Egypt has announced a new security arrangement with Somalia, a landmark deal that will see Egyptian soldiers stationed in Somalia to cooperate directly with their Somali counterparts. The stated aim is to bolster regional security, aligning with the African Union’s renewed stabilization efforts in Somalia. The deal comes at a delicate time in East Africa, where regional tensions and instability are increasingly prominent.
Notably, Ethiopia has criticized the move, alleging that certain actors are taking steps to “destabilize the region.” This security pact follows a bilateral meeting in August between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. This security agreement comes against a backdrop of longstanding tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, primarily driven by disputes over the Nile River, a vital resource for both nations.
Tensions Over Nile Water
Egypt and Ethiopia’s historical rivalry is deeply rooted in conflicts over the use of the Nile River. The Nile is crucial to Egypt’s survival, providing the lifeblood for agriculture, drinking water, and hydroelectric power generation. However, disputes over water rights have strained relations between the two countries for decades.
In 1959, Egypt signed the Nile Waters Agreement with Sudan, securing the flow of water from the Nile into both countries. Ethiopia was notably absent from this agreement, a point of contention that has lingered for decades. Egypt’s development of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s, facilitated by the treaty, allowed it to harness the Nile for its agricultural and economic growth. The dam was a critical infrastructure project, unlocking vast agricultural potential while providing hydroelectric power for Egypt’s booming population.
Ethiopia, for its part, has long sought similar developmental gains, culminating in the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile. The dam, completed in 2023, has raised alarm in Cairo, as it siphons off water to fill reservoirs, potentially reducing the flow to downstream countries, including Egypt. At full capacity, the dam could hold around 74 billion cubic meters of water, posing a significant threat to Egypt’s water security.
While the GERD’s completion has not yet triggered immediate disaster for Egypt, the long-term consequences could be dire. By 2050, Egypt’s population is projected to reach 160 million, intensifying pressure on its water resources. The power to control the Nile’s flow now lies in Ethiopia’s hands, making Egypt vulnerable to potential water shortages as its reliance on the river deepens.
Geopolitical Scope of Egypt-Ethiopia Rivalry
The Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry is no longer confined to water disputes; it has begun to spill into the wider Horn of Africa, with both nations seeking to assert influence beyond their borders. In January, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, a breakaway state from Somalia. The move alarmed Egypt, which subsequently pledged support to the Somali central government.
By aligning with Somalia, Egypt is positioning itself as a counterbalance to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. Egypt’s support for Somalia comes not only through rhetoric but through tangible actions, such as the newly signed security pact. Egypt’s involvement in Somalia is likely motivated by both geopolitical considerations and a desire to increase pressure on Ethiopia amid their ongoing water disputes.
The region’s historical context also plays a role. Ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region have long been a source of tension between Somalia and Ethiopia. In the late 1970s, Somalia attempted to annex the Ogaden, leading to a brief war with Ethiopia. Despite Somalia’s defeat, the conflict has remained a sensitive issue for both countries. Egypt’s closer relationship with Somalia adds another layer of complexity to these historical grievances.
Limitations of Geography and Likelihood of Proxy Conflict
Despite the increasing tensions, a full-scale war between Egypt and Ethiopia seems unlikely due to geographic constraints. The two nations are separated by more than 800 kilometers of Sudanese territory, making a direct land invasion nearly impossible. Additionally, Ethiopia’s lack of sea access limits its military options against Egypt, while any large-scale aerial conflict would need to pass through Sudanese or Eritrean airspace, further complicating matters.
The most likely scenario, therefore, is a limited or proxy conflict. Ethiopia could potentially use Somaliland as a proxy to counter Egyptian influence in Somalia, while Egypt might seek to exploit Ethiopia’s internal ethnic cleavages. The Ogaden region, where ethnic Somalis live, could serve as a flashpoint if Egypt were to back separatist movements or exploit sectarian tensions.
However, Ethiopia has demonstrated a willingness to take a hard line on internal unrest, particularly with the recent conflict in Tigray. The Ethiopian government’s aggressive stance toward foreign-backed uprisings suggests that any Egyptian attempts to foment unrest in the Ogaden region would likely escalate tensions, further destabilizing the region.
Somaliland’s Role in the Conflict
Somaliland’s role in this broader geopolitical context is crucial. Though internationally recognized as part of Somalia, Somaliland has operated as a de facto independent state since 1991. Its relative stability and the strategic port of Berbera have attracted international attention, including investments from Ethiopia and the UAE.
The recent port deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia has aggravated tensions with Somalia’s central government, which opposes any agreements that undermine Somali territorial integrity. Yet, despite the growing friction, a full-scale war between Somaliland and Somalia remains unlikely. Both sides are heavily reliant on international backing, with the African Union and Western powers focused on combating the Islamist insurgency in southern Somalia rather than fueling conflict in the north.
Somalia also lacks the resources to forcibly reintegrate Somaliland, while Somaliland’s government is wary of any actions that could provoke an international backlash. Miscalculations, however, remain a risk. With Egypt and Ethiopia both seeking to assert influence in the region, Somaliland’s strategic importance is likely to increase, potentially making it a focal point in their wider rivalry.
Regional Powers: Turkey, UAE, and Their Interests
The Horn of Africa has become a battleground for influence among regional powers, with Egypt and Ethiopia only two players in a larger game. Turkey and the UAE, in particular, have both sought to expand their influence in the region.
Turkey has maintained a strong relationship with Somalia, providing military training and development assistance while securing its own strategic foothold. At the same time, Ankara has cultivated ties with Ethiopia, seeking to balance its interests and mediate between the two.
The UAE, meanwhile, has significant interests in both Somaliland and Somalia. Its investment in the Berbera port has deepened its involvement in Somaliland, placing it at odds with Egypt’s interests in the region. Though Egypt and the UAE have historically been close allies, their relationship has shown signs of strain. The UAE’s alleged support for the RSF in Sudan’s ongoing civil war and its financing of controversial development projects in Egypt, such as the new city of Ras El Hekma, have added to tensions between the two.
As regional powers increasingly stake out their interests in the Horn of Africa, the prospect of a diplomatic solution to the underlying Egypt-Ethiopia conflict over the Nile grows dimmer. The involvement of external actors complicates efforts to mediate between the two, making a resolution to the water dispute ever more elusive.
Egypt’s new security arrangement with Somalia marks a significant shift in the regional balance of power in East Africa. The deal reflects Cairo’s growing concerns over Ethiopia’s influence in the Horn of Africa, particularly in light of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. While geography limits the likelihood of a direct conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia, the risk of proxy wars and increased instability in the region is rising.
As Egypt and Ethiopia continue to assert their influence, other regional players such as Somaliland, Turkey, and the UAE are also becoming entangled in the conflict. The stakes are high, with water security, territorial integrity, and regional power dynamics all at play. For now, the Horn of Africa remains a fragile and volatile region, with the potential for conflict lurking just beneath the surface.