by sanctions and technological constraints, this could be a transformative moment—one that reorients not only its air force but also its place in the shifting dynamics of Middle East geopolitics.

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