Pakistan and Indonesia have reportedly accelerated negotiations over a potential acquisition of nearly 40 JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter jets and associated armed unmanned systems, a move that could mark a consequential inflection point in Asia’s evolving defence procurement ecosystem. The discussions come as both countries recalibrate their airpower strategies amid intensifying Indo-Pacific security competition, widening maritime flashpoints, and escalating cost pressures across global defence markets.
The strategic weight of the talks was underscored following a high-level meeting in Islamabad between Indonesia’s Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Chief Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu. Official readouts from both sides confirmed engagement on “matters of mutual interest, evolving regional and global security dynamics, and exploration of avenues for enhancing bilateral defence cooperation,” signalling intent while stopping short of confirming contractual commitments.
A senior Pakistani defence source framed the scale of the negotiations more explicitly. Retired PAF Air Marshal Asim Suleiman said the “Indonesia deal is in the pipeline,” adding that the prospective acquisition figure was “close to 40.” If finalised, such a purchase would place Indonesia among the largest international operators of the JF-17 platform and elevate Pakistan into the upper tier of emerging fighter exporters.
From an economic standpoint, the prospective deal—estimated at between US$1 billion and US$1.5 billion depending on configuration, training, weapons, and sustainment packages—would rank among Pakistan’s most significant defence export achievements. It would reinforce Islamabad’s increasingly deliberate strategy of monetising indigenous aerospace capabilities to offset fiscal constraints and persistent external financing pressures.
For Indonesia, whose air force modernisation drive already includes 42 French-built Rafale fighters and planned acquisitions of Turkish KAAN aircraft, the JF-17 Thunder offers a cost-efficient multirole complement. Analysts note that the platform could sustain wide-area maritime patrols and strike missions across the world’s largest archipelagic state without overburdening defence budgets already stretched by naval modernisation, disaster response, and internal security requirements.
Beyond the numbers, the talks carry symbolic and strategic resonance. They deepen defence-industrial ties between two Muslim-majority nations that increasingly view autonomy, diversified sourcing, and operational flexibility as essential hedges against great-power volatility and the growing weaponisation of supply chains. As Indo-Pacific tensions sharpen across the South China Sea, the Natuna Islands, and wider regional chokepoints, the emerging Pakistan–Indonesia alignment illustrates how middle powers are quietly reshaping the region’s airpower balance through pragmatic, capability-driven partnerships rather than alliance-centric dependency models.
The accelerated negotiations also reflect a broader recalibration of defence diplomacy in Asia. States facing overlapping maritime, airspace, and grey-zone challenges are increasingly prioritising timely capability acquisition over prolonged procurement cycles dominated by political conditionalities. In this context, platforms that offer acceptable performance, lower lifecycle costs, and fewer geopolitical strings are gaining traction.
Strategically, a prospective JF-17 acquisition would signal Indonesia’s intent to balance high-end deterrence platforms with scalable, combat-capable assets deployable persistently across dispersed theatres. Simultaneously, the talks reinforce Pakistan’s ambition to institutionalise defence exports as a core pillar of national power projection, using competitively priced, combat-validated systems to embed long-term strategic relationships beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
Pakistan and Indonesia’s defence relationship rests on a historically layered foundation shaped by shared post-colonial trajectories and parallel security anxieties. Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, Pakistan in 1947; both emerged into strategically congested neighbourhoods marked by unresolved territorial disputes and fragile regional orders.
The 1951 Treaty of Friendship formalised bilateral ties and established a political framework that gradually evolved into sustained military engagement. Over subsequent decades, defence cooperation expanded through training exchanges, institutional linkages, and mutual participation in international defence forums. Indonesian officers attended Pakistani military institutions, while Pakistan maintained a steady presence in Jakarta-oriented defence dialogues and exercises.
A pivotal milestone came in 2012 with a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation that broadened collaboration beyond training into joint production, procurement alignment, and defence-industrial consultation. Indonesia’s regular participation in Pakistan’s International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) reinforced industrial familiarity, while Pakistan’s growing export orientation positioned platforms like the JF-17 as viable alternatives for countries seeking credible air combat capability without the political constraints or lifecycle costs associated with Western suppliers.
Momentum behind the current negotiations accelerated following Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Pakistan in December 2025, when defence cooperation was elevated alongside broader economic and strategic partnerships. Analysts note that such historical continuity reduces political friction, accelerates trust-based negotiations, and allows sensitive deals—particularly in combat aviation—to progress with fewer diplomatic encumbrances than first-time supplier relationships.
The JF-17 Thunder’s appeal to Indonesia stems from a convergence of operational necessity, geographic reality, and fiscal pragmatism. Jakarta faces the challenge of defending a vast maritime domain spanning more than 17,000 islands while managing an air force fleet composed of ageing F-16s, legacy Hawk trainers, and Russian-origin platforms approaching obsolescence.
Designed as a lightweight, single-engine multirole fighter co-developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, the JF-17 offers flexibility for sustained patrol, interception, and strike missions across dispersed island chains and contested maritime corridors. The Block III variant—reportedly central to the negotiations—integrates an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, helmet-mounted display systems, advanced electronic warfare suites, and compatibility with beyond-visual-range missiles such as the PL-15.
With a top speed of Mach 1.6, a 23mm cannon, and multi-domain weapons compatibility including air-to-air, air-to-surface, and anti-ship munitions, the aircraft aligns with Indonesia’s emphasis on flexible force projection rather than pure air-superiority roles. Cost remains decisive: estimates place the JF-17 Block III at around US$25–30 million per unit, allowing Indonesia to field meaningful fleet numbers without diverting disproportionate resources from other defence priorities.
Equally important is sustainment. The platform’s design prioritises ease of maintenance and rapid turnaround—critical attributes for Indonesia’s dispersed basing architecture, where logistics efficiency directly affects sortie generation. Its combat usage by Pakistan has further strengthened perceptions of the aircraft as a proven, rather than purely conceptual, solution.
Beyond fighter jets, the proposed package reflects an increasingly holistic export model. Discussions reportedly include Pakistan’s Shahpar-series armed drones, particularly the Shahpar-II medium-altitude long-endurance UAV, offering endurance of up to 20 hours and precision-strike capability. Indonesian interest reportedly centres on maritime domain awareness, counter-insurgency, and persistent surveillance missions where manned aircraft would be cost-inefficient.
Air defence systems such as the LY-80 surface-to-air missile have also been mentioned as part of a layered protection concept for airbases and critical infrastructure. Training is another core component, encompassing pilot instruction, ground crew certification, senior engineering education, and long-term sustainment planning—aimed at enabling Indonesia to operate the systems independently rather than relying indefinitely on external contractors.
Such structuring reflects Pakistan’s evolving export doctrine, which increasingly prioritises lifecycle partnerships over one-off sales. Still, official statements remain cautious. Indonesian Defence Ministry spokesperson Brigadier General Rico Ricardo Sirait has stressed that discussions remain general and have “not yet led to concrete decisions,” underscoring that negotiations remain open.
For Pakistan, the Indonesia talks are part of a broader export push driven by economic necessity and industrial maturation. Recent engagements with Azerbaijan and discussions with Middle Eastern and African partners highlight Islamabad’s ambition to reposition its defence industry as a revenue generator rather than a fiscal burden.
Indonesia’s calculus is equally strategic. President Subianto’s “Golden Indonesia 2045” vision emphasises defence self-reliance and diversified sourcing amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry. Integrating Pakistani and China-linked systems alongside French and Turkish platforms strengthens Jakarta’s diplomatic flexibility and mitigates supply disruption risks.
Yet hurdles remain. Financing structures, technology transfer terms, interoperability concerns, and potential geopolitical pressures—including sanctions sensitivities—could complicate progress. Indonesia’s defence budget remains constrained, and domestic scrutiny over procurement transparency is high.
Despite these challenges, analysts argue that if concluded, the deal would represent far more than a conventional arms sale. It would signal a quiet reordering of strategic agency across Asia’s security architecture, where middle powers increasingly privilege operational sufficiency, lifecycle sustainability, and political flexibility over prestige platforms.
As negotiations continue, the prospective Pakistan–Indonesia JF-17 agreement stands as a bellwether for how emerging defence industries are reshaping global arms markets beyond traditional Western and Russian monopolies—and how Asia’s middle powers are redefining autonomy in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
