Pakistan’s assertion that multiple countries are seeking to acquire the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet has thrust the China-Pakistan jointly developed aircraft into an unexpected spotlight, prompting questions about whether Islamabad’s aviation industry can translate rising international interest into timely deliveries.
A Bloomberg report on Tuesday noted that in the past month alone, Iraq, Bangladesh and Indonesia have expressed interest in the JF-17, citing Pakistan’s Armed Forces. Reuters separately reported that Saudi Arabia and Libya are also exploring the aircraft, following Pakistan’s public praise of the jet’s performance during its May 2025 aerial confrontation with India.
The sudden clustering of inquiries from at least five countries has triggered debate over Pakistan Aeronautical Complex’s (PAC) production capacity, which Bloomberg estimated at fewer than 20 aircraft per year, with most currently destined for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
Yet Chinese aviation analysts argue that what appears to be a bottleneck is in fact a “sweet problem,” reflecting strong market validation rather than structural weakness. Backed by Chinese industrial support, they say, Pakistan’s capacity constraints are unlikely to become a long-term obstacle if firm export orders materialise.
Pakistan’s Minister for Defence Production, Raza Hayat Harraj, has framed the JF-17’s rising appeal in starkly economic terms. Each aircraft costs between USD 40 million and USD 50 million, depending on variant and customer customisation, a price bracket that sharply undercuts Western fighters whose unit costs have climbed well beyond the reach of many developing and middle-income states.
This pricing advantage, combined with claims of combat-proven performance, has elevated the JF-17 from a niche export option into a serious contender for air forces seeking to replace ageing fourth-generation fleets without assuming the financial, political, or sustainment burdens associated with aircraft such as the Rafale or F-16.
The convergence of interest from South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa suggests that the JF-17’s appeal is no longer limited to politically aligned customers. Instead, it reflects a broader reassessment by multiple air forces grappling with escalating acquisition costs, export restrictions, and supply-chain weaponisation amid deepening geopolitical fragmentation.
Harraj has also confirmed that China is “definitely involved” in ongoing negotiations, underscoring that any JF-17 export remains inseparable from the Sino-Pakistani defence-industrial framework rather than a standalone Pakistani commercial transaction.
Bloomberg’s analysis focused on whether Pakistan can expand production quickly enough to meet a sudden surge in demand. The report cited former Air Vice Marshal Faaiz Amir, who noted that PAC’s output has historically been calibrated to match domestic requirements rather than speculative export ambitions.
“So far it was like whatever Pakistan can make, the capacity was just enough for Pakistan,” Amir was quoted as saying. “We had a long view for exports, but you don’t build capacity for exports before there are orders.”
That assessment highlights a structural reality: PAC’s Kamra facilities were designed primarily to recapitalise the PAF, not to sustain simultaneous high-volume exports to multiple international customers.
Pakistan currently produces approximately 16 to 18 JF-17s annually. With the PAF operating more than 150 aircraft and needing to replace over 250 ageing fighters—including Mirage III/Vs and remaining F-7s—any diversion of production slots to exports risks stretching domestic replacement timelines.
The existing export backlog already presents challenges. Azerbaijan’s USD 1.6 billion contract for 40 JF-17s, signed in 2024, represents a significant commitment that alone could occupy several years of output at current production rates.
Chinese aerospace analysts dismiss concerns over capacity as premature. Wang Ya’nan, a prominent Chinese aviation expert, has described the situation as a “sweet problem,” arguing that strong demand provides the commercial justification needed to scale production.
According to this view, there are no major technical obstacles preventing expanded output. The JF-17’s modular design and established supply chains allow for production responsibilities to be redistributed or expanded, potentially including partial assembly or component manufacturing within China itself.
From Beijing’s perspective, every additional export strengthens Chinese aerospace influence indirectly, embedding Chinese avionics, weapons and sustainment ecosystems into new air forces without the political exposure that often accompanies direct Chinese fighter exports.
For Pakistan, Chinese backing offers access to capital, industrial expertise, and supply-chain resilience—factors that could enable PAC to evolve from a domestically focused facility into a mid-tier global fighter production hub.
However, Western analysts remain cautious. Sameer Lalwani has argued that expanding production lines requires substantial upfront investment, and it remains unclear whether Pakistan, China, or prospective buyers are willing to commit capital without long-term guaranteed orders.
International attention has been amplified by Pakistan’s claim that the JF-17 performed “exceptionally” during the May 2025 Indo-Pakistani aerial confrontation. While details of the engagement remain contested, the narrative of combat validation has resonated strongly among prospective buyers who prioritise operational credibility over peacetime marketing claims.
Defence analyst Manoj Harjani noted that the JF-17 is increasingly perceived as a market disruptor, not only because of its price, but because of its reported performance in a high-intensity scenario.
Former PAF Air Marshal Asim Suleiman described the international interest as “a very big achievement,” reflecting the programme’s transformation from a national necessity into a geopolitical export instrument.
The JF-17’s origins lie in Pakistan’s strategic isolation following its 1998 nuclear tests, when Western sanctions abruptly severed access to advanced combat aircraft. The 1999 agreement with China that evolved the Super-7 concept into the JF-17 was as much a political hedge as a technical programme.
From its first prototype rollout in 2003 to operational induction in 2007, the JF-17 was designed as a pragmatic solution: a lightweight, multirole fighter capable of replacing obsolete fleets without exceeding Pakistan’s fiscal or technological constraints.
Early Block I aircraft prioritised air defence sufficiency over sophistication. Block II marked maturation, introducing air-to-air refuelling and expanded avionics integration. The Block III variant represents the most significant leap, incorporating an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, helmet-mounted display systems, and compatibility with advanced beyond-visual-range missiles such as the PL-15.
Powered by the Klimov RD-93 engine, the JF-17 offers a Mach 1.6 top speed, a combat radius exceeding 1,350 kilometres, and a payload capacity of roughly 3,629 kilograms—figures that provide credible flexibility for air forces without extensive tanker fleets.
Yet reliance on foreign engines and high-end avionics underscores persistent vulnerabilities. Disruptions affecting Russian or Chinese supply chains could ripple through the programme, complicating Pakistan’s long-standing ambition for greater industrial autonomy.
The reported interest from Iraq, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Libya reflects a convergence of operational need and geopolitical pragmatism rather than opportunistic enthusiasm.
Iraq seeks an affordable multirole platform capable of counter-insurgency and border security missions without the sustainment burden of Western fighters. Bangladesh’s evaluation—potentially involving a 16-aircraft order—signals a desire to replace ageing MiG-29s with a modern platform compatible with its Chinese-centric logistics ecosystem.
Indonesia’s exploratory discussions for up to 40 aircraft are particularly significant. Jakarta is simultaneously acquiring Rafales and pursuing F-15s, but rising costs and delivery delays have prompted consideration of a lower-cost multirole complement.
Saudi Arabia’s reported interest in as many as 50 JF-17s, under a deal valued around USD 2 billion, reflects Riyadh’s broader strategy of diversifying suppliers and converting financial leverage into tangible defence capabilities.
Libya’s interest, though politically contentious, highlights how the JF-17’s availability outside Western export regimes appeals to states constrained by embargoes or fragmented governance.
The expansion of JF-17 exports would deepen Sino-Pakistani defence integration, reinforcing what both capitals describe as an “all-weather” partnership. For Pakistan, exports generate foreign currency inflows and expand strategic influence across regions traditionally dominated by Western arms suppliers.
However, proliferation carries risks. Deliveries could alter local balances of power or intensify arms races in already volatile regions.
In South Asia, export momentum strengthens Pakistan’s strategic narrative relative to India’s Rafale-centric modernisation, even as New Delhi advances indigenous Tejas variants. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s interest underscores a regional recalibration where affordability increasingly outweighs prestige.
As Harjani observed, every sale requires consensus between Islamabad and Beijing, ensuring alignment with broader strategic objectives rather than purely commercial considerations.
Looking ahead, Pakistan envisions the JF-17 as one layer within a tiered airpower architecture alongside J-10C fighters and potential future stealth platforms. This vision depends on uninterrupted production and timely deliveries.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s confirmation that several countries are “actively” engaged in negotiations signals political confidence, but industrial execution remains the decisive variable.
If supported by Chinese capital infusion and industrial restructuring, Pakistan could theoretically deliver more than 100 aircraft within three years, transforming PAC into a credible mid-tier global fighter exporter.
Without such investment, export timelines risk stretching to the point where aircraft approach mid-life upon delivery, undermining the programme’s value proposition.
The JF-17’s rise embodies resilience, affordability and geopolitical alignment. Whether it evolves into a scalable global fighter programme or remains constrained by finite industrial throughput will depend on whether ambition is matched by industrial realism.
