Pakistan’s Predictable Denial and Pahalgam Massacre: A Deep Dive into the Hybrid War Against India

terror attack Pahalgam

On April 22, 2025, a brutal terror attack shook the valley town of Pahalgam in Kashmir. Twenty-eight Hindu tourists were methodically executed by terrorists affiliated with the “Resistance Front,” a proxy of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). As expected, the government of Pakistan denied any involvement. But this pattern of denial, denial in the face of damning evidence, is nothing new. It’s a consistent thread running through the history of Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism against India.

Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan has never accepted culpability for any act of aggression against India. Whether it was the 1948 and 1965 wars, the Kargil conflict in 1999, or the deadly attacks on the Indian Parliament (2001) and Mumbai (2008), Pakistan’s standard response has been to disown responsibility. The Pahalgam attack fits the same mold.

The “Resistance Front” may sound like a new name, but Indian intelligence has long established its links with Lashkar-e-Taiba. And LeT itself is no rogue actor; it is nurtured and protected by the Pakistani Army. Despite being globally banned, LeT continues to operate openly under various aliases, and its leaders roam free in Pakistan. This institutionalized support highlights the state complicity behind these attacks.

Just days before the Pahalgam massacre, on April 18, a known LeT commander named Abu Musa addressed a rally in Rawalkot’s Khai Gala, located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). His speech was incendiary, calling for jihad in response to the Indian government’s revocation of Article 370. The slogans and threats in his speech mirrored what the killers in Pahalgam reportedly yelled while executing Hindu tourists.

Musa’s rhetoric wasn’t in isolation. His speech followed a declaration from the Pakistan Army Chief, General Asim Munir, on April 17. Munir reaffirmed that Kashmir was Pakistan’s “jugular vein” and insisted on supporting Kashmiris in their “heroic struggle.” It wasn’t merely a political stance; it was a green light to militant groups to escalate violence.

General Munir has taken an unusually hardline position compared to his recent predecessors. Not only has he reinforced the religious foundation of Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir, but he has also revived the rhetoric of the two-nation theory to emphasize irreconcilable differences with India. His public statements have frequently painted Hindus as adversaries and branded India’s policies as manifestations of “Hindutva extremism.”

Munir’s framing of the Kashmir conflict is not geopolitical but religious. He projects it as an existential battle between Islamic identity and Hindu dominance. On several occasions, including his speech at the Margalla Dialogue in November 2024, he accused India of spreading extremist ideology and persecuting minorities globally. This narrative not only radicalizes domestic opinion but also empowers terror groups to act with impunity.

Pakistan is often described as an “Army with a country.” The military establishment defines not just national security policy, but foreign and nuclear policy as well. Civilian leadership is largely ceremonial when it comes to decisions about India. The Pakistani Army has drawn three inviolable lines: civilians must not question the military’s authority, interfere in defense or foreign affairs, or touch the nuclear program.

This centralized military control ensures continuity in aggression against India, regardless of which civilian government is in power. With General Munir at the helm, the likelihood of increased covert operations, hybrid warfare, and terror attacks has gone up.

Hybrid warfare, as practiced by Pakistan, is a toxic mix of regular and irregular tactics. It includes use of terrorists, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, urban warfare, and psychological operations. The goal is not conventional victory, but to destabilize India, deepen communal fissures, and erode trust in state institutions.

In hybrid warfare, the line between state and non-state actors blurs. Organizations like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed are tightly woven into the military strategy. Their actions are coordinated with, if not directly planned by, elements within the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani Army.

The nature of the Pahalgam attack was calculated. It was not just terrorism; it was a communal massacre. The victims were chosen based on their religious identity, a style reminiscent of other atrocities supported by the Pakistani deep state. The targeting of Hindu pilgrims sends a clear message: that India’s internal religious harmony is now a battlefield.

Moreover, the method of killing—brutal executions—mirrors the tactics of radical Islamist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS, both of which have ideological overlap with elements in Pakistan. The symbolism of attacking civilians in a peaceful town, during a time of pilgrimage, is aimed at striking fear and provoking communal backlash.

Unfortunately, the fallout of such attacks isn’t limited to geopolitical tensions. Domestically, it risks increasing polarization. Statements like those from Robert Vadra, son-in-law of Congress leader Sonia Gandhi, which imply that India’s own internal religious policies are to blame, play directly into the hands of Pakistan’s psychological warfare strategy.

Vadra said that the attack stemmed from minorities feeling “uncomfortable” in a Hindutva-driven India. This narrative dilutes the external culpability of state-sponsored terrorism and turns the discourse inward. It is essential that Indian political discourse does not lend credence to the propaganda of those who orchestrate such violence.

India has already begun to respond. The closure of the Wagah-Attari border and expulsion of Pakistani military attachés are significant diplomatic steps. Additionally, suspending the Indus Water Treaty is a bold but necessary move. The Indus is a lifeline for Pakistan, and this decision underscores that continued hostility will carry a cost.

Yet, diplomatic isolation alone is not enough. India must consider recalibrating its deterrence doctrine. Another Balakot-style response may not only be warranted but essential. Critics argue about nuclear escalation, but Pakistan did not go nuclear after the Indian Parliament attack or the 2008 Mumbai carnage. Fear of escalation must not be allowed to paralyze action.

Strategic Clarity: What Must Be Done

  • Enhance Counter-Terror Intelligence: India must boost its intelligence capabilities, both human and technical, in border states and within Jammu and Kashmir.
  • Invest in Hybrid Warfare Capabilities: This includes cyber defense, social media monitoring, and rapid response to misinformation.
  • Forge Global Alliances: India’s case against Pakistan must be internationalized more aggressively. Washington, London, and Brussels must be made aware that their ally in Islamabad is sheltering and empowering terrorists.
  • Show Political Unity: The ruling and opposition parties must speak in one voice against terrorism. Internal political bickering only strengthens the narrative of the enemy.
  • Prepare Militarily, Act Decisively: The Indian military must remain on high alert and prepared for cross-border operations that send a clear message to Pakistan’s deep state.

The Pahalgam massacre is not just another attack. It is a signal—clear and chilling—that the hybrid war against India is intensifying. Pakistan’s denials are predictable and irrelevant. What matters now is how India chooses to respond. Strategic restraint, while virtuous in theory, must not become a shield for inaction. Peace can only be pursued from a position of strength.

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