North Korea has reportedly used components from Western manufacturers in producing missiles that Russia deployed against Ukraine in early September, according to a new report by an independent Ukrainian investigative body. The report, which has intensified discussions about the effectiveness of international sanctions, asserts that North Korea has found ways to acquire critical microelectronics despite economic restrictions designed to hinder its missile and weapons programs.
The Ukrainian investigative organization, known as NAKO (National Anti-Corruption Organization), analyzed the remnants of North Korean missiles, specifically the KN-23 and KN-24 models, found in the Poltava region after an attack on September 7. These missile fragments, discovered in Myrne and Bilyky, reveal a troubling reality: North Korea has allegedly obtained Western-manufactured electronic components to advance its ballistic missile capabilities.
The Ukrainian report details that the missiles, known as Hwasong-11A or Hwasong-11B within North Korea, contained parts from at least nine different companies based across Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Significantly, some components were manufactured as recently as 2023 and 2024, indicating that North Korea’s procurement network has remained active and effective despite recent sanctions and export controls.
NAKO’s analysis identified nine Western companies whose components were found in the missiles, sparking a debate about the effectiveness of sanctions and oversight within international supply chains.
- Diodes Inc. (U.S.)
- Bourns (U.S.)
- Broadcom (U.S.)
- Analog Devices (U.S.)
- Avago (U.S.)
- NXP (Netherlands)
- Traco Power (Switzerland)
- STMicroelectronics (Switzerland)
- XP Power (United Kingdom)
While these companies may not have directly supplied North Korea, the presence of their components suggests that North Korea may be leveraging a network of intermediaries to acquire technology crucial for its missile development. The Ukrainian report asserts that these components likely passed through multiple hands before reaching North Korean missile programs.
Notably, some of the parts recovered from the missiles were manufactured in recent years, including some produced in 2023 and 2024. This finding implies that North Korea has managed to circumvent sanctions effectively, acquiring high-value components through intermediaries or unauthorized resellers. According to NAKO, XP Power’s isolate power converters were suspected of being manufactured in 2022 and likely acquired by North Korea between 2023 and 2024. Similarly, chips and conversion boards from Avago and Analog Devices were also identified in the missile debris.
The Ukrainian investigative body’s findings have been corroborated by various military analysts, including Joost Oliemans, an expert in North Korean missile technology. Oliemans noted that the analysis aligns with North Korea’s known procurement tactics and added that the presence of Western electronics in missiles underscores a potential intelligence failure in tracking and preventing such exchanges.
“The findings suggest an intricate international network that has enabled North Korea to evade sanctions and acquire the technology it needs to enhance its missile program,” Oliemans remarked. “These supply chains require more thorough scrutiny and more robust enforcement mechanisms.”
The report has intensified global scrutiny of international sanctions aimed at curbing North Korea’s missile ambitions. Designed to isolate Pyongyang’s access to technology and financing, these sanctions appear to have significant gaps, particularly in the area of microelectronics. North Korea’s ability to obtain the latest components manufactured in Western countries demonstrates the limitations of the current enforcement framework and underscores the need for reform.
The Ukrainian organization’s report calls for immediate action, with NAKO urging global leaders to investigate and penalize companies and networks that enable North Korea’s access to missile technology. In a statement, NAKO stated, “All entities involved in the development and export of North Korea’s weapons must be exposed and penalized. North Korea’s arms exports must cease.”
The KN-23 and KN-24 missile models, dubbed Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B in North Korea, have become a central focus of military analysts. These missiles boast a range of up to 690 kilometers, capable of reaching deep into enemy territory. Their high-arc trajectory, which enables the missiles to approach targets from near-vertical angles, has proven challenging for Ukraine’s air defense systems to intercept.
Reports from Conflict Armament Research (CAR), another investigative organization, previously revealed in February that North Korea had used components from a variety of European suppliers in the KN-23/KN-24 missile models. CAR’s research indicated that North Korea maintains an extensive network dedicated to sourcing electronics and other sensitive components despite international restrictions.
The Ukrainian investigative body’s report on the September 7 missile strike marks a continuation of CAR’s findings and underscores the persistent and effective procurement capabilities of North Korea’s missile programs.
The revelation of Western components in North Korean missiles used by Russia has raised pressing questions regarding international export regulations and their enforcement. Experts point out that while Western countries have strict export controls, the enforcement of these controls can be challenging given the complex, multi-layered nature of global supply chains. The technology required for advanced weaponry, especially in microelectronics, often passes through several intermediaries, increasing the difficulty of tracking final destinations.
If unchecked, this situation could have profound geopolitical implications. As North Korea strengthens its relationship with Russia, potentially supplying additional missiles for use against Ukraine, the risk of technology proliferation extends beyond the Korean peninsula. Analysts caution that North Korea’s ongoing weapons development could embolden other countries facing sanctions, signaling a shift in how sanctioned states circumvent global restrictions.
Amid the report’s revelations, there is a growing consensus among experts that more stringent international coordination is necessary to close the gaps in the current sanctions framework.
- Increased Transparency in Supply Chains: Encouraging Western companies to enhance traceability and monitoring in their supply chains, especially for dual-use technologies that can be repurposed for military applications.
- Enhanced Intelligence Collaboration: Expanding intelligence-sharing efforts to monitor and disrupt North Korea’s procurement networks across multiple countries.
- Targeted Sanctions on Intermediaries: Developing targeted sanctions against intermediaries suspected of aiding North Korea’s acquisition of critical technology, particularly in countries with limited export oversight.
The Ukrainian government has also joined calls for increased international efforts to prevent similar incidents. “We must ensure that technologies produced in democratic nations are not weaponized against us,” said a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense spokesperson. “The West must enforce sanctions and trace these critical technologies more rigorously.”
For decades, North Korea has skillfully navigated sanctions by leveraging its extensive network of intermediaries and exploiting gaps in the international financial system. Sanctions aimed at limiting North Korea’s access to technology have historically focused on direct exports, often overlooking third-party brokers or companies that can obtain and resell components to Pyongyang.
North Korea’s well-documented practice of using front companies, particularly in China and Russia, to purchase essential components has exacerbated the issue. The report from Ukraine highlights the need to adapt sanctions strategies to account for evolving procurement methods and broader collaboration with countries along North Korea’s supply chain routes.
