Iran’s National Security Council, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Mohsen Rezaei, publicly claimed that Pakistan has pledged to retaliate with nuclear weapons against Israel if the latter were to launch a nuclear strike on Iran. The unprecedented statement, broadcast on Iranian state television, has ignited fierce international debate over the potential expansion of nuclear deterrence beyond traditional fault lines.
“Pakistan has told us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, we will also attack it with nuclear weapons,” Rezaei declared, a statement that—though not corroborated by Islamabad—resonated across capitals from Washington to Riyadh.
The claim comes amid heightened regional tensions following Israel’s targeted military actions against key Iranian strategic facilities. While no official Pakistani government or military representative has confirmed such a nuclear contingency, Islamabad has, in recent weeks, vocally supported Iran—emphasizing Islamic unity and regional solidarity in the face of Israeli aggression.
The Pakistani government’s official stance remains carefully calibrated. No policy document or press briefing has indicated a doctrinal shift in Pakistan’s nuclear posture to include Israel. Yet, the depth of Islamabad’s diplomatic backing for Tehran has intensified. On June 14, in a thunderous address to Pakistan’s National Assembly, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif condemned Israeli strikes on Iran, Yemen, and Palestine, calling for “a unified Muslim response to Zionist aggression.”
“If Muslim nations don’t unite now, each will face the same fate,” Asif warned, challenging Muslim-majority countries with existing diplomatic ties with Israel to reconsider their alignments.
Asif went further, urging the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to convene an emergency summit. “We will support Iran at every international forum to protect their interests,” he said, reiterating Pakistan’s deep-rooted ties with Iran.
This powerful rhetorical pivot has been interpreted by some observers as a harbinger of potential military-policy recalibration—particularly if Israel-Iran hostilities escalate further. Others see it as ideological posturing aimed at domestic and pan-Islamic audiences.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, originally conceived to counter conventional and nuclear threats from India, has evolved into a sophisticated, flexible deterrent. At the core lies its Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) policy, which does not adhere to the “No First Use” principle embraced by other nuclear powers like India and China.
This doctrine allows Pakistan to use nuclear weapons under a variety of scenarios—from battlefield use to preemptive strikes in case of existential threats. The nation’s arsenal:
- Hatf-9/Nasr: Tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield deployment.
- Shaheen Series: Medium- and long-range ballistic missiles.
- Babur Cruise Missiles: Land and sea-based variants with nuclear capabilities.
The Shaheen-III, with a reported range of 2,750 kilometers, brings Israel within theoretical striking distance from western or southern Pakistan—a capability never officially directed at Tel Aviv but now impossible to ignore.
While Pakistani leadership maintains that its strategic orientation is India-centric, its growing arsenal tells a more expansive story. The Shaheen-III, test-fired multiple times since 2015, enables Pakistan to target areas as far west as the eastern Mediterranean.
More alarmingly, Pakistan has made significant progress on the Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile—equipped with MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles) capability. This technology allows a single missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads aimed at different targets, significantly enhancing first-strike potential and overwhelming advanced missile defence systems.
If fielded successfully, the Ababeel would render even sophisticated defence networks like Israel’s Iron Dome or Arrow-3 vulnerable in a saturation scenario.
Complementing its ballistic arsenal is Pakistan’s development of Babur-1B and Babur-3 cruise missiles. These platforms, capable of launch from land and sea, enhance strategic flexibility and survivability. While an operational Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) has not yet been publicly confirmed, ongoing sea-based developments suggest Pakistan is inching toward a second-strike capability—a pillar of credible nuclear deterrence.
If confirmed, this would complete Pakistan’s nuclear triad—air, land, and sea-based delivery systems—placing it in the elite league of states with comprehensive deterrence architectures.
Pakistan’s nuclear trajectory has long been viewed through the prism of its rivalry with India. However, Rezaei’s remarks and recent diplomatic signals suggest a potential broadening of Pakistan’s strategic horizon.
Historically, Islamabad has enjoyed close military, economic, and ideological ties with Arab and Muslim-majority nations, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. Its unyielding support for the Palestinian cause has also earned it credibility across the Muslim world. Yet, until now, these relationships have not translated into explicit military guarantees.
Analysts argue that should Pakistan formally extend its nuclear deterrent to Iran—whether directly or implicitly—it would mark a historic doctrinal rupture and upend the current equilibrium of both South Asian and Middle Eastern strategic architectures.
“Even if Pakistan never fires a missile, the mere perception that it could become a nuclear backstop for Iran alters deterrence dynamics,” says Dr. Miriam Levison, a senior fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “It forces Israel, the U.S., and Gulf states to recalculate their strategic assumptions.”
With capability comes responsibility—and danger. The introduction of Pakistan into the volatile Israel-Iran standoff increases the risk of miscalculation, preemptive doctrines, and crisis instability. In a worst-case scenario, even a limited exchange between Iran and Israel could trigger broader regional responses, with Pakistan—now seen as an ideological and strategic stakeholder—drawn into the fray.
The lack of clear communication channels between Pakistan and Israel further compounds the danger. Unlike India and China, which maintain hotlines and military-to-military engagement mechanisms, Pakistan and Israel have no formal diplomatic relations or deconfliction arrangements. This vacuum increases the probability that assumptions replace intelligence, leading to catastrophic errors.
Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding Pakistan’s red lines could either serve as a deterrent—or as a dangerous wildcard in an already combustible environment.
Western powers have so far responded with caution. While the U.S. State Department refused to directly comment on Rezaei’s statement, sources within NATO’s Strategic Command say contingency discussions are underway to assess the implications of a Pakistan-Israel nuclear dimension.
Meanwhile, Gulf states—particularly those with security agreements with both the U.S. and Israel—are alarmed. A senior UAE diplomat, speaking anonymously, described the development as “deeply unsettling” and “potentially irreversible if not addressed diplomatically.”
China and Russia, both allies of Pakistan and Iran in varying capacities, have called for “restraint and dialogue.” However, neither has condemned the remarks nor sought to mediate directly, preferring instead to use the crisis to highlight the “failures of U.S.-led regional policy.”
Whether Pakistan has formally guaranteed nuclear protection to Iran remains unconfirmed. But even the perception of such a pact has profound implications.
From a technical perspective, Pakistan can strike Israel using existing systems, should political or ideological will align. From a doctrinal standpoint, it has never limited its nuclear use to the Indian subcontinent. And from a geopolitical perspective, Islamabad stands at a unique intersection of Islamic solidarity, strategic reach, and asymmetric capability.
The question, therefore, is not just what Pakistan says or does—but what other nations believe it might do.
As the world navigates the post-unipolar era, with rising regional powers and shifting alliances, the traditional boundaries of deterrence are dissolving. South Asia can no longer be considered an isolated nuclear theatre, and Middle Eastern conflicts now carry the risk of spillover into adjacent regions.
In this context, Pakistan’s nuclear capability—once a regional deterrent—has evolved into a strategic factor in multiple theatres. The implications are vast:
- Israel must now consider a new nuclear vector.
- Iran finds itself potentially shielded by a credible third-party deterrent.
- India may react by accelerating its own arsenal expansion.
The U.S. and NATO face the challenge of managing a multi-front deterrence crisis without direct influence over all parties involved.
The strategic geography of nuclear deterrence has changed. With the right missile system and the wrong trigger, distances shrink and alliances entangle. Whether Pakistan has truly extended a nuclear shield over Iran remains ambiguous. But the world now knows that such a possibility exists—and that alone is enough to shift the balance of power.
