In a rare glimpse into Iran’s evolving military capability, a recent demonstration involving the Bavar-373 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system has cast new light on Tehran’s ambitions to counter the world’s most advanced stealth aircraft. According to data shared by the Middle East Spectator via Telegram, Iran’s homegrown system achieved a landmark feat by intercepting a domestically produced Karrar drone at a range of 316 kilometres. While seemingly routine on the surface, this test has implications that could rattle military planners from Washington to Tel Aviv.
At the core of this revelation lies a sobering assessment: the Bavar-373’s radar system may now be capable—at least in theory—of detecting, tracking, and even engaging the U.S. F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter. That possibility, if verified, would not only mark a seismic shift in regional air defence dynamics but also signal Iran’s arrival at the global table of high-end air warfare technology.
The performance data from the Iranian military exercise revealed that the Bavar-373’s fire-control radar successfully intercepted a Karrar drone with a radar cross-section (RCS) of 2.14 square metres, or about 3.22 decibels. While not stealthy by modern fighter jet standards, this test showcases the radar’s long-range tracking and targeting abilities against fast-moving aerial targets.
Although Iran has not disclosed the precise range at which the drone was first detected, estimates based on known radar specifications provide crucial context. The fire-control radar used in Bavar-373 is reportedly able to detect a target with a 0.01 m² RCS—typical of stealth platforms—at 82 kilometres, and targets with a 0.05 m² RCS at 123 kilometres.
However, the story doesn’t end there. According to military analysts, if the Bavar-373 incorporates or is upgraded with an L-band radar array—similar to those found in the U.S. AN/TPY-4 system—it could theoretically detect aircraft like the F-35 at distances of up to 218 kilometres. This stems from a known vulnerability in stealth aircraft design: while radar-absorbent coatings and geometry can scatter or absorb X-band frequencies (used in targeting radars), L-band and VHF frequencies are more difficult to deflect.
Technical diagrams included in the report simulate how the F-35’s stealth profile changes across radar frequencies, showing a significantly larger radar signature in the L-band spectrum. In this context, Iran’s radar technology—if sufficiently sophisticated—could begin to close the gap between theoretical stealth and practical detectability.
Iran’s defence doctrine has long rested on developing asymmetric capabilities to challenge technologically superior adversaries. With arms embargoes and sanctions choking off access to foreign military hardware, the Islamic Republic turned to an ambitious strategy: build what it cannot buy.
The Bavar-373 was originally developed as a domestic response to Russia’s S-300PMU2 air defence system, which Moscow delayed delivering during a period of heightened international sanctions. Rather than wait, Tehran pursued a parallel effort, combining insights from Russian, Chinese, and indigenous designs to create a high-end air defence system tailored for Iranian needs.
The final result is more than just a clone. The Bavar-373’s architecture incorporates several advanced features:
- Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar providing 360-degree coverage.
- Dual-band radar tracking (S-band and L-band) for greater versatility across stealth and conventional targets.
- Simultaneous tracking of up to 100 targets and the ability to engage six at once.
- Missiles with a reach exceeding 200 km, including the Sayyad-4B, which uses terminal active radar homing.
- Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) built to function in jamming-heavy environments.
This blend of mobility, precision, and redundancy makes the Bavar-373 a key pillar in Iran’s emerging layered air defence network.
The F-35 Lightning II, the cornerstone of American airpower and widely used by allies like Israel, was designed with near-invisibility in mind. Boasting a radar cross-section reportedly as small as 0.0015 m² in the X-band, the fighter is built to penetrate heavily defended airspace without detection. Yet stealth is not a cloak of invisibility; it is a delay mechanism—designed to reduce the range at which enemy radars can detect and track an aircraft, buying time for mission success or escape.
This delay becomes less effective when facing systems optimized for low-frequency radar bands. While stealth geometries and coatings excel against fire-control radars in the X-band, they are inherently less effective against the longer wavelengths used in L-band or VHF surveillance radars. In these bands, the aircraft’s cross-section can expand up to 0.5 m² or more, making it visible from farther away.
If the Bavar-373 is indeed operating with effective L-band capability and high-resolution processing, Iran may now possess a system that can reliably track, and potentially engage, fifth-generation fighters. That alone shifts the strategic calculus for air operations over or near Iranian territory.
The potential detection of stealth aircraft by Iran’s Bavar-373 carries profound geo-strategic implications. Five stand out:
- Elevated Airspace Security
Iran’s most sensitive assets—nuclear sites, missile silos, and military command nodes—have long been vulnerable to Western airstrikes, especially from stealth platforms. With the Bavar-373, Tehran could now credibly claim it can monitor, if not neutralize, these threats before they reach critical targets. This could embolden Iran to adopt a more aggressive posture in defending what it views as core strategic interests. - Asymmetric Counterbalance
The ability to deny stealth aircraft uncontested access to Iranian airspace undermines one of the West’s most significant force multipliers. In an age where fifth-generation platforms represent the apex of aerial dominance, the prospect of their detectability—even if partial—alters the risk/reward balance of military intervention. - Diplomatic Leverage
Air defence capabilities often translate into diplomatic capital. Iran, facing pressure over its nuclear programme, missile arsenal, and regional proxies, could leverage the Bavar-373’s performance to extract concessions in future negotiations. The message would be clear: aerial attack is no longer a low-risk option for Washington or its allies. - Regional Rebalancing
A credible stealth-tracking SAM system would likely prompt neighbours such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even Turkey to reassess their air defence frameworks. It could also trigger a regional arms race in radar and counter-radar technologies, especially as Gulf states rely heavily on American hardware for deterrence. - Prestige and Export Potential
For Iran, proving the viability of Bavar-373 could represent a coming-of-age moment for its military-industrial complex. Export partnerships—especially with nations under Western sanctions or with limited access to NATO-grade systems—could provide a new revenue stream and political alliance network. Countries in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America might see the Bavar-373 as a cost-effective, sovereign alternative to expensive Western or Russian platforms.
Scepticism is warranted. Iran’s history of military announcements is peppered with exaggeration and bravado, and independent verification of Bavar-373’s capabilities remains scarce. Military analysts caution that real-world performance can differ significantly from test conditions, especially in environments dominated by electronic warfare, cluttered signal environments, and coordinated decoy tactics.
Moreover, while detecting a stealth aircraft is one thing, successfully targeting and hitting it in combat conditions is another. The full kill chain—acquisition, track, intercept, and destroy—requires split-second coordination and robust networking, elements which are difficult to simulate in static tests.
Nonetheless, even partial success in tracking stealth targets could force adversaries to adopt less efficient, higher-risk operational profiles—flying higher, slower, or in greater numbers—all of which reduce combat effectiveness.
The reported capabilities of Iran’s Bavar-373 system, if substantiated, would represent a major advance in non-Western air defence technology. More importantly, it would puncture the assumption that stealth aircraft enjoy unchallenged operational freedom in any theatre short of a peer-level conflict.
While the F-35 remains a formidable tool of modern warfare, its dominance depends on a threat environment shaped by outdated radar systems and limited integrated air defence networks. If Iran has managed to change that equation—even slightly—it could mark the beginning of a new era in which even the most advanced jets must fly more carefully, more deliberately, and with greater risk.
