
- Public Opinion Clash Raises Concerns of Misunderstanding, Strategic Risks
A new academic study has exposed a striking divide between how Americans and South Koreans view the likelihood of U.S. military intervention if war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula. The findings suggest a potentially dangerous mismatch in expectations between the two allied populations, raising questions about the stability of the decades-old security partnership between Washington and Seoul.
The research, conducted in February 2025 and published on South Korea’s portal Naver, surveyed 552 Americans and 1,000 South Koreans. It revealed that South Koreans are far more confident than Americans about the likelihood of U.S. military action in the event of a North Korean invasion of the South.
While 62.9% of South Korean respondents believed the U.S. would at least provide weapons or intelligence support, and over 41% expected American troops to directly intervene, the American public appeared far less certain. In fact, 24.3% of Americans — nearly one in four — said they believed the U.S. would “do nothing” militarily if North Korea attacked South Korea. Only 37% of Americans thought U.S. troops would be sent.
This stark contrast has alarmed experts who warn that differing assumptions could have real-world consequences if conflict erupts.
Timothy Rich, a professor of political science at Western Kentucky University and a longtime analyst of Korean affairs, described the findings as “deeply concerning.”
Speaking to reporters, Rich said, “Americans were more than three times as likely as South Koreans to believe the U.S. would take no military action. That gap in perception is not just academic — in a real crisis, it could lead to confusion, disappointment, and even anger.”
Rich noted that South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. support likely stems from the visible and long-standing U.S. military presence in South Korea. Approximately 28,500 American troops are currently stationed in the country as part of a mutual defense treaty dating back to 1953, after the Korean War armistice.
“For many South Koreans, the U.S. presence feels like an automatic insurance policy,” Rich said. “But American public opinion may be shifting in a different direction.”
The study’s timing is significant. The survey was conducted amid growing isolationist sentiment in parts of the U.S. political landscape, especially following former President Donald Trump’s efforts during his previous term to pressure allies, including South Korea, to shoulder a greater share of defense costs.
Trump, who is seeking another term in the 2024 presidential election, repeatedly questioned the value of U.S. alliances in Asia. He criticized the cost of maintaining troops overseas and hinted that U.S. involvement in a future Korean conflict might not be guaranteed without greater South Korean financial contributions.
“America First” rhetoric, combined with costly military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, has left many Americans wary of new foreign conflicts. That weariness may explain why 24.3% of American respondents told researchers they believed the U.S. would avoid military action entirely in a Korean war scenario.
Some Americans might also see the Korean Peninsula’s security as less directly tied to U.S. national interests than in previous decades, especially with rising challenges from China and the war in Ukraine dominating foreign policy attention.
In contrast, South Koreans appear to retain strong faith in their alliance with the U.S. The study found that only 7.1% of South Koreans believed the U.S. would “do nothing” if war broke out — a figure dramatically lower than the American response.
Rich explained that this optimism might not only reflect the U.S. troop presence but also decades of joint military exercises, defense agreements, and public messaging from both governments about the strength of their alliance.
However, this confidence could also be setting the stage for dangerous disappointment.
“If a war happens, and if U.S. support is limited or delayed due to political debates in Washington, South Koreans might feel abandoned,” Rich warned. “The perception of betrayal — whether justified or not — could cause political backlash in South Korea and even strain the alliance long-term.”
Experts say the consequences of this perception gap could play out in multiple ways:
- In the early stages of a war, misaligned expectations could affect South Korea’s military planning and civilian response.
- Delays in U.S. troop deployments or limited intervention could shock South Korean society and inflame anti-American sentiment.
- The gap might also embolden North Korea if Pyongyang perceives the U.S. as reluctant to commit to another foreign war.
These risks are compounded by the evolving security environment in Northeast Asia. North Korea has continued its missile testing in 2024 and 2025, including developments in tactical nuclear weapons and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, China’s rising influence and territorial disputes in the South China Sea have distracted U.S. strategic focus.
The study’s results also come at a sensitive moment in South Korean domestic politics. Public debate over whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons has intensified over the past two years. Several polls have shown majority support among South Koreans for nuclear armament, driven by skepticism about North Korean denuclearization and doubts about U.S. security guarantees.
In recent months, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration has increased its defense budget and explored options for indigenous missile defense systems and military modernization.
“The gap in perceptions shown in this study could accelerate South Korea’s drive for greater self-reliance,” said Lee Sang-hyun, president of South Korea’s Sejong Institute think tank. “It’s not just about nuclear weapons — it’s about having independent military capabilities that reduce dependence on uncertain American commitments.”
Despite the worrying data, both U.S. and South Korean officials have maintained that their alliance remains strong.
The U.S. Department of Defense has reiterated its “ironclad” commitment to South Korea’s defense, emphasizing the credibility of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Yet, the academic study’s findings cannot be ignored.
“As alliances are ultimately based on public support, these gaps in perception matter,” Timothy Rich cautioned. “Governments can sign treaties, but public opinion shapes what is politically possible in a crisis.”
Both Washington and Seoul now face a communications challenge. If South Koreans overestimate U.S. willingness to intervene, they may fail to prepare adequately for the possibility of delayed or limited American involvement. Meanwhile, U.S. leaders may need to engage their own public to rebuild understanding of the strategic importance of defending South Korea — or risk an eroding alliance.
In many ways, the study serves as a wake-up call for policymakers in both countries. The U.S.-South Korea alliance, often touted as one of the most successful security partnerships in the world, may be less immune to political shifts than previously assumed.
“This isn’t a crisis yet,” Rich concluded. “But it’s a warning sign. Alliances are not just about tanks and planes. They’re about trust. And that trust must be managed carefully, especially in dangerous times.”
As tensions on the Korean Peninsula show no sign of easing, the gap in public perceptions across the Pacific could prove to be one of the most critical — and underappreciated — strategic challenges of the years ahead.