A bombshell revelation by a former senior Pakistan Air Force (PAF) commander has sent shockwaves through South Asia’s defence circles, stirring up fresh debate over one of the most intense and consequential aerial clashes the region has seen in decades. Air Commodore (retd) Khalid Chishti, a highly decorated veteran with over 3,000 flying hours and multiple gallantry awards, has publicly claimed that a Chinese-made HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system was responsible for downing one of India’s prized Rafale fighter jets during the four-day aerial confrontation in May 2025.
Speaking on a recently released defence podcast that has gone viral in strategic communities from New Delhi to Washington, Chishti detailed how Pakistan’s HQ-9B air defence system engaged and destroyed either a Rafale or a Su-30MKI over Pakistan-administered Kashmir on the night of 6 or 7 May. If true, this account significantly diverges from the official narrative provided by Islamabad and suggests that ground-based air defences — not just air-to-air missiles — played a more decisive role in India’s reported aircraft losses than previously acknowledged.
The May 2025 air battle over Kashmir is already being dubbed the largest air engagement in the region since the Cold War. Triggered by a deadly cross-border incident in Poonch, the skies over the Line of Control (LoC) became the theatre for four consecutive days of aerial manoeuvres, long-range missile duels, and high-stakes sorties involving nearly 125 combat aircraft from both sides.
India deployed its Rafale fleet, Su-30MKIs, Mirage-2000s, and upgraded MiG-29UPGs, backed by PHALCON AWACS and Netra platforms. Pakistan countered with J-10CEs, JF-17 Block IIIs, and F-16s, supported by Chinese KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft and mobile ground radar arrays. Both sides invoked electronic warfare assets, and both claimed aerial victories — but refrained from releasing definitive combat footage or wreckage evidence, leading to speculation, propaganda, and information warfare.
While the Pakistani government maintained that India lost five aircraft — including three Rafales, one Su-30MKI, and one MiG-29 — all shot down by PAF J-10CEs using PL-15E beyond visual range (BVR) missiles, Chishti’s narrative upends that version.
According to Chishti, the HQ-9B battery deployed near Muzaffarabad was instrumental in neutralizing one of the IAF’s premier assets. He emphasized that the Chinese system’s phased-array radar managed to track the Indian fighter despite its stealth-oriented design, and that the Rafale’s electronic countermeasures were insufficient against the HQ-9B’s sophisticated target discrimination and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).
“This was not merely an opportunistic shot,” Chishti claimed. “It was a carefully coordinated intercept involving AWACS cueing, passive detection systems, and a SAM engagement envelope that Indian pilots did not expect.”
The former Air Commodore stopped short of confirming whether the downed aircraft was a Rafale or a Su-30MKI, citing “classified forensic analysis still under wraps,” but insisted the kill was executed by a SAM and not a fighter jet.
Chishti’s assertions stand in stark contrast to statements from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) and Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, who both maintained that all Indian losses were due to air-to-air engagements.
At a post-conflict press briefing, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar had declared: “Our J-10CEs outfought and outgunned the Indian Air Force. The so-called Rafale superiority has been exposed. Every Indian aircraft we downed was in the air-to-air domain.”
This hard line has helped project a narrative of PAF air dominance, but the divergence in accounts — especially from a seasoned insider like Chishti — has created a split in the discourse among military observers, analysts, and intelligence agencies tracking the regional balance of power.
The HQ-9B system, developed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), is a modern long-range SAM platform designed to counter advanced aerial threats, including low-observable (stealth) aircraft, high-altitude drones, and even some classes of ballistic missiles.
Seen as China’s answer to Russia’s S-300 and S-400 systems, the HQ-9B features a maximum engagement range of 260 kilometres, an altitude reach of 30 km, and the capability to intercept targets moving at supersonic speeds. Its strength lies in the system’s robust radar array and its multi-layered command-and-control network, capable of real-time data fusion and integration with airborne sensors and EW systems.
Pakistan acquired the HQ-9B in 2021 as part of a USD 500 million deal, amid growing concern over India’s induction of the Russian S-400 Triumf system. While Islamabad has kept the precise deployment locations classified, satellite imagery and local reports had hinted at HQ-9B batteries being operational in key strategic zones including the Islamabad-Rawalpindi axis and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
The potential confirmation of a Rafale kill by the HQ-9B would not only mark the system’s first known real-world combat success but also elevate its market value as China seeks to expand military exports in competition with Russian and Western defence giants.
India’s official response to the May 2025 conflict has been circumspect, likely due to the high political stakes and the need to maintain deterrence credibility. While Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh initially downplayed reports of heavy losses, the IAF has since confirmed that “multiple platforms were engaged and suffered damage,” without specifying types or quantities.
Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan appeared to acknowledge setbacks: “Losses occur in any high-tempo operation. What we must learn is how and why those losses occurred — and how to adapt our doctrine accordingly.”
Meanwhile, Air Marshal A.K. Bharti’s dismissive response to journalist questions about the alleged downing of three Rafales — “Combat is a complex environment. Outcomes are not binary” — did little to ease speculation.
Indian analysts are now questioning whether New Delhi underestimated the reach and lethality of Pakistan’s integrated air defence network, especially when combined with long-range AEW&C surveillance and powerful BVR missiles like the PL-15E.
Much of the early focus on India’s losses revolved around the PL-15E, a radar-guided BVR missile capable of hitting targets over 200 kilometres away. When paired with the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar onboard the J-10CE, the PL-15E gives the PAF a first-shot advantage in many engagement scenarios.
Indian Rafales, equipped with the Meteor BVR missile, were believed to hold the edge in terms of no-escape zones and guidance precision. However, the actual combat results, as implied by both Pakistani officials and now Chishti’s indirect confirmation, suggest otherwise.
What Chishti’s account truly highlights is a broader transformation in air combat doctrine: modern aerial warfare is no longer about dogfights alone. It is about integrating fighters, SAMs, radars, satellites, and jammers into a cohesive battle network capable of seeing, tracking, and engaging targets far beyond traditional detection ranges.
Pakistan’s strategy during the May 2025 conflict appeared to pivot around an “overlapping kill web,” wherein HQ-9B batteries, KJ-500 AEW&Cs, and J-10CE fighters all operated as nodes in a broader air denial grid. The result: a seamless transition between air-to-air and surface-to-air engagements, making the skies hostile for any intruder.
India’s response — though technologically formidable — was seemingly constrained by gaps in its electronic warfare coverage, interoperability limitations between platforms like the Su-30MKI and Rafale, and a potentially over-reliant doctrine on manned-aircraft survivability.
For Beijing, the HQ-9B’s reported success in Kashmir is a quiet but significant win. It not only validates China’s SAM technology in combat but also solidifies its role as a strategic partner and arms provider in South Asia. Chinese analysts have already begun highlighting the system’s “proven combat capabilities” in unofficial military blogs, and defence attachés in several capitals are reportedly watching closely.
Countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and even Egypt — long reliant on U.S. or Russian SAMs — are reassessing procurement priorities as Chinese platforms become increasingly viable alternatives in a more multipolar arms marketplace.
As the dust settles over the Himalayan frontier, both India and Pakistan are expected to conduct internal reviews, modify tactics, and bolster weak points. India has reportedly accelerated the procurement of domestic BVR missiles, enhanced SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) capabilities, and fast-tracked indigenous AESA radar development.
Pakistan, meanwhile, is likely to double down on its integration efforts, possibly even fielding more mobile HQ-9B units or enhancing its indigenous Babur cruise missile’s anti-radiation variant to target Indian air defences in future conflicts.
But beyond tactics and technology, the May 2025 air battle may go down in history as the conflict that marked the end of air combat as a two-player game between fighters. In this new era, SAMs — silent, stationary, and often underestimated — are just as deadly as the fastest jets in the sky.
Air Commodore Khalid Chishti’s revelation may not change official records overnight, but it has already altered how military professionals and strategists interpret the May 2025 conflict. Whether a Rafale was indeed brought down by a HQ-9B battery or not, the claim underscores a larger truth: the battlefield of the sky is evolving, and the ground now holds a decisive card in aerial dominance.
