Kevin Rudd’s decision to step down early from his role as Australia’s ambassador to the United States has taken Canberra and Washington by surprise, but the move carries a sense of inevitability when viewed against the arc of his career and the strategic moment confronting global politics.
Rudd’s term was not due to expire until next year, and any extension would likely have been limited. Yet the reopening of a familiar door — his former role as president of the Asia Society — offered him an opportunity to return to what he has long regarded as his central intellectual and strategic preoccupation: China and its evolving relationship with the United States. From March, Rudd will head the Asia Society’s Center for China Analysis, placing him back at the forefront of global debates on the defining geopolitical rivalry of the era.
In his departure statement, Rudd underscored this motivation, saying he had always believed that “the future of US–China relations … is the core question for the future stability of our region and the world.” It is a view consistent with his scholarly work and public interventions over more than a decade, most recently his 2024 book How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World. Few Australian political figures have invested as much intellectual capital in understanding China’s leadership, ideology and strategic intent.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on Tuesday praised Rudd as “regarded as perhaps the world’s most eminent and sought-after expert on China and China–US relations.” There is little reason to doubt Albanese’s insistence that Rudd’s decision to leave early was his own. The government had weathered the most serious political risks associated with Rudd’s appointment — namely, the legacy of his sharply critical remarks about Donald Trump before becoming ambassador.
Those remarks, which included describing Trump as the “most destructive president in history,” were well documented and widely circulated. Rudd’s language, characteristically forceful and sometimes flamboyant, did not go unnoticed among Trump’s inner circle. The potential for embarrassment lingered even after Rudd took up his diplomatic post. During Albanese’s October meeting with Trump, the president’s pointed aside — “I don’t like you either, and I probably never will” — served as a reminder that the past had not been forgotten.
Yet those negatives were largely neutralised, and in many respects outweighed, by Rudd’s effectiveness in Washington. His deep knowledge of China, fluent Mandarin, and relentless work ethic made him an unusually influential ambassador. Few could rival his energy or his determination to pursue Australian interests across multiple fronts simultaneously. While his hyperactivity sometimes tested the patience of colleagues in Canberra, it also delivered tangible results.
Rudd knew Washington’s policy ecosystem intimately and cultivated access across the administration, Congress and the broader strategic community. Senior US officials were frequent visitors to the Australian residence, often engaging with visiting Australian ministers and officials in informal but productive settings. His tenure coincided initially with Joe Biden’s presidency, providing the Albanese government with a relatively sympathetic administration that shared many policy instincts.
The environment became more complex with Trump’s return to office. The second Trump term proved more assertive, more transactional and surrounded by figures with little sentimental attachment to alliance orthodoxy. For Australia, the challenges were substantial: a US review of AUKUS, the imposition and management of Trump-era tariffs, and negotiations over a critical minerals agreement vital to supply chain security.
Securing the first bilateral meeting between Albanese and Trump was, by most accounts, extraordinarily difficult. Rudd was central to navigating these sensitivities, balancing reassurance with persistence. He was also heavily involved in advancing investment ties and played a key role in the long-running efforts that ultimately secured Julian Assange’s return to Australia.
Against this backdrop, Rudd’s departure may remove an occasional irritant in dealings with the Trump administration. But it also leaves a formidable gap. His successor — yet to be named — will inherit a demanding brief and an exceptionally high benchmark. Few diplomats combine Rudd’s subject-matter expertise, political instincts and sheer stamina.
Rudd has made clear he will remain based in the United States, dividing his time between New York and Washington. His voice, therefore, will not fade from public debate. Through the Asia Society’s Center for China Analysis, he will have a powerful platform to shape policy conversations on US–China relations, Indo-Pacific security and global order. As he described it, the centre is a “think and do” tank — suggesting an intent not just to analyse events, but to influence them.
Whether Rudd’s return to a more overtly public role will be tempered by the lessons of diplomacy remains to be seen. His past experience has shown both the impact and the risks of unfiltered commentary, particularly on social media. For Australia, his early exit marks the end of a distinctive ambassadorship at a time of global uncertainty — and the beginning of a new phase in which Kevin Rudd, once again, speaks primarily as a strategist rather than a state representative.
