Hidden deep beneath a mountain and shrouded in reinforced concrete, the Fordo Fuel Enrichment Plant has long been a focal point of international anxiety. As the United States launched a series of targeted strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities last month, it is this subterranean site—once exposed to the world in 2009 by Western intelligence—that has once again taken center stage in global geopolitics.
The site, widely considered the most heavily surveilled patch of earth, is more than just a facility: it is a symbol of Iranian resilience, technological ambition, and the unrelenting focus of a decades-long international standoff over nuclear weapons development. Now, as the dust settles from the U.S. strikes, the pressing question emerges: How much damage was really done—and where does the conflict go from here?
Fordo was never meant to be easy to destroy. Located near the city of Qom, it lies more than 80 meters underground and beneath a protective shell of rock and concrete. Designed with the explicit purpose of withstanding aerial bombardment, it represents Iran’s determination to keep its nuclear options viable, no matter the pressure.
When it was publicly outed by U.S., British, and French leaders in 2009, it sent shockwaves through diplomatic and intelligence communities. Since then, Fordo has been under intense satellite scrutiny, cyber infiltration, and signal interception, becoming what one intelligence official recently described as “the most spied-on place on the planet.”
Yet, despite all this surveillance, Western intelligence agencies now face a daunting task: understanding exactly what damage the latest U.S. strikes have caused and whether Iran’s nuclear program has merely been delayed—or remains alive beneath the mountain’s unyielding crust.
According to a leaked assessment from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), early conclusions suggest that the core components of Iran’s enrichment program at Fordo were not destroyed. The report, however, is labeled “low confidence”—a crucial classification that underscores just how little is definitively known.
General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged the uncertainty. “Final battle damage will take some time,” he told reporters, adding that early satellite imagery and signal intercepts provide “limited insight” into subterranean damage.
Despite deploying newly developed bunker-busting munitions for the first time in an operational setting, the absence of visible signs—such as mountain cave-ins or significant surface deformation—suggests that Fordo’s structural defenses may have held firm.
“We used multiple penetrator bombs, precisely coordinated,” a senior Pentagon source said. “But the Iranians engineered that facility to endure just this kind of assault.”
However, not all is impenetrable. Experts emphasize that even if the bombs failed to reach the core chambers directly, the shockwaves and vibrations would still have had an impact. “Centrifuge systems are incredibly delicate,” said Dr. Ali Tavassoli, a nuclear physicist at MIT. “Even a slight jolt can send them careening off axis, permanently damaging them.”
That possibility opens up a murky middle ground: the strike may not have obliterated the facility, but it could have rendered it temporarily inoperable.
Western analysts are now turning to an array of technical intelligence tools—far beyond traditional satellite imaging—to build a clearer picture. Seismic sensors, typically used to monitor nuclear tests and earthquakes, are helping estimate the depth and magnitude of the explosions. Radiation “sniffers” mounted on surveillance aircraft are on constant patrol, though so far, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported no detectable radiation spikes.
More experimental technologies, like LIDAR (light detection and ranging), are also being deployed to map potential internal structural changes. By using airborne laser pulses, analysts hope to gain a rough 3D model of any cavity shifts beneath the mountain—though this too is far from precise.
Still, technical data only goes so far. Human intelligence—intercepts of Iranian military chatter, informants on the ground, or insider leaks—will be essential in painting a fuller picture.
A crucial lead comes from surveillance footage taken just before the attacks. A fleet of lorries was seen entering and exiting Fordo, prompting speculation that Iran may have preemptively moved its most critical assets.
“There’s a very real possibility that Iran dispersed its enriched uranium stockpile before the bombs fell,” one Western intelligence officer said. “And maybe some centrifuge components too. That would significantly reduce the long-term effectiveness of the strike.”
If confirmed, this maneuver would indicate both strategic foresight on Iran’s part and potential gaps in U.S. real-time intelligence. It also raises the question: Where were these materials taken?
Analysts are now closely watching another site known by the codename “Pickaxe”—another mountain-enclosed location believed to be under development. Unlike Fordo, which had been known for over a decade, Pickaxe is relatively new on the intelligence community’s radar. Some fear it could become the next Fordo—an alternative sanctuary for Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
“This is a classic game of shell and shadow,” said Emily Raskin, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies in London. “Every time the West targets one site, Iran shifts capabilities to another. It’s nuclear whack-a-mole.”
Despite this, Iran’s overall nuclear infrastructure remains largely centralized. The destruction or disabling of a site like Fordo still represents a substantial setback. But Raskin warns against celebrating too early: “They’ve got the expertise and the motive. You can bomb facilities, but you can’t bomb knowledge out of existence.”
The human factor in Iran’s nuclear program has long been a point of vulnerability. In recent years, Israel has waged a covert campaign of targeted assassinations against top Iranian nuclear scientists.
The most recent strike wave reignited that campaign. In the days preceding the Fordo bombing, two physicists associated with the Iranian Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) were killed in separate incidents—both believed to be Mossad operations. By removing the scientific architects of the program, Israel and its allies aim not only to delay but to disorient Iran’s technical continuity.
Weaponization—the process of turning enriched uranium into an actual bomb—requires knowledge that cannot be easily replaced. Precision engineering, metallurgy, high-speed implosion triggers, and miniaturization all demand elite expertise. Disrupting this knowledge base could lengthen Iran’s path to a weapon far more effectively than simply destroying hardware.
The Biden administration is now caught in a familiar strategic bind: how to measure success in a shadow war that may never yield definitive outcomes.
Pentagon sources have signaled that more strikes could follow if intelligence confirms Iran is reconstructing its program. But there is growing concern that repeated bombings may only push Tehran to accelerate efforts in deeper secrecy and potentially withdraw from international agreements altogether.
Some administration officials argue that the attack was necessary to “buy time” and send a message. Others worry that it may end the possibility of diplomatic re-engagement altogether, especially if Iran believes survival lies solely in nuclear deterrence.
Iran’s public response has been defiant but measured. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared the strikes “an act of terrorism,” but did not signal immediate retaliation. President Ebrahim Raisi vowed that Iran’s nuclear program would continue “without pause,” but did not announce any military response either.
Behind closed doors, however, analysts believe Iran is reassessing. “They will probably try to reconstitute the program, but more carefully and with more redundancy,” one European diplomat involved in IAEA monitoring said. “They won’t be reckless. But they won’t back down either.”
In the months ahead, intelligence agencies on all sides will enter a new phase of cat-and-mouse. The IAEA’s inspections—already limited due to Iran’s restrictions—may become even more constrained. Cyberwarfare, drone reconnaissance, and covert operations will increase in frequency and intensity.
The stakes are high. If Iran is seen to be rebuilding its program rapidly, pressure will mount in Washington, Tel Aviv, and even in European capitals for further military action.
Conversely, if evidence suggests Iran is slowing or refraining, diplomatic overtures may resume—though the pathway back to a deal akin to the 2015 JCPOA seems increasingly remote.
Fordo, scarred but standing, is now both a battlefield and a bellwether. It represents not only a tactical challenge for military planners but also a strategic puzzle for policymakers. Did the U.S. attack meaningfully delay Iran’s path to the bomb, or merely provoke it to run faster in the dark?
