Japan is considering a significant expansion of its military presence on the remote island of Iwo Jima as rising Chinese naval activity beyond the First Island Chain fuels concern in Tokyo about the vulnerability of key Pacific bases such as Okinawa.
The move reflects a broader reassessment of Japan’s defense posture as China steadily expands its military reach across the western Pacific. Japanese officials increasingly worry that frontline bases close to East Asia—particularly those hosting American and Japanese forces—could be exposed to missile strikes in the opening stages of a conflict.
Against that backdrop, the island best known for one of the most brutal battles of World War II is re-emerging as a strategic focal point in modern Pacific defense planning.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense (Japan) plans to conduct a study in the coming fiscal year on upgrading the island’s air and port infrastructure.
The proposed improvements include extending the island’s runway, strengthening port facilities, and installing a floating pier capable of receiving large vessels transporting construction equipment and materials.
Officials are also considering the permanent deployment of Japan Self-Defense Forces fighter aircraft to the island. Such a deployment would enable rapid responses to foreign aircraft or naval vessels operating near Japan’s eastern maritime approaches.
The initiative would complement Japan’s ongoing military buildup across southern islands including Okinawa and Kyushu. Defense planners describe the upgrade as an effort to close what they call a “surveillance gap” on the Pacific side of the Japanese archipelago.
Unlike Japan’s southwestern island chain, which faces China across the East China Sea, the eastern Pacific approaches remain relatively thinly defended.
Iwo Jima’s remote location makes it a natural candidate for strengthening Japan’s depth of defense.
Located roughly 1,200 kilometers south of Tokyo, Iwo Jima sits within the Volcano Islands group and commands access to a vast exclusive economic zone extending deep into the Pacific Ocean.
Control of this region carries both military and economic importance.
Japanese officials believe the surrounding seabed may contain valuable resources, including deposits of rare earth minerals that have been discovered near remote Pacific islands.
These minerals are essential for high-technology industries ranging from electric vehicles to advanced defense systems, and securing them has become a strategic priority for many countries.
Expanding Japan’s infrastructure on the island could therefore help protect not only sea lanes and military operations but also long-term economic interests tied to seabed resource exploration.
Tokyo’s reassessment is driven largely by the growing reach of China’s military.
In recent years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has increased operations beyond the First Island Chain, the strategic line stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines.
Chinese aircraft carrier groups have begun sailing deeper into the Pacific, conducting exercises east of Japan and near critical sea lanes.
Japanese officials are also concerned about suspected seabed survey activities conducted by Chinese vessels. Such surveys could help map underwater terrain, including communication cables, while also improving submarine navigation and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
These activities signal Beijing’s determination to expand its operational reach and challenge long-standing maritime dominance held by the United States and its allies.
Despite its strategic appeal, expanding military infrastructure on Iwo Jima is not straightforward.
The island remains a sacred historical site due to the ferocious battle fought there during Battle of Iwo Jima, where thousands of Japanese and American troops lost their lives.
The island’s wartime legacy means any large-scale construction must carefully balance defense requirements with historical preservation.
Environmental and logistical challenges further complicate development.
Iwo Jima is a volcanic island with unstable terrain and limited natural infrastructure. Transporting materials requires long supply chains, and harsh environmental conditions can slow construction projects.
These constraints make any expansion expensive and technically challenging.
Despite these difficulties, analysts see significant strategic value in upgrading the island.
Defense analyst Yoshihiro Inaba noted in a December 2025 article for Naval News that Iwo Jima is currently the only island in the Pacific theater with a runway capable of supporting fighter operations by the Japan Self-Defense Forces.
This capability gives the island potential importance as an alternate operating base if frontline airfields closer to China were damaged or disabled during a conflict.
In particular, air bases in Okinawa and Japan’s southwestern islands could face heavy missile strikes in the opening phase of a war involving Taiwan.
If those facilities were degraded, aircraft could relocate to more distant bases such as Iwo Jima.
Such redundancy is increasingly seen as critical in modern warfare, where precision missiles can rapidly disable fixed infrastructure.
The growing threat posed by China’s missile forces is a central factor behind Japan’s evolving strategy.
According to the 2025 report from the US Department of Defense on Chinese military power, the People’s Liberation Army now possesses a large arsenal of long-range precision strike weapons capable of reaching far into the western Pacific.
These weapons could strike targets between roughly 2,800 and 3,700 kilometers from mainland China, placing numerous American and allied bases within range.
Key facilities such as Okinawa and even the strategically vital island of Guam could face missile attacks in a conflict scenario.
The vulnerability of Okinawa is particularly concerning because it hosts major air bases used by both Japanese and American forces.
Analysts warn that China’s missile arsenal could quickly disable these installations.
In a December 2024 analysis published by the Stimson Center, defense experts including Kelly Grieco argued that China could crater runways and taxiways at key bases such as Naha Air Base, Kadena Air Base, and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
Such strikes could prevent aircraft from taking off or landing, effectively grounding operations at the start of a conflict.
The analysis suggested that runways could remain unusable for fighter operations for roughly 280 hours—about 11 to 12 days—while tanker aircraft operations could be disrupted for around 800 hours, or more than 33 days.
These disruptions could severely degrade allied airpower in the critical early stages of a war.
Another problem is the limited fortification of many Pacific air bases.
Defense analysts Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton noted in a January 2025 report by the Hudson Institute that many American aircraft stationed in Japan are parked in open areas with little physical protection.
Precision missile strikes could therefore destroy aircraft, fuel systems and support infrastructure before they even take off.
The lack of hardened shelters and fortified facilities means that a relatively small number of well-placed missile strikes could produce disproportionate damage.
This vulnerability has prompted both Washington and Tokyo to reconsider how they disperse and protect air assets across the Pacific.
Enhancing infrastructure on Iwo Jima could strengthen the deterrent value of the alliance between Japan and the United States.
Every airfield extension, port upgrade or logistics facility built by Japan could potentially be used by American forces during joint operations.
The two countries already operate under a close security partnership anchored in the US–Japan Security Alliance.
Expanding the island’s capabilities could provide additional operating locations for both Japanese and US aircraft, increasing flexibility in wartime scenarios.
Such development aligns with evolving American military concepts for operating under missile threat.
The United States Air Force has developed the Agile Combat Employment strategy to adapt to the realities of modern missile warfare.
Under this concept, aircraft and support personnel are dispersed across numerous small or temporary bases rather than concentrated at a handful of large installations.
The aim is to complicate enemy targeting by creating a network of potential operating locations.
If one base is damaged, aircraft could quickly relocate to another, maintaining operational tempo and survivability.
Upgraded infrastructure on Iwo Jima could support this approach by providing an additional air operations hub along the Second Island Chain.
Strategists often view the Pacific through the lens of island chains.
The First Island Chain runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, forming the immediate maritime boundary between China and the open Pacific.
Beyond it lies the Second Island Chain, stretching from the Bonin Islands and Volcano Islands through the Marianas to western New Guinea.
By strengthening bases within this second line, the United States and its allies hope to maintain operational freedom even if frontline bases closer to China are damaged or temporarily disabled.
Iwo Jima’s location places it squarely within this second defensive belt.
However, even bases in the Second Island Chain face their own vulnerabilities.
A May 2025 report by the US Government Accountability Office warned that Guam’s defenses remain limited despite its strategic importance.
The island is currently protected mainly by a single Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery consisting of six launchers and a radar unit.
Additional protection is sometimes provided by US Navy ships operating nearby.
Washington plans to develop a more comprehensive defensive architecture known as the Guam Defense System, designed to counter advanced ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles.
But the system is unlikely to become fully operational until the late 2020s or early 2030s.
Some analysts argue that the United States is attempting to mitigate Guam’s vulnerability by developing alternative bases.
Facilities are being expanded on islands such as Tinian and Palau.
Yet critics say these locations may not be sufficient.
Security analyst Lyle Goldstein wrote in an October 2025 article for Defense Priorities that the number of backup bases remains limited and that their distance from potential conflict zones could reduce their effectiveness.
Goldstein also emphasized China’s numerical advantages in air power within its own region.
In a conflict over Taiwan, aerial battles would likely occur close to China’s mainland, where Chinese aircraft could operate with shorter supply lines and greater numbers.
The dispersed basing concept itself has also drawn criticism.
In a July 2024 article for US Naval Institute journal Proceedings, analyst Michael Blaser argued that Agile Combat Employment may rely on assumptions that no longer hold in an era of advanced surveillance.
One key assumption is that adversaries would lack enough long-range missiles to strike numerous dispersed bases simultaneously.
However, China’s expanding missile inventory could enable simultaneous attacks on multiple airfields across the region.
Another assumption is that the enemy’s targeting cycle would be slower than the pace at which US aircraft generate sorties.
Yet advances in artificial intelligence, satellite surveillance and automated imagery analysis could dramatically shorten that timeline.
According to Blaser, modern reconnaissance systems might reduce the enemy “kill chain” to less than 24 hours, allowing rapid identification and targeting of dispersed aircraft.
Without strong deception, camouflage and mobility measures, dispersed basing could become increasingly vulnerable.
Within this complex strategic environment, Japan’s interest in expanding its presence on Iwo Jima reflects a broader transformation of its defense strategy.
For decades, Japan maintained a relatively restrained military posture under its post-World War II constitution.
But growing regional tensions and the rise of China’s military power have prompted Tokyo to gradually increase defense spending and strengthen alliances.
Japan is investing in new missile defenses, counter-strike capabilities and expanded basing infrastructure across its southern islands.
Upgrading Iwo Jima represents another layer of that strategy.
By pushing military infrastructure deeper into the Pacific, Japan aims to ensure that its forces—and those of its allies—retain operational flexibility even if frontline bases are damaged.
The logic behind the plan is rooted in redundancy.
Modern warfare increasingly revolves around long-range precision strikes capable of disabling key infrastructure within minutes.
Air bases, ports and command centers that once seemed secure can now be targeted from hundreds or thousands of kilometers away.
Creating multiple operating locations spreads risk and reduces the chance that a single strike could cripple military operations.
Iwo Jima, despite its remoteness, offers an opportunity to create such depth.
Yet the effectiveness of this strategy remains uncertain.
China’s expanding missile reach, improvements in surveillance technology and growing naval presence in the Pacific could complicate efforts to establish secure fallback bases.
Even facilities located far from the Chinese mainland may not be immune to modern long-range strike systems.
At the same time, the logistical costs of building and maintaining infrastructure on remote islands are immense.
Japan must also balance military expansion with environmental concerns and the island’s historical legacy.
A symbol of shifting Pacific geopolitics
Still, the renewed focus on Iwo Jima underscores how dramatically the strategic landscape of the Pacific has changed.
An island once synonymous with the brutality of World War II is now reappearing in contemporary defense planning as a potential hub for future air and naval operations.
For Japan and its allies, strengthening the island’s infrastructure represents an attempt to adapt to an era defined by missile warfare, contested sea lanes and intensifying great-power competition.
