Myanmar’s junta leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, arrived in China this Tuesday for a summit of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) — his first known visit to the country since orchestrating Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021. While the visit demonstrates Myanmar’s reliance on China, it has prompted mixed reactions from analysts who view the invitation as a sign of China’s cautious but necessary support for the regime. The diplomatic implications of this visit highlight Beijing’s strategic but guarded stance toward Myanmar, driven largely by regional stability and economic interests rather than an endorsement of the junta itself.
The GMS Summit, held in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming, brings together representatives from Myanmar, China, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia to discuss regional issues and economic cooperation. Though Min Aung Hlaing’s participation is nominally centered around regional concerns, the visit carries significant geopolitical overtones. China’s approach to the event has been deliberately understated; Beijing emphasized the summit’s regional nature and downplayed the implications of Min Aung Hlaing’s attendance, suggesting that the invitation does not amount to a clear endorsement of his regime.
Richard Horsey, a senior advisor for Myanmar at Crisis Group, commented on the cautious tone China has maintained regarding Myanmar’s leadership, noting that Beijing’s invitation to Min Aung Hlaing is not a definitive endorsement. “While this still implies recognition as head of state, it does not have the same diplomatic weight as a bilateral invitation to visit Beijing,” Horsey remarked. Since taking power in 2021, Min Aung Hlaing has sought Beijing’s support as a means of legitimacy, but the restrained nature of this invitation reflects China’s own apprehensions.
China’s tepid endorsement of Min Aung Hlaing’s government, however, also reflects its concerns over stability in Myanmar. With clashes between the junta and rebel forces intensifying, Beijing appears to favor maintaining a somewhat stable relationship with Myanmar’s leadership — as the region’s turbulence directly impacts its border security, economic projects, and energy interests.
At the heart of China’s vested interest in Myanmar is the strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a trillion-dollar endeavor to construct infrastructure and trade routes linking Asia, Africa, and Europe. Myanmar’s location offers China a key land route to the Indian Ocean, circumventing the congested Strait of Malacca. Over the past decade, China has invested heavily in Myanmar’s infrastructure, including pipelines, railways, and ports, to secure energy access and economic growth for its landlocked southwestern regions.
Jason Tower, an expert from the United States Institute of Peace, points out that “Beijing has now made clear its intentions for the Myanmar military to succeed” due to the regime’s essential role in protecting China’s BRI investments. China has also supported Myanmar’s commitment to elections, which the junta has promised to hold, albeit under highly controversial terms. The political legitimacy of such an election is questioned by many, given the junta’s suppression of major political opposition and ongoing armed clashes in various regions. Still, Beijing has shown tacit support, as a semblance of political stability would benefit China’s economic projects in Myanmar.
While Min Aung Hlaing seeks reassurance from China, his regime has been severely destabilized by rising rebel resistance, which now controls an area roughly the size of Bosnia. These rebel advances, some of which have occurred near Myanmar’s border with China, raise serious security concerns for Beijing. Notably, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), one of Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic armed groups, has achieved significant military gains against the junta, capturing the city of Lashio earlier this year. Located near major trading routes, Lashio’s capture marked a critical shift in regional power and prompted Beijing to reconsider its stance.
According to Tower, China’s response has been to cut off resources, such as electricity and internet access, to MNDAA-held areas near its Yunnan Province, indicating Beijing’s displeasure with the rebels’ encroachment into strategic zones. This measure is both a warning to the insurgents and an indication of China’s fragile relationship with Myanmar’s military. Despite this intervention, Beijing’s stance on directly supporting the junta is still fraught with caution due to a longstanding mutual mistrust, fueled in part by historical conflicts between the two countries.
