On September 2, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un crossed the border into China aboard his armored green train, en route to attend Beijing’s grand commemoration of Japan’s surrender in World War II. The move, confirmed by Pyongyang’s state newspaper Rodong Sinmun, places Kim alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a highly symbolic event that doubles as a projection of geopolitical power in 2025’s tense international climate.
The gathering—ostensibly to honor the 80th anniversary of Japan’s capitulation—has been orchestrated by Beijing as a display of historical unity, military strength, and a deliberate challenge to Western influence in Asia. But Kim’s presence carries outsized implications: it underscores North Korea’s deepening dependence on Beijing, affirms the reemergence of a Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang axis, and sends a direct warning to Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul.
Kim Jong Un’s arrival itself was emblematic. State media images showed him inside his trademark armored train—dark green, heavily fortified, and resembling the bulletproof convoys he has used on rare trips abroad. With him was a high-level entourage, including Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui and Kim Song Nam, director of the Workers’ Party International Affairs Department. Both figures symbolize the twin pillars of North Korea’s diplomacy: nuclear weapons and China ties.
Choe Son Hui is one of the few women to rise to the top echelons of Pyongyang’s rigid hierarchy. Having shaped North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy since the early 2000s, she now occupies a pivotal role as Pyongyang attempts to cement its legitimacy through weapons development while simultaneously seeking strategic shelter under China’s wing.
Kim Song Nam, for his part, is the regime’s China whisperer. Analysts, such as Michael Madden of the Stimson Center, describe him as Kim Jong Un’s “point man” for managing relations with Beijing’s Communist Party. His presence signals that this visit is as much about strategic coordination as it is about ceremony.
For Xi Jinping, this week’s commemoration is more than historical remembrance. Beijing has advertised the parade as a “celebration of peace and victory,” but the massive military spectacle—including thousands of troops in lockstep formation, advanced drone flyovers, hypersonic missile carriers, and cyberwarfare units—will serve as a not-so-subtle message to the United States and its allies.
It also provides a rare opportunity for Xi, Putin, and Kim to appear together—a tableau that starkly contrasts with Western portrayals of China and Russia as isolated aggressors. Instead, the parade casts them as pillars of a rising “multipolar world,” standing against what they call U.S.-led “hegemony.”
“Kim’s attendance is no small gesture,” said Professor Zhao Tong, a Beijing-based security scholar. “It shows North Korea is no longer content to stay in the shadows of international diplomacy. Kim wants to be seen as part of a front with Xi and Putin, shaping the rules of the new order.”
Before stepping onto Chinese soil, Kim staged a calculated domestic move: he visited a missile laboratory in Pyongyang. State news agency KCNA reported that he inspected facilities developing carbon-fiber composite materials for solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
The lab claims its engines can generate propulsion of nearly 2,000 kilonewtons, destined for North Korea’s next-generation “Hwasong-19” and “Hwasong-20” ICBMs—missiles designed to reach the continental United States.
That Kim chose to highlight these weapons on the eve of his China trip was no coincidence. It sends a layered message: to Washington, that North Korea’s arsenal continues to grow; to Beijing, that Pyongyang brings hard power to the table in any strategic partnership; and to domestic audiences, that Kim remains the architect of national strength.
Kim’s visit also dovetails with Xi Jinping’s broader push for what Beijing calls a “new global order.” During a summit earlier this week, Xi urged nations of the Global South to band together against unfair Western-dominated systems of governance. Russia, India, and other countries joined in echoing the call.
North Korea wasted no time aligning itself with this narrative. A North Korean vice foreign minister praised Xi’s stance, declaring that Pyongyang would expand cooperation with Beijing to pursue “fairer global governance.” In Pyongyang’s lexicon, this phrase usually doubles as a euphemism for resisting U.S. sanctions and military pressure.
By presenting themselves as defenders of the Global South, Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang hope to attract sympathy from countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia—regions that have long bristled at Western economic dominance.
The symbolism of Xi, Putin, and Kim appearing together cannot be overstated. For years, North Korea balanced uneasily between Moscow and Beijing, wary of overdependence on either. But Western sanctions, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and intensifying U.S.-China rivalry have accelerated alignment.
China provides North Korea with food, fuel, and trade lifelines. Russia, in need of artillery shells and laborers for its grinding war in Ukraine, has drawn closer to Pyongyang, reportedly trading food and energy for military supplies. Now, with Beijing hosting both, the three leaders are openly projecting unity.
“It’s a marriage of convenience, but it’s becoming institutionalized,” noted Jenny Town, a North Korea expert at the Stimson Center. “All three share a common enemy in the United States and its alliances. That alone is enough to drive deeper coordination.”
Unsurprisingly, the planned parade has rattled Northeast Asia. In Tokyo, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s office expressed concern that the event could be used to “legitimize military aggression under the guise of history.” South Korea’s foreign ministry condemned Kim’s missile factory visit as “provocative and destabilizing,” warning that closer military cooperation among Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow “will not be ignored.”
The United States, while officially downplaying the parade, has quietly stepped up consultations with Seoul and Tokyo. Pentagon officials privately worry that North Korea’s new solid-fuel ICBMs, if successfully deployed, could reduce warning times for U.S. missile defenses, thereby increasing the risk of miscalculation.
China’s choice to spotlight the WWII surrender of Japan carries its own symbolic weight. For Beijing, the commemoration reinforces its narrative of having endured Japanese aggression and emerged victorious alongside global allies. Yet, critics note that the event has been repurposed into a display of contemporary power rather than historical memory.
Japan, for its part, views the spectacle warily. The Japanese government has urged restraint, warning that “militarized commemorations of history only serve to reopen old wounds.” Yet, with its own military undergoing rapid modernization and constitutional reinterpretation, Tokyo knows it cannot afford to ignore the symbolism of three nuclear-armed neighbors standing together.
For Kim Jong Un, the visit to China is as much about optics as substance. Domestically, he can broadcast images of himself standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Xi and Putin—proof to North Koreans that their leader is respected and relevant on the world stage. Internationally, his attendance sends a defiant message: North Korea is not isolated, but embedded in the heart of a rising anti-Western bloc.
Still, risks abound. Overreliance on Beijing could reduce Pyongyang’s bargaining power, while overt military cooperation with Russia could provoke harsher sanctions from the West. Yet, Kim appears confident that the benefits outweigh the costs—especially with Washington distracted by crises in Europe and the Middle East.
The real significance of Kim’s trip may lie not in the parade itself, but in the sidelines. Behind closed doors, Xi, Putin, and Kim are likely to discuss arms deals, economic aid, and coordination at the United Nations. Already, there are whispers of a new trilateral framework that could formalize cooperation across military, economic, and political fronts.
For Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, this represents a strategic challenge. Containing North Korea becomes far more complex when Pyongyang enjoys the backing of two permanent UN Security Council members. Deterring China’s assertiveness in the Pacific also becomes trickier when Beijing can count on both Moscow and Pyongyang to flank U.S. alliances.
Kim Jong Un’s armored train journey into China on September 2 is more than a diplomatic footnote. It marks a moment when three authoritarian powers—China, Russia, and North Korea—are consciously binding themselves together against a common adversary. The optics of Xi, Putin, and Kim sharing the same stage will reverberate far beyond Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.
