Corruption in the military is increasingly emerging as a global concern, with scandals and procurement scams surfacing across continents. From battlefield-dependent Ukraine to the strategic might of China and the United States, and from struggling democracies like Romania to rising defence markets in Asia and Africa, recent developments show that defence corruption is neither isolated nor diminishing—it is expanding.
At present, global attention is focused heavily on the corruption scandal engulfing Ukraine and the mounting pressure it places on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The crisis—deeply damaging to Kyiv’s reputation abroad—comes at a time when Ukraine’s military survival depends almost entirely on the integrity and efficiency of its defence institutions. Yet the Ukrainian case is only one instance in a much wider pattern. Emerging evidence indicates similar trends in other regions, involving military elites, political leaders, and global defence corporations.
On November 13, Romanian authorities arrested a former senator accused of attempting to bribe the country’s defence minister with €1 million to facilitate a fraudulent arms procurement scheme. The proposed plan involved purchasing Russian-style artillery shells from Kazakhstan, importing them into Romania, rebranding them as Romanian-manufactured munitions, and then selling them onward to Ukraine.
The scheme’s long-term goal was even more ambitious: to position the participating network to benefit from future funding under the European Union’s Rearmament of Europe programme launched in March to bolster defence production within the bloc. The case has sparked widespread political backlash within Romania and renewed criticism of the EU’s oversight mechanisms over its defence funding initiatives.
Romania is not alone. In August, Bulgarian investigative agencies carried out sweeping raids across Sofia and other cities involving allegations of overpricing in arms sales to Ukraine. According to investigators, intermediaries and officials artificially inflated prices to generate illicit profits, exploiting the urgency of Ukraine’s wartime procurement needs.
One of the most significant recent developments is China’s internal military purge. Last month, nine senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers were expelled from both the Communist Party and the military. Among them was General He Weidong, formerly China’s second-highest-ranking military official and a member of the powerful Politburo.
He Weidong’s fall is historic for several reasons. He is the highest-ranking general to be disgraced in recent years, the first sitting Politburo member since 2017 to face an investigation, and the third general from President Xi Jinping’s current Central Military Commission to be removed. The charges, officially described as “serious crimes related to their duties,” are widely understood to be corruption-related.
What is striking is that many of those targeted were promoted by Xi himself as part of his drive to strengthen party control over the military. Yet since 2017, dozens of top officers—frequently handpicked by Xi—have been implicated. The pattern illustrates deep-rooted structural corruption in China’s military establishment, despite Xi’s decade-long anti-graft campaign.
Corruption linked to military procurement has also surfaced in the United States. In May, a group of Democratic Senators attempted to block $3.5 billion in arms sales to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, arguing that the deals could personally benefit former President Donald Trump’s family.
The UAE package included Chinook helicopters, F-16 components, and repairs for Apache, Black Hawk, and Chinook helicopters. Qatar’s deal involved the acquisition of MQ-9B Predator drones and associated systems.
Senators alleged that the Emirati investment firm MGX planned to finance a $2 billion investment using a stablecoin issued by World Liberty Financial—a cryptocurrency venture backed by the Trump family. They argued this created a direct conflict of interest, linking White House decision-making to private financial gain.
India is no stranger to high-profile defence corruption, with the infamous Bofors scandal having toppled the Rajiv Gandhi government and tainted Indian politics for decades. More recently, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has continued probing allegations that executives of AgustaWestland and Finmeccanica paid kickbacks to Indian intermediaries and senior officials to manipulate technical evaluations and secure a lucrative contract for 12 helicopters.
These cases illustrate how corruption in military procurement has targeted governments across the political spectrum and remains an entrenched problem despite reforms.
These incidents, while diverse, reflect a common pattern. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), corruption in the arms trade accounts for roughly 40% of all corruption in global transactions. Such corruption undermines democratic oversight, misallocates public funds, and erodes trust in national security institutions.
Robert Barrington, Professor of Corruption Studies at Sussex University, states bluntly: “The international arms trade is probably the single highest risk sector for corruption, and it has been for years.”
The most common mechanism is the payment of large commissions or kickbacks. Middlemen—sometimes disguised as technical advisors or consultants—receive payments that are then distributed to political and military decision-makers who facilitate the deals. This system operates in secrecy and often involves multiple jurisdictions, shell companies, and opaque financial networks.
A study by the World Peace Foundation (WPF), which maintains a Corruption Tracker database covering 63 countries and 81 companies over 45 years, reveals a striking contradiction: more than 80% of corruption cases involve NATO members, and 69% involve at least one Global North country selling arms to the Global South.
Yet the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) consistently ranks these seller countries among the world’s least corrupt. In fact, 86% of cases tracked by the WPF involve a country ranked among the top 30 least corrupt nations.
This sharp mismatch between perception and reality raises serious questions about global anti-corruption metrics.
The WPF study highlights the problem of “price gouging”—inflating defence contract prices far beyond justified levels. The defence industry is dominated by a handful of corporations, creating limited competition and allowing suppliers to inflate bids, particularly on large-scale procurement.
AUKUS Submarine Program: Australia’s commitment to purchase up to eight nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS is projected to cost an astronomical AUD$368 billion by 2050. Before joining AUKUS, Canberra cancelled a €56 billion contract with France for conventional submarines, paying a €555 million penalty.
Hunter-class Frigates: Costs for this BAE Systems project have ballooned from AUD$35 billion to AUD$65 billion.
F-35 Program: The Lockheed Martin F-35 remains the most expensive weapons program in history, with a projected lifetime cost exceeding $2 trillion. Lockheed Martin recently settled a $30 million case for inflating F-35-related prices.
The study cites similar cases in Tanzania, Indonesia, and even wartime Ukraine, where missing mortar rounds and improper procurement procedures have led to losses.
Between 2011 and 2019, Niger received nearly $240 million in U.S. military support as part of a spending surge of about $1 billion. Audits later revealed more than $137 million was lost to over-invoicing, waste, and corruption. Much of the procurement was routed through Russian, Ukrainian, and Chinese state-run arms firms. Political elites siphoned off funds under the cover of national security, demonstrating how fragile states become particularly vulnerable to defence-related graft.
Two structural drivers stand out across global cases:
Secrecy, justified in the name of national security, which shields military procurement from public scrutiny and oversight.
Limited competition, especially in capital-intensive defence projects where only a few companies dominate, enabling price inflation and collusion.
As countries continue to increase defence spending amid geopolitical tensions, the risk of corruption is likely to grow—not shrink—unless transparency, oversight, and accountability mechanisms are strengthened globally.
