Pakistan has concluded one of the largest weapons export agreements in its history, signing a multibillion-dollar deal to supply combat aircraft and military equipment to Libya’s eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), according to information published by Reuters on December 22, 2025.
Pakistani officials said the agreement was finalized following a meeting in Benghazi between Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Saddam Khalifa Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the LNA. Deliveries are expected to unfold over roughly two and a half years.
A copy of the draft agreement lists 16 JF-17 fighter jets and 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft. One Pakistani official confirmed the list as accurate, while noting that final quantities for some items could still shift within the broader package. Two officials put the total value above $4 billion, with another two estimating it at $4.6 billion, suggesting the price tag likely includes not only aircraft but also training, sustainment, and additional equipment for land, sea, and air operations. The LNA’s own media channel confirmed the defense cooperation pact with Pakistan, citing weapons sales, joint training, and military manufacturing. Haftar described the agreement as a strategic pivot, stating on Al Hadath television that a new phase of military cooperation with Pakistan had begun.
The centerpiece of the deal is the JF-17 fighter. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex lists the aircraft’s maximum takeoff weight at 13,500 kilograms, maximum speed at Mach 1.6, and service ceiling at 55,500 feet. The lightweight multirole platform is designed to deliver credible combat performance while avoiding the cost and political restrictions often associated with Western fighters. The JF-17 carries weapons and pods on seven external hardpoints, with a payload capacity of approximately 3,700 kilograms, supporting medium-range air-to-air missiles and a variety of air-to-ground munitions. Pakistan has marketed the fighter abroad as a lower-cost multirole option, offered with training and maintenance outside Western supply chains—an important factor for Libya, where access to spare parts and political recognition are key operational considerations.
Equally significant are the 12 Super Mushak trainers, which play a crucial role in sustaining an air arm capable of regeneration. Powered by a Textron Lycoming IO-540 engine producing 260 horsepower, the aircraft is designed for basic flight training. In Libya, where airpower has been fractured since 2011, pairing a modern fighter fleet with trainers creates a pipeline for screening, primary flight instruction, and conversion to jets. This ensures that the force can sustain losses, develop domestic instructors, and reduce reliance on foreign contractors, whose presence can become politically sensitive or vulnerable to sanctions.
The timing of the acquisition reflects Libya’s fragmented geography and the economics of coercion. Haftar controls much of eastern and southern Libya, including key oilfields, while the UN-recognized Government of National Unity holds the west. Neither side has achieved a durable monopoly of force. In this context, a 16-aircraft fighter wing is less about achieving classic air superiority and more about operational flexibility. It enables rapid strike missions, armed overwatch of ground columns, deterrent patrols over oil infrastructure, and the ability to threaten time-sensitive targets across long desert lines of communication. It also acts as a counterweight to drone-centric warfare, which has defined Libya’s post-2019 battlespace.
The deal’s legality and implementation will be closely scrutinized because Libya remains under a UN arms embargo imposed in February 2011, requiring Security Council approval for weapons transfers. Pakistani officials have insisted the arrangement does not violate UN restrictions and cited broader international engagement with Libyan actors, though enforcement of the embargo has historically been inconsistent. European Union Operation IRINI, which monitors aerial, satellite, and maritime activity, adds another layer of scrutiny.
Politically, the deal is striking not only for its size but also for its direction. In a global arms market dominated by the United States and select European exporters, a multibillion-dollar transfer from one Global South nation to another is rare, particularly involving combat aircraft. Pakistan is seeking to expand its defense export footprint by promoting a domestic industry spanning aircraft, armored vehicles, munitions, and naval construction, leveraging the operational reputation of its air force.
The Libya-Pakistan agreement also reflects a broader strategic approach. Large-scale Pakistani arms exports to Libya have been limited in recent decades. Here, the deal is framed as a comprehensive cooperation framework, including joint training and potential military manufacturing, echoing Pakistan’s approach in other markets where aircraft sales are part of long-term industrial and institutional partnerships rather than one-off deliveries. Senior officers from both sides’ general staffs reportedly participated in the signing, underscoring the intended durability of the relationship.
Financial details of the transaction remain undisclosed, but Libya’s oil-dependent economy provides context. Hydrocarbons dominate exports and government revenue, giving the LNA access to hard currency required to negotiate a multiyear acquisition plan despite fragmented state institutions.
If deliveries include robust spares, integrated munitions, and a sustainable training pipeline, the LNA could field the most coherent fast-jet capability seen from any Libyan faction in years. This would shift the balance from ad hoc drone strikes toward a more structured air posture. Conversely, delays in sustainment or political pressure could render the deal largely symbolic. Regardless, the scale and South-to-South nature of the agreement mark a watershed moment for both Haftar’s strategy and Pakistan’s ambition to compete as a full-spectrum defense exporter on the global stage.
