Pakistan is approaching a defining milestone in its defence-industrial trajectory as it moves to finalise a US$1.5 billion (approximately RM7.05 billion) arms agreement with Sudan, a deal that would mark one of the most ambitious overseas military packages ever assembled by Islamabad and underline its emergence as a full-spectrum global arms exporter rather than a domestically focused producer.
The proposed agreement, which remains in its advanced negotiation phase, reflects a broader transformation underway within Pakistan’s military-industrial complex. Over the past decade, Islamabad has quietly shifted from producing primarily for its own armed forces to marketing cost-effective, combat-tested platforms to conflict-affected states seeking alternatives to Western, Russian, or increasingly conditional defence supply chains. Sudan, locked in a brutal civil war since April 2023, has emerged as a pivotal test case for this strategy.
At its core, the package is designed to rebuild Sudan’s shattered airpower architecture from the ground up. It reportedly includes light attack aircraft, advanced and basic trainer jets, unmanned aerial systems, air defence solutions, pilot training programmes, and potentially a limited number of JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighters. Together, these elements point to Pakistan’s intent to offer integrated airpower ecosystems rather than isolated platforms, an approach that aligns closely with the realities of modern asymmetric warfare.
Retired Air Marshal Aamir Masood, a senior figure closely briefed on Pakistan Air Force developments, underscored the breadth of the deal in remarks that suggest negotiations are well beyond the exploratory stage. “Besides the Karakoram-8 jets, it includes Super Mushshak training aircraft, and perhaps some coveted JF-17 fighters developed jointly with China and produced in Pakistan,” he said, framing the agreement as a structured procurement pipeline rather than a speculative transaction.
Masood also hinted at the broader political and financial scaffolding underpinning the deal, noting that “Saudi Arabia may favour and support all the favourable regimes in Gulf for procurement of Pakistani military equipment and training.” Read against Riyadh’s regional manoeuvring, the comment suggests that the Sudan agreement is as much about alliance management and strategic signalling as it is about arms exports.
Economically, the timing is significant. Pakistan remains under chronic fiscal strain, grappling with balance-of-payments pressures and heavy reliance on external financial support. Defence exports have increasingly been positioned by policymakers as both a stabilising economic instrument and a diplomatic tool, allowing Islamabad to convert indigenous manufacturing capacity—much of it developed in partnership with China—into foreign exchange inflows while strengthening ties with influential Middle Eastern patrons.
Strategically, the Sudan package illustrates how Pakistan has refined a competitive export formula built around affordability, rapid delivery, operational relevance, and a willingness to sell where Western suppliers hesitate. This positioning has proven attractive to states confronting insurgencies, sanctions, or political isolation, particularly as traditional suppliers impose stricter end-use monitoring or political conditions.
The inclusion of strike aircraft, drones, and counter-drone capabilities also places Pakistan firmly within a new category of exporters responding to the realities of contemporary warfare. Air dominance is no longer defined solely by high-end fighters, but by the ability to integrate surveillance, precision strike, and layered air defence to counter swarms of low-cost unmanned systems.
At the heart of the proposed agreement is a deliberately layered airpower package aimed at restoring Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) capabilities from pilot training through frontline strike operations. The reported inclusion of 10 Karakoram-8 (K-8) light attack aircraft, jointly developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Hongdu Aviation, would provide Sudan with a dual-use platform capable of advanced training and precision ground attack.
Armed with guided munitions and able to operate from austere airfields, the K-8 is well suited for close air support against mobile insurgent units. With unit costs estimated between US$10 million and US$15 million (RM47–70.5 million), the aircraft allows Sudan to field meaningful numbers without prohibitive financial exposure, a crucial consideration for a country at war and under severe economic stress.
Equally significant is the reported inclusion of more than 200 unmanned systems, spanning reconnaissance drones and kamikaze loitering munitions. These are thought to draw on Pakistan’s Shahpar-II unmanned combat aerial vehicle ecosystem, which offers endurance of up to 20 hours and compatibility with laser-guided weapons. Such systems would allow the SAF to conduct persistent surveillance over contested territory, strike high-value targets with minimal risk to pilots, and mirror the drone-centric tactics that have proven decisive in conflicts from Ukraine to Nagorno-Karabakh.
To protect these assets, as well as critical airbases and logistics hubs, the package is expected to include air defence systems optimised for low-altitude threats. This addresses one of the SAF’s most acute vulnerabilities, as drones operated by the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have repeatedly targeted runways, aircraft shelters, and command nodes.
Basic and advanced pilot training would be reinforced through the supply of Super Mushshak aircraft, ensuring Sudan can regenerate aircrew capacity over time rather than relying solely on foreign contractors or obsolete training pipelines. For a force suffering from attrition and limited sortie generation, this element is as strategically important as frontline hardware.
The most consequential component, however, is the potential inclusion of JF-17 Thunder fighters. The Block III variant, equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and beyond-visual-range missiles, would give Sudan its first genuinely modern fighter capability in decades. With unit costs ranging from US$25 million to US$50 million (RM117.5–235 million) depending on configuration, even a modest squadron could significantly alter Sudan’s airpower calculus by enabling air interdiction, airspace denial, and precision strike missions well beyond the reach of light aircraft.
Sudan’s interest in such capabilities is rooted in the nature of its war. Since April 2023, fighting between the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has transformed the country into a laboratory for asymmetric warfare. Drones, urban combat, and foreign-backed militias have eclipsed conventional force structures, while state authority has collapsed across vast areas.
The conflict, which has produced more than 20,000 deaths, displaced over 10 million people, and pushed nearly half the population toward famine, has also exposed the structural weaknesses of Sudan’s ageing air force. Reliant on legacy platforms, the SAF has struggled to counter the RSF’s growing use of commercially adapted kamikaze drones and intelligence-driven hit-and-run tactics that eroded Khartoum’s control of key urban centres.
RSF battlefield momentum has been widely attributed to external support networks providing drones, logistics, and expertise, enabling it to contest airspace indirectly by attacking runways and command nodes rather than engaging in traditional air combat. In this context, restoring even limited air superiority has become a strategic imperative for the SAF.
As one Sudanese military analyst has observed in regional commentary, Pakistan’s systems could provide the operational edge needed to counter RSF asymmetry. The appeal lies less in technological extravagance than in relevance: endurance, precision, and cost efficiency matter more than stealth or supersonic performance in Sudan’s environment.
For Pakistan, the Sudan deal fits into a broader export surge. Islamabad has already concluded a reported US$4.6 billion (RM21.62 billion) agreement with Libya’s National Army, engaged in advanced talks with Bangladesh, and sustained defence relationships with Azerbaijan and Myanmar. Collectively, these have pushed annual defence exports toward the US$1 billion (RM4.7 billion) mark.
Central to this effort is the JF-17 Thunder, whose operational use has given it credibility rare for an aircraft in its price bracket. Pakistan’s willingness to engage with states facing sanctions or internal conflict differentiates it from more risk-averse suppliers, positioning it as a supplier of last resort for governments seeking rapid capability enhancement.
The approach carries risks. Reliance on Chinese subsystems creates supply-chain vulnerabilities, while arming active conflict zones invites international scrutiny and reputational costs. Humanitarian critics warn that such transfers may prolong suffering, while proponents argue that restoring state military capacity is a prerequisite for stabilisation.
Regionally, the Sudan deal also reflects Gulf geopolitics. Saudi Arabia’s reported facilitation aligns with its interest in stabilising Red Sea security and counterbalancing rival influences, while reinforcing Pakistan’s role as a dependable military partner during periods of economic stress.
Ultimately, the US$1.5 billion Pakistan-Sudan arms agreement represents more than a commercial breakthrough. It is a strategic inflection point that encapsulates the paradox of contemporary arms trading, where economic necessity, strategic ambition, and ethical ambiguity converge, reshaping power balances from South Asia.
