The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a warning that sent shockwaves through Washington: within a decade, China could deploy dozens of nuclear-armed missiles in low Earth orbit. The report, presented in a new threat-assessment chart, outlines a sobering scenario where Chinese missiles—part of a strategy known as a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)—might threaten the U.S. homeland with unprecedented speed and unpredictability.
This futuristic-sounding threat is not science fiction. It’s a resurgent Cold War-era concept gaining new life through advanced Chinese technology. And it’s changing how the United States approaches missile defense—ushering in a bold, controversial initiative known as the Golden Dome.
Unlike traditional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which follow predictable high-arc trajectories, a FOBS launches into low Earth orbit and deorbits at any point to strike its target. It can travel in directions that circumvent existing radar and defense systems, including over the South Pole—a vulnerability in the U.S. detection network focused on northern hemisphere threats.
The DIA chart unveiled this month starkly illustrates the dangers. By 2035, China could field as many as 60 space-based nuclear-capable FOBS missiles. Russia, also pursuing this technology, may have a dozen. These numbers are modest compared to China’s expected arsenal of 700 ICBMs or 4,000 hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), but the stealth and speed of FOBS make them especially alarming.
FOBS were first conceived by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, culminating in the deployment of the R-36O missile system in 1968. The missile was eventually retired in 1983 under arms control agreements like the SALT II Treaty. However, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, while prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit, left room for ambiguity—especially when it comes to weapons launched into orbit but not completing a full orbit.
In July and August of 2021, China stunned U.S. intelligence agencies by conducting a FOBS test. A Long March 2C rocket launched a hypersonic glide vehicle into low Earth orbit, which then maneuvered back into the atmosphere and toward its target. The maneuverability of the hypersonic vehicle, paired with orbital insertion, signaled a revolutionary military capability.
“What we saw was a very significant event of a test of a weapon system. And it is very concerning,” said General Mark Milley, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling it near “Sputnik moment.”
The implications were dire: U.S. early warning systems, geared toward detecting traditional ICBMs, could be bypassed. The time between detection and impact would be drastically shortened, possibly leaving national leaders with only minutes to respond.
Amid this growing threat, former President Donald Trump, newly returned to office, signed an executive order on January 27 directing the Pentagon to develop a nationwide missile defense shield, dubbed the Golden Dome. Trump called the potential for a missile strike “the most catastrophic threat facing the United States,” and his directive seeks to protect the country from ballistic, hypersonic, and space-based weapons.
The Golden Dome envisions a layered, space-centric architecture capable of detecting, tracking, and neutralizing threats in all phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. At its core are two key programs:
The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS): Designed to detect fast-moving threats with greater fidelity.
The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA): A network of low-Earth orbit satellites for persistent global surveillance and tracking.
While details remain vague, defense experts suggest the Golden Dome may include space-based interceptors—kinetic kill vehicles stationed in orbit to engage hostile missiles during their vulnerable boost phase.
Congress has responded with a mix of enthusiasm and skepticism. The missile defense initiative was the second-largest recipient in the recent $150 billion defense funding package, receiving $24.7 billion. However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) warned that a fully realized Golden Dome could cost upwards of $542 billion over 20 years.
Representative Ken Calvert, chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, voiced a common concern: “No one has defined what the Golden Dome is. Is it defending the entire Lower 48 and Alaska? What are we doing and how are we doing it?”
The lack of clarity and immense cost are not the only criticisms. Many arms control experts fear a new arms race in space. If the U.S. deploys orbital interceptors, adversaries could respond with space-based countermeasures, including anti-satellite weapons or even their own space-borne nuclear platforms.
The FOBS threat is only one piece of the puzzle. According to the DIA chart, China’s broader strategic weapons modernization is accelerating. By 2035:
Nuclear-armed ICBMs will grow from 400 to 700.
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) will increase from 72 to at least 132.
Hypersonic glide vehicles could multiply from 600 to 4,000.
Russia’s numbers are smaller but also trending upward. These developments underscore the strategic shift from sheer numbers to technological sophistication and diversification.
China is also likely developing conventional missiles with ranges capable of reaching Alaska, and possibly further. These may not be nuclear-tipped, but their speed and precision make them dangerous.
The weaponization of space has long been feared but avoided through treaties and strategic restraint. Now, with FOBS and similar systems entering the mix, restraint is breaking down.
Under Trump’s order, the U.S. Space Force will be responsible for deploying the Golden Dome, including satellite constellations, interceptors, and possibly directed-energy weapons. The notion of a global, space-based defense grid once belonged to science fiction or Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” program. Today, it is rapidly becoming policy.
Supporters argue that a space-based defense is the only way to counter threats like FOBS, which exploit gaps in ground-based detection and interception. Critics warn it could spur a spiral of militarization that leaves space more dangerous, not less.
The question now is whether the U.S. can move fast enough. The technological edge once firmly held by Washington is no longer guaranteed. China’s aggressive investment in next-generation weapons—including FOBS, hypersonics, and space systems—has caught the Pentagon flat-footed.
Developing and deploying a space-based missile shield is a colossal technical and financial challenge. It requires not just rockets and sensors, but new command systems, AI-enhanced tracking, and ultra-fast decision-making processes.
There’s also the geopolitical cost. Space-based missile defenses could shatter arms control regimes and alienate allies who fear being caught in a superpower arms race.
With the FOBS threat now back in focus and China accelerating its strategic modernization, the world may be entering a new missile age. One defined not by the brute-force standoff of Cold War arsenals, but by speed, stealth, and orbital maneuverability.
The United States’ answer—the Golden Dome—is bold, expensive, and still largely conceptual. But as old assumptions about missile defense crumble, policymakers may have little choice but to pursue it. Whether the Golden Dome becomes a shield or a spark for greater instability remains to be seen.
One thing is certain: the race for space superiority has begun, and the outcome will shape global security for decades to come.
