Four years after Myanmar’s military coup, the country’s civil war remains deeply unpredictable. If one word could define the situation in 2025, it is “fluidity”—a precarious balance of power where no single faction can claim decisive control. The military junta, formally known as the State Administration Council (SAC), faces mounting pressure from ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), yet resistance forces themselves remain fragmented and face significant obstacles in waging a coordinated campaign.
While predictions about the war’s trajectory abound, one certainty remains: Myanmar’s accelerating economic collapse and deepening humanitarian crisis. Yet amid the chaos, two starkly contrasting realities on the ground are shaping the war’s future. The first is the continued success of ethnic armed organizations in securing their own territories. The second is the failure of Bamar-majority resistance forces to consolidate into a unified army capable of advancing from guerrilla tactics to mobile warfare.
These competing dynamics will likely determine the course of the war in 2025, potentially in ways that could challenge China’s efforts to impose a Pax Sinica across Myanmar.
Ethnic Armies’ Gains and the Buffer Zone Strategy
Since late 2023, ethnic armed organizations have dealt crushing defeats to the SAC, securing and expanding their autonomous strongholds. Key victories include:
- The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Kokang, northeastern Shan State
- The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), operating in northern Shan State
- The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin State
- The Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State
These groups have employed conventional maneuver warfare rather than guerrilla tactics, allowing them to push the military out of large swaths of territory. Their success has not only strengthened their own positions but has also provided a lifeline to resistance groups in central Myanmar, where the military remains entrenched in urban centers.
To counterbalance the junta’s power, ethnic forces have increasingly pursued a “buffer zone” strategy—supporting, supplying, and training Bamar-majority PDFs near their own territories. This policy has played out most visibly in:
- Northern Sagaing Region – The KIA has bolstered PDF forces and directly participated in operations, capturing strategic towns such as Kawlin and Pinlebu.
- Mandalay Region – The TNLA has supported the Mandalay PDF in extending operations into northern Mandalay townships.
- Eastern Bago and Karen State – The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has helped PDFs establish footholds beyond Karen State, threatening key military command centers.
- Arakan Yoma and Ayeyarwady Delta – The AA has expanded operations into Magwe and Bago regions, and more recently into the economically crucial Ayeyarwady Delta.
Bamar Resistance
While EROs have gained ground, the Bamar-majority resistance remains fragmented. Since the 2021 coup, numerous PDFs have emerged across Myanmar, but they have struggled to transition from localized guerrilla attacks to a coordinated, large-scale military strategy. This failure stems from several factors:
- Lack of Centralized Command – The National Unity Government’s (NUG) Ministry of Defense lacks the resources and authority to impose unified leadership over the diverse PDF units.
- Resource Shortages – The resistance remains critically under-equipped in weapons and ammunition, making sustained offensives against heavily armed junta forces difficult.
- Leadership Challenges – The absence of experienced military leadership and strategic coordination has hindered efforts to develop a long-term plan to defeat the SAC.
While PDFs have been successful in launching hit-and-run attacks against military convoys and outposts, they remain incapable of capturing and holding major urban centers. The result is a battlefield stalemate, where the military maintains control of cities but struggles to project power into the rural areas where resistance forces operate.
As EROs solidify control over their own territories and PDFs intensify their attacks, key regions are emerging as potential game-changers in the conflict.
- The Ayeyarwady Valley and Ka Pa Sa Industrial Belt
The AA’s expansion into central Myanmar puts increasing pressure on the Ayeyarwady Valley, home to Myanmar’s key defense industries. The military’s Ka Pa Sa network of munitions factories, which produces weapons for junta forces, is now within striking range of resistance forces. The potential disruption of these industrial hubs could have severe consequences for the military’s ability to sustain operations.
- The Ayeyarwady Delta: Myanmar’s Economic Heartland
The AA’s recent incursions into the Ayeyarwady Delta are strategically significant. As the country’s primary rice-producing region, the Delta is vital for Myanmar’s food security and economy. Any prolonged conflict here could not only weaken the junta financially but also trigger wider instability.
- The Sittaung Valley and Eastern Bago
The KNLA’s expansion into the Sittaung Valley threatens key military supply routes and command centers, particularly in Toungoo, where the military’s Southern Regional Military Command is based. A successful PDF push here could further isolate junta forces in central Myanmar.
Military Reactions and SAC’s Diminishing Control
The military has responded to these developments by deploying elite divisions to counter resistance offensives. In January, the junta dispatched the 99th Light Infantry Division to combat AA advances in the Arakan Yoma region. However, by early February, this force suffered heavy losses, further underscoring the SAC’s struggles to hold territory outside major urban centers.
Similarly, reinforcements from Yangon Command were rushed to Pathein to prevent the AA from advancing deeper into the Delta, but fighting remains ongoing. Despite these deployments, the junta’s ability to sustain prolonged counteroffensives is in question due to growing manpower shortages and declining morale among its forces.
A Tipping Point in 2025?
With intensified pressure on the regime’s industrial and economic heartlands, the war may be approaching a critical juncture. The possibility of a rapid collapse, however, remains uncertain due to several complicating factors:
- China’s Role – Beijing has pressured the TNLA to accept a ceasefire, reflecting its broader goal of maintaining stability in northern Myanmar. If China actively intervenes to prop up the SAC, it could prolong the conflict.
- Ethnic Resistance Priorities – EROs have historically prioritized securing their own territories over launching full-scale offensives against the junta. While buffer zones provide crucial support to PDFs, it remains unclear whether groups like the AA or KIA would commit to a broader push into central Myanmar.
- The SAC’s Electoral Strategy – The junta has floated the possibility of holding elections in late 2025, a move widely seen as an attempt to cement its rule. If the SAC is unable to secure key territories before then, the election plan may collapse, further weakening its grip on power.
The trajectory of Myanmar’s civil war in 2025 remains uncertain, but several key trends are evident. Ethnic resistance forces continue to expand their control, while the Bamar-majority resistance struggles to achieve unity. The military, despite its superior firepower, is increasingly on the defensive, facing threats to its industrial and economic core.
If the junta loses control over vital industrial zones and food-producing regions, the war could reach a decisive turning point. Whether this leads to the departure of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, negotiations, or further escalation remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: the days of SAC’s unchallenged rule are over.
