Israel’s October 27, 2026, election has left the country facing a potentially prolonged coalition battle, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc and his principal rival, former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief Gadi Eisenkot, competing to assemble the parliamentary majority needed to form the next government.
Exit polls suggest neither side has secured a clear path to the 61 seats required for a majority in the 120-member Knesset. Although Netanyahu’s Likud party appears to be emerging as the largest individual party, its position does not automatically guarantee that he will remain prime minister. In his post-election address, Netanyahu expressed confidence that he could form “a strong new right-wing government.”
The outcome could take weeks to resolve as political parties negotiate alliances, seek support from smaller factions and consider possible defections or a broader unity arrangement. Israel’s president must consult parliamentary factions before assigning a member of the Knesset the task of forming a government. If neither principal contender can secure a majority, the country could face another election in 2027.
The election, held nearly three years after the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, was a crucial test of Netanyahu’s long-standing leadership and his government’s handling of the resulting regional conflicts. Voter turnout reportedly reached 77.7 percent, the highest level in nearly three decades, reflecting substantial public engagement.
Arab-majority parties also appear to have made significant gains, potentially giving them considerable influence in coalition negotiations. Yet both Netanyahu and Eisenkot may find it politically difficult to depend on their support.
The immediate question is who will govern Israel. The more consequential question, however, is whether a change in leadership would substantially alter the country’s strategic direction toward the Palestinians, Lebanon, Iran, the United States, India and China.
The answer may be less dramatic than the electoral contest suggests. Netanyahu and Eisenkot differ over political accountability, the conduct of the war and the relationship between military operations and diplomatic objectives. But both come from a security establishment that prioritises Israeli military superiority and regards Iran and armed groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah as major threats.
An Eisenkot premiership would therefore be more likely to change the management and presentation of Israeli policy than to produce a fundamental strategic reversal.
Eisenkot: A change in leadership, not necessarily ideology
Eisenkot’s challenge to Netanyahu is rooted partly in the security failures surrounding the October 7 attacks and the government’s handling of the subsequent war.
A former IDF chief of staff, Eisenkot joined Netanyahu’s emergency war cabinet after the attacks but left in June 2024, arguing that the government lacked a credible post-war strategy. He has accused Netanyahu of failing to take responsibility for the security breakdown and of prolonging the conflict without a convincing political endgame.
When Eisenkot established his centrist Yashar party in September 2025, he campaigned on the slogan “Israel Must Win,” emphasising security, political accountability and a more direct approach to national leadership. His party platform also stresses strengthening the military, improving public education and restoring institutional checks and balances
His military background, however, offers little indication of a fundamental shift toward a more conciliatory regional policy.
Eisenkot is associated with the Dahiya Doctrine, a military approach that advocates overwhelming and disproportionate force against infrastructure in areas used by hostile armed groups. As a senior military commander, he also supported MABAM, Israel’s campaign between wars, involving intelligence operations and targeted strikes intended to weaken adversaries without triggering full-scale conflict.
His approach combines military pressure with an emphasis on strategic planning. He supports aggressive action against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but argues that military operations must serve clearly defined national objectives rather than the political survival of an individual leader.
This distinction could be significant for Israel’s conduct of future conflicts. Yet it does not necessarily imply a reduction in military pressure on its adversaries.
Palestine: Little prospect of a strategic breakthrough
On the Palestinian question, the differences between Netanyahu and Eisenkot appear more limited than their political rivalry might suggest.
Eisenkot opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state under the conventional two-state framework and supports substantial Israeli security control over the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. He has indicated that the Palestinian Authority would be preferable to continued Hamas rule, but that preference does not amount to support for Palestinian sovereignty.
He also supports Israeli settlements in occupied territory when he considers them consistent with national interests, while opposing some of the practices associated with the expansion of settlement outposts and violence by settlers.
His approach to Gaza centres on dismantling Hamas’s military capabilities and leadership, maintaining Israeli security arrangements and permitting reconstruction under conditions that protect Israel’s security interests.
Netanyahu’s government has pursued broadly similar strategic objectives, although its policies have been shaped by far-right coalition partners who favour settlement expansion and take a harder line on Palestinian political aspirations.
An Eisenkot government could therefore adopt a different tone, exercise greater discipline in its public messaging and place more emphasis on coordination with Washington. But a fundamental change in Israel’s position on Palestinian statehood would remain unlikely.
The distinction is important: a change in leadership could influence how Israel manages the conflict without necessarily changing its underlying territorial and security objectives.
Lebanon and Iran: Deterrence remains central
Lebanon would also remain a major security priority under Eisenkot.
He favours arrangements that protect northern Israel from Hezbollah, including a security zone or buffer arrangement, alongside greater American and French diplomatic involvement. This reflects a familiar Israeli military approach: weaken Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, prevent attacks across the border and use diplomatic mechanisms to reinforce deterrence.
Eisenkot’s association with the Dahiya Doctrine suggests that he would not necessarily hesitate to authorise overwhelming force if he believed Israeli security required it. His likely distinction from Netanyahu would be the effort to connect military operations to a clearer diplomatic framework and a more sustainable post-conflict arrangement.
Iran presents an even more fundamental continuity.
Both leaders regard preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons as a core Israeli security objective. Eisenkot has argued that the Iranian threat cannot be considered resolved while Tehran retains the capability and material to pursue a nuclear weapon.
His preferred approach would combine military pressure with diplomacy aimed at restricting Iran’s nuclear programme and securing verifiable limits on its capabilities. If negotiations failed, military action would remain an option.
Netanyahu has also sought to use military operations to constrain Iran’s regional influence and nuclear ambitions. The difference may lie in how each leader balances military action against diplomatic opportunities.
An Eisenkot administration could offer Washington a more predictable process for consultation and coordination, reducing the risk of unilateral decisions that complicate American regional diplomacy. Nevertheless, Tehran would still face an Israeli leadership committed to maintaining military superiority and preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Washington: Continuity with closer coordination
The United States would remain central to Israel’s strategic calculations regardless of who forms the next government.
US support for Israel rests on longstanding intelligence cooperation, defence assistance, military technology and shared regional security interests. Those foundations are institutional and are unlikely to disappear if Netanyahu loses office.
US President Donald Trump has supported Netanyahu, making a potential defeat for the Israeli prime minister a personal and political setback for him. But Washington’s broader interests extend beyond its relationship with any individual Israeli leader.
Eisenkot’s military background and emphasis on institutional coordination could encourage a more structured relationship with the United States. Greater consultation over military operations and clearer articulation of political objectives could make it easier for Washington to coordinate regional diplomacy, including efforts to expand relations between Israel and Arab countries.
Such a change would not necessarily mean that Israel would become less militarily assertive. Rather, it could make Israeli decisions more predictable for its principal strategic partner.
India: A relationship built to survive political change
India is also unlikely to substantially alter its relationship with Israel following a change of government.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Netanyahu have developed close political ties, but the bilateral partnership extends well beyond their personal relationship. Defence cooperation, water management, agriculture technology, innovation and other areas have created institutional links between the two countries.
The India-Israel relationship also intersects with the I2U2 framework, which brings together India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.
Eisenkot has given no indication that he would seek to downgrade relations with New Delhi. His emphasis on intelligence, defence and calibrated military operations is broadly compatible with India’s interest in maintaining security cooperation while avoiding unnecessary regional escalation.
A government led by Eisenkot could, in some respects, make India’s diplomatic balancing easier.
Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners have frequently taken positions on Gaza and the Palestinians that have complicated the diplomatic environment for countries seeking to maintain relations with Israel while supporting Palestinian rights. India has continued to pursue its strategic partnership with Israel while officially supporting a negotiated two-state solution.
A less ideologically confrontational Israeli government could give New Delhi greater room to sustain both relationships, including its partnerships across the Gulf.
The fundamental interests connecting India and Israel would remain, even if the political atmosphere surrounding the relationship changed.
China: A possible tightening of strategic scrutiny
China, by contrast, could face a more difficult strategic environment under an Eisenkot government.
During Netanyahu’s tenure, Israel maintained substantial economic relations with Beijing, including Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects and commercial technology. At the same time, Israel faced growing American pressure to scrutinise Chinese investments in strategically sensitive sectors.
Eisenkot’s military background and emphasis on cooperation with the United States could make his government more cautious about Chinese involvement in critical infrastructure, artificial intelligence and dual-use technologies.
Closer alignment with Washington would not necessarily end Israel-China trade. Israel would still have economic reasons to maintain commercial ties with the Chinese market.
However, an Eisenkot administration could be less willing to allow economic cooperation to create tensions with the United States over sensitive technology or security infrastructure.
That would reduce Israel’s room to balance its economic relationship with China against its dependence on American strategic support.
The real choice facing Israel
Israel’s election has exposed a divided political landscape, but it has not necessarily produced a choice between two fundamentally different strategic visions.
Netanyahu represents a familiar political leadership whose security policies have been accompanied by intense disputes over accountability, coalition politics and the objectives of war. Eisenkot offers a former military commander who promises greater institutional discipline, accountability and a clearer relationship between military action and political strategy.
The election’s unresolved outcome leaves both men facing difficult coalition arithmetic. With neither camp initially securing a clear parliamentary majority, smaller parties and Arab-led factions could play a decisive role, while the possibility of another election remains open.
If Eisenkot becomes prime minister, Israel could adopt a more predictable and institutionally coordinated approach to Washington, while maintaining a hard line toward Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Its position on Palestinian statehood, however, may change far less than the leadership transition would suggest.
If Netanyahu survives, the country’s broad security priorities will also remain familiar, although his ability to govern will depend on the coalition he can assemble.
Ultimately, Israel’s voters have challenged the political establishment without necessarily endorsing a wholesale reorientation of national strategy. The country may be choosing between a familiar prime minister and a familiar general, with the principal differences lying in leadership, accountability and the management of military power.
For Palestinians, Iran and Hezbollah, the prospect of an Eisenkot government offers little immediate assurance of a strategic reprieve. For Washington and New Delhi, it could offer a more predictable partner. For Beijing, it could mean tighter scrutiny of sensitive economic and technological ties.
