The Philippines is considering a major expansion of its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile arsenal, underscoring Manila’s growing reliance on an Indian-Russian jointly developed weapons system to strengthen its coastal defenses against China, despite being a longstanding treaty ally of the United States.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. announced on November 4, 2026, that Manila was seeking to acquire additional BrahMos missile systems and had already submitted a list of proposed modifications to Indian authorities to make the weapons better suited to the country’s geographical and infrastructure challenges.
Speaking at the 3rd Delhi Defense Dialogue, Teodoro said the Philippines hoped to increase its existing BrahMos inventory and wanted the system adapted to the country’s particular operational requirements.
“We hope to increase the number of BrahMos units we have, and we have also shared a wish list on the BrahMos with the Indian authorities in order to make it more tailor-fitted for the Philippine environment,” he said.
Teodoro also highlighted logistical challenges associated with transporting and operating sophisticated missile systems across the Philippines’ extensive archipelago. The country’s thousands of islands, relatively fragile road networks and bridges, and varying infrastructure conditions create significant difficulties for military mobility and weapons deployment.
Reports suggest that the Philippines could purchase as many as five additional BrahMos systems, potentially involving nearly 60 missiles, under a contract estimated to be worth between $700 million and $800 million. If finalized, the acquisition would represent a substantial expansion of Manila’s ground-based anti-ship missile capabilities.
The potential purchase builds on a $375 million agreement signed between India and the Philippines in January 2022 for three batteries of the shore-based BrahMos anti-ship missile system. The contract marked India’s first major export of the BrahMos and represented an important milestone in New Delhi’s efforts to establish itself as a defense exporter.
The original procurement was intended to strengthen the Philippines’ ability to deter Chinese naval activity in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s expansive maritime claims overlap with the internationally recognized maritime rights and territorial claims of several Southeast Asian countries.
China and the Philippines have repeatedly experienced confrontations involving coast guard vessels, maritime militia and fishing boats, particularly around Scarborough Shoal and other disputed areas within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
Manila maintains that its maritime rights are protected by the 2016 arbitral ruling under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which rejected the legal basis of China’s expansive nine-dash-line claims. Beijing has consistently rejected the ruling.
Although Teodoro did not explicitly identify China as the reason for the proposed missile expansion, his remarks came amid continuing maritime tensions and form part of the Philippines’ broader effort to strengthen its external defense capabilities.
Under successive military modernization programs, including the Horizon initiatives, Manila has increasingly shifted its military priorities from internal security and counterinsurgency operations toward territorial defense, maritime surveillance and the protection of its exclusive economic zone.
The acquisition of additional BrahMos missiles fits directly into that strategic transition.
The Philippines’ growing dependence on BrahMos presents an interesting strategic development because the missile’s technological origins are closely associated with Russia, even as Manila deepens its military cooperation with Washington.
The BrahMos program emerged from an Indo-Russian joint venture established in 1998 between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya.
The missile draws heavily on the technological foundations of Russia’s P-800 Oniks anti-ship missile. However, decades of development have incorporated substantial Indian engineering, production and technological contributions, transforming BrahMos into a distinct weapon system capable of deployment from land, naval vessels and aircraft.
The Philippines does not procure the missile directly from Russia. Instead, it purchases the system from India, which has increasingly positioned BrahMos as a central component of its defense-export strategy.
Nevertheless, the arrangement highlights an unusual feature of Manila’s defense policy. The Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, while Washington has generally maintained reservations about Russian-origin military equipment because of sanctions, supply-chain vulnerabilities and broader geopolitical competition with Moscow.
Yet the practical demands of deterring China appear to be encouraging a pragmatic approach.
Under the 2023 Bilateral Defense Guidelines, Washington and Manila reaffirmed their security commitments, including the applicability of the Mutual Defense Treaty to armed attacks against Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the South China Sea.
More importantly, the United States is increasingly helping the Philippines integrate its BrahMos capabilities into a wider maritime-strike architecture.
Earlier this year, American and Philippine forces conducted maritime-strike training that simulated the employment of ground-launched BrahMos missiles against hostile naval formations.
On August 25, 2026, the two countries practiced using simulated Hermes unmanned aerial vehicles to detect and track a notional Chinese surface action group consisting of two Type 052D destroyers, one Type 054A frigate and one Type 901 replenishment ship.
The exercise involved surveillance, target identification, tracking, fire planning and simulated missile employment.
The objective was to establish a complete targeting chain connecting aerial surveillance assets with ground-based anti-ship missile units.
This is particularly important because acquiring sophisticated missiles alone does not automatically provide an effective maritime-strike capability. Long-range weapons require accurate intelligence, persistent surveillance, secure communications and reliable targeting information.
By rehearsing these operational procedures, American and Philippine forces are working to ensure that Philippine-operated BrahMos batteries can function more effectively within a coordinated allied defense network.
The development suggests that Washington’s immediate priority in the South China Sea is strengthening the Philippines’ ability to counter Chinese maritime power, even when that involves supporting a weapon system with Russian technological origins.
The geographical deployment of BrahMos is another important dimension of the Philippines’ emerging military strategy.
Manila has established a BrahMos missile facility at Philippine Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in Zambales, on the western coast of Luzon.
Luzon is strategically important because of its position along the first island chain and its proximity to Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, a major maritime passage connecting the South China Sea with the western Pacific Ocean.
The strait would become a critical operational area during any major regional conflict involving China, Taiwan and the United States. Its geographical significance makes the northern Philippines an increasingly important location for surveillance, maritime interdiction and coastal-defense operations.
The BrahMos deployment at Zambales is also part of a broader pattern of expanding American-Philippine military cooperation.
During the Balikatan 2026 exercises, the United States deployed its Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), a mobile ground-based anti-ship missile capability, alongside High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS).
The deployment demonstrated the ability of American forces to establish mobile maritime-strike positions near strategically important waterways, including approaches to the Luzon Strait.
Washington has also maintained the Typhon Mid-Range Capability missile system in the Philippines following its initial deployment in 2024. The system can launch Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and SM-6 missiles, providing American forces with additional long-range strike options.
Together, BrahMos, NMESIS and Typhon illustrate an increasingly integrated approach to coastal defense and maritime denial.
Rather than depending exclusively on conventional naval forces, the Philippines is seeking to develop the ability to threaten hostile surface vessels from land-based positions, complicating the movement of opposing naval formations through strategically important waters.
The BrahMos is a two-stage, supersonic cruise missile designed for precision strikes against land and maritime targets. It uses a solid-fuel booster during the initial launch phase, which separates after accelerating the missile. A liquid-fuel ramjet engine subsequently sustains its high-speed flight.
The missile can reach speeds approaching Mach 3, or nearly three times the speed of sound, depending on the variant and operating conditions.
Its combination of high speed, relatively low-altitude flight and advanced guidance systems makes interception challenging for naval air-defense systems.
During its terminal approach, the missile can fly at very low altitudes, reducing the time available for an opposing vessel to detect, identify and engage it.
The weapon also incorporates inertial navigation and terminal guidance technologies, including an active radar seeker in relevant configurations.
The original export configuration had a range of approximately 290 kilometers, while subsequent developments have expanded the missile’s operational range. Its land-based coastal-defense variant is particularly relevant to the Philippines because it can threaten hostile vessels without requiring the country to deploy large numbers of expensive warships.
For a country facing a substantial military imbalance with China, such capabilities offer an important form of asymmetric deterrence.
China possesses a significantly larger navy, advanced surface combatants, submarines, aircraft and extensive maritime surveillance infrastructure. The Philippines cannot realistically match those capabilities through conventional force expansion alone.
Instead, Manila is pursuing an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy designed to make military operations near its coastline more difficult and costly for an adversary.
The BrahMos provides a potentially powerful component of that strategy by allowing relatively small ground-based units to threaten larger naval vessels operating within missile range.
Former Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana previously described the missiles as an important deterrent, saying they would provide protection against attempts to undermine the country’s sovereignty and sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea.
Teodoro has also described BrahMos as a potential game-changer for maritime security, particularly in strengthening the Philippine Marine Corps’ Coastal Defense Regiment.
The proposed expansion therefore represents more than another arms purchase. It reflects Manila’s determination to establish a credible coastal-defense network supported by domestic military units, Indian missile technology and American surveillance and operational cooperation.
For India, a larger Philippine order would strengthen its position as an emerging defense exporter and deepen strategic engagement with Southeast Asia. For the Philippines, BrahMos offers an opportunity to improve its maritime deterrence without attempting to match China’s military capabilities ship for ship.
Ultimately, the proposed acquisition highlights a changing regional security environment in which traditional political and military alignments are increasingly shaped by operational requirements. Although the Philippines remains firmly allied with Washington, its growing reliance on an Indian-Russian missile demonstrates that Manila is willing to diversify its defense partnerships to address what it considers its most immediate strategic challenge: China’s expanding military and maritime presence in the South China Sea.
