China’s Ministry of National Defense made a bold and scathing accusation, condemning NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) for “spreading its evil hooks” into the Asia-Pacific region . This comment, delivered by Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang, reflected Beijing’s deepening frustration with NATO’s expanding role beyond its traditional Euro-Atlantic sphere. For China, NATO is more than a military alliance; it is perceived as a destabilizing force, sowing the seeds of war and chaos in regions from Afghanistan and Iraq to Libya and Ukraine.
The timing of China’s condemnation is telling. On July 10, NATO issued its final communiqué at a summit in Washington, explicitly identifying China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The document also labeled China as a systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security, setting the stage for a broader geopolitical confrontation. While NATO has increasingly emphasized cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies, Beijing views this shift as a direct threat to its strategic ambitions and regional influence. In this context, China’s accusations appear not just defensive, but indicative of its growing unease about the strategic encirclement it perceives.
NATO’s Growing Concern: China as a Systemic Challenge
To understand China’s harsh rhetoric, it’s essential to consider the language used by NATO in its most recent communiqué. The document went beyond merely criticizing China’s support for Russia, expressing concerns about various aspects of Chinese policy, including its cyber activities, space capabilities, and nuclear arsenal. The communiqué warned:
“The PRC continues to pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security… We call on the PRC to uphold its commitment to act responsibly in cyberspace… We urge the PRC to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.”
The document also referenced China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, calling for transparency and engagement to reduce risks. This multifaceted critique reveals that NATO’s concerns with China extend far beyond its relationship with Russia. NATO’s focus on issues like cybersecurity, space militarization, and nuclear proliferation underscores the Alliance’s growing apprehension about China’s expanding military and technological capabilities.
Yet, the question remains: will NATO’s attitude towards China soften if Beijing withdraws its support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict? The answer, as NATO’s communiqué suggests, is a resounding no. China’s geopolitical ambitions and its increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific have made it a long-term challenge for NATO, regardless of its stance on Ukraine.
NATO’s Indo-Pacific Pivot: The Rise of IP-4
One of the most notable shifts in NATO’s strategic focus has been its engagement with the Indo-Pacific. The alliance has been strengthening ties with four key regional players, often referred to as the “IP-4″—Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. NATO argues that the Indo-Pacific is not just a regional issue but a global one, with developments there directly impacting Euro-Atlantic security.
The strategic linkage between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters was established well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States, a key player in both regions, had already been advocating for NATO to recognize the interconnectedness of global security challenges. In fact, the EU’s 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific explicitly stated that the security of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait would directly impact European prosperity and security.
In this context, NATO has been actively cultivating its relationships with IP-4 members. In 2022, leaders from these countries participated in NATO’s summit in Madrid, marking the first time that heads of state from the Indo-Pacific had been involved in NATO proceedings. By July 2023, these relationships had deepened further, with the launch of new flagship projects focusing on areas such as military healthcare, cybersecurity, and disinformation, as well as the broader use of technology in defense.
NATO’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific is not just about responding to immediate threats but also about promoting shared values and burden-sharing. The Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are increasingly seen as interconnected in the global order. According to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, “developments in [the Indo-Pacific] can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.”
For European NATO members, engagement in the Indo-Pacific also serves a practical purpose. It allows them to contribute meaningfully to global security while reinforcing their value as allies to the United States. By assisting the U.S. in addressing its most significant strategic challenge—China—Europe can demonstrate that it is a valuable partner in maintaining global stability. This argument is particularly compelling as some American strategists have called for a pivot away from Europe to focus more resources on the Indo-Pacific.
For NATO, this strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific is not just about containing China, but also about maintaining the relevance of the alliance in an increasingly multipolar world. The security of global trade routes, particularly the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, is not just an issue for Asia but one that has far-reaching implications for Europe’s security and economic well-being.
European Allies’ Response to the Indo-Pacific Challenge
Leading European nations like France, Germany, and the UK have also recognized the significance of the Indo-Pacific to their national security interests. The UK, for example, sent a carrier task group to the region in recent years and is expected to do so again. It has also signed agreements with Japan for the stationing of forces, signaling its long-term commitment to Indo-Pacific security. Similarly, France and Italy have sent naval task groups to the region, underscoring their role in maintaining freedom of navigation in crucial waterways.
Defense cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific powers is also on the rise. For example, South Korea’s multi-billion-dollar arms sales to Poland and the UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Air Program highlight the increasing defense industrial collaboration across regions. These bilateral agreements reflect a broader European consensus that security in the Indo-Pacific cannot be separated from Euro-Atlantic security.
At the same time, European engagement in the Indo-Pacific also faces significant hurdles. Germany, for instance, is embroiled in a domestic debate about the economic costs of a more confrontational stance towards China. With a trade relationship worth €250 billion ($274 billion), China is Germany’s largest trading partner, making any shift towards Indo-Pacific security a potentially costly endeavor. Likewise, France, particularly under President Emmanuel Macron, has shown reluctance to burn bridges with China, even going so far as to veto a proposal to open a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.
China’s Uneasy Response: Economic Power vs. Strategic Threat
Despite NATO’s growing involvement in the Indo-Pacific, China still wields significant economic power in the region and beyond. This economic influence ensures that, at least for now, NATO as an institution will likely avoid direct confrontation with China. While individual NATO members may engage in more assertive actions against China, the alliance itself is unlikely to take a unified stance aimed at containing Beijing’s rise.
However, China’s concerns are not entirely misplaced. NATO’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through its partnerships with IP-4 countries, signals a long-term strategy that could potentially limit China’s strategic influence in the region. The deepening military ties between NATO countries and key Indo-Pacific nations—such as Japan and Australia—pose a challenge to China’s broader ambitions.
The AUKUS agreement, for instance, which will see Australian submariners trained aboard UK submarines and Australia purchasing nuclear-powered submarines from the U.S., highlights the growing military collaboration aimed at countering Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. Such developments suggest that, while NATO may not seek direct confrontation with China, its growing presence in the region is designed to serve as a counterbalance to Beijing’s ambitions.
Taiwan and the Tipping Point
While NATO’s current involvement in the Indo-Pacific remains largely cooperative and focused on strengthening partnerships, the strategic landscape could shift dramatically in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. A military conflict over Taiwan could trigger a far more robust response from NATO, particularly given the alliance’s focus on upholding the rules-based international order and its commitment to freedom of navigation.
In such a scenario, NATO’s symbolic support in the form of joint military drills could quickly evolve into more substantive military engagement, especially if the United States, as NATO’s leading member, calls for collective action. However, any such involvement would be contingent on consensus within the alliance—a consensus that may be difficult to achieve given the divergent economic and strategic interests of its members.
NATO’s evolving relationship with China reflects the growing complexities of a multipolar world. While China views NATO as a destabilizing force that sows chaos in regions far from its traditional sphere, NATO sees China as a systemic challenge to the global order, particularly in areas like cybersecurity, nuclear proliferation, and regional security in the Indo-Pacific. As NATO continues to strengthen its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, China’s concerns about encirclement are unlikely to dissipate.
At the same time, divisions within NATO, particularly among European members like France and Germany, may prevent the alliance from fully committing to a strategy of containment against China. However, should Beijing’s actions, particularly concerning Taiwan, become more aggressive, NATO’s current stance of cooperation and strategic dialogue could rapidly shift towards confrontation.
