The Philippines will assume the annually rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for 2026, inheriting a crowded and combustible agenda at a moment of unusual strain for both the regional bloc and the wider international order. Manila’s stewardship will unfold against a backdrop of armed conflict, political volatility, intensifying great-power rivalry, and growing doubts about ASEAN’s capacity to shape outcomes rather than merely manage optics.
The list of challenges facing the Philippine chairmanship is daunting. Myanmar remains engulfed in a grinding civil war, with an election planned that few observers believe will be free or fair. Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia have flared once again, driven by long-standing historical grievances and complicated by Thailand’s own looming election cycle. Looming over all of this is the defining strategic issue for ASEAN: how to manage relations with an increasingly assertive China, particularly in the contested waters of the South China Sea.
There is a real risk that much of ASEAN’s activity under Philippine leadership will be performative rather than transformative. Hard problems have resisted collective solutions for years, and ASEAN’s consensus-driven model limits its ability to act decisively in moments of crisis. Still, the Philippines will be under pressure to demonstrate that ASEAN relevance has not faded beyond repair.
Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr enters the ASEAN chairmanship facing constraints at home. His administration has been buffeted by political volatility and persistent corruption allegations, factors that may sap diplomatic bandwidth and weaken Manila’s leverage abroad. While ASEAN chairmanships are institutionally driven rather than personality-based, the domestic standing of the chair’s leader inevitably shapes perceptions of authority and effectiveness.
Formally, the Philippines has laid out a broad agenda built around three pillars: enhancing peace and security, strengthening prosperity and economic ties, and advancing people empowerment. In practice, however, Manila has its eyes on one overriding objective: progress toward a long-delayed code of conduct in the South China Sea.
That code has been under negotiation for roughly eight years, reflecting both its importance and its intractability. For the Philippines, the incentive to conclude an agreement is acute. Manila’s disputes with Beijing have become more frequent, more visible, and more dangerous, raising fears of miscalculation. Yet these same tensions also make China less inclined to compromise, particularly if it believes a code of conduct could constrain its freedom of action.
Even in the most optimistic scenario, any code that emerges may prove more symbolic than functional, heavy on principles and light on enforcement. Still, symbolism matters in a region where the erosion of norms has been gradual but persistent.
The urgency of the South China Sea issue was underscored by a clash on December 12 near Sabina Shoal—known as Escoda Shoal in the Philippines and Xianbin Reef in China. Located just 75 nautical miles off the Philippine island of Palawan, the feature lies well within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. According to Manila, Chinese maritime militia and Coast Guard vessels drove several Filipino fishing boats from the area, using high-pressure water cannons that left three Filipinos injured.
Incidents such as this have become emblematic of the Philippines’ predicament: legally confident but materially overmatched, and increasingly reliant on diplomatic, legal, and alliance-based tools to push back against Chinese pressure. As ASEAN chair, Manila will find it difficult to separate its national interests from the bloc’s collective posture, reinforcing the likelihood that China management will dominate the year.
The Philippines is not without external support. In November, the United States made a conspicuous show of backing, sailing the Nimitz carrier strike group near Scarborough Shoal—a major flashpoint with China—alongside Philippine Navy vessels and a Japanese destroyer as part of a two-day joint patrol and exercise. The message was unmistakable: Washington remains invested in freedom of navigation and in its alliance with Manila.
Yet confidence in the United States is not unqualified. Don McLain Gill, a lecturer in international studies at De La Salle University in Manila, notes that there is an acknowledgement in the Philippines that today’s United States is not the same as in previous eras. The trust deficit left by President Donald Trump’s earlier approach to alliances, he argues, will be difficult to repair fully. Questions about long-term US commitment inevitably shape ASEAN calculations.
The Philippines’ chairmanship is also likely to accentuate a familiar but widening divide within ASEAN: that between maritime Southeast Asia and the mainland states. Manila, along with Vietnam, has been among the most vocal ASEAN members on the South China Sea. By contrast, several mainland countries have tended to adopt more cautious or muted positions, reflecting their economic ties with China and their own domestic preoccupations.
Myanmar is consumed by its internal conflict, leaving it largely disengaged from regional diplomacy. Thailand and Cambodia are mired in a dispute with deep historical roots, one that may or may not ease after Thailand’s election scheduled for February 8. While a settled government in Bangkok could open space for a reset, hyper-nationalism on both sides suggests grievances will persist. Thailand itself may remain trapped in a familiar cycle of fragile coalition governments and policy paralysis.
Myanmar’s planned election offers even less hope of resolution. The civil war’s ethnonational roots are deep and unyielding, and ASEAN’s limited leverage has rendered it a virtual bystander. The bloc lacks both the sticks and the carrots to influence events meaningfully, leaving individual member states to decide whether—and how—to recognise any government that emerges from a deeply contested process.
Vietnam stands out as a partial exception. It shares maritime disputes with China and would likely support the Philippines on South China Sea issues. At the same time, Hanoi is adept at strategic balancing and careful not to antagonise major powers unnecessarily, particularly one that sits at its doorstep. Still, Vietnam’s growing economic weight gives it increasing influence. Its GDP growth of around 8 per cent contrasts sharply with Thailand’s 2 to 3 per cent, fuelling perceptions that Hanoi is emerging as a subregional leader.
Beyond headline disputes, deeper structural problems threaten to undermine ASEAN cohesion. Laos remains mired in debt, Cambodia is grappling with conflict and political strain, and Thailand is struggling with sluggish growth. The spread of scam operations and associated criminal networks has further eroded governance and public trust across parts of the region. Together, these factors risk entrenching chronic instability in the heart of mainland ASEAN.
This comes at a moment when ASEAN arguably needs internal integration more than ever. Leaders such as Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong have spoken of the need for ASEAN to “earn” its much-vaunted centrality—a recognition that relevance can no longer be assumed. One traditional measure of that centrality has been whether major external leaders, particularly the president of the United States, attend ASEAN’s annual summitry. Even that is uncertain, with the possibility that US domestic politics, including midterm elections, could keep Washington’s attention elsewhere in 2026.
Speaking in Kuala Lumpur in October during the handover of the chairmanship, President Marcos struck a note of resolve tempered by realism. While acknowledging that change may be unpredictable, he said ASEAN’s “compass must remain constant, anchored in cooperation” and oriented toward a stable, secure, open, inclusive, and rules-based regional architecture.
Some tangible, nuts-and-bolts deliverables may well emerge from the Philippines’ year at the helm. These could include incremental steps toward deeper economic integration, progress on common market aspirations, improved disaster preparedness, and enhanced humanitarian assistance mechanisms. Manila may also push to formalise an ASEAN Coast Guard forum, currently informal, as a means of improving maritime domain awareness and coordination.
Yet expectations remain tempered. In geostrategic terms, ASEAN’s international reputation has arguably not been this low since the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Singapore’s former diplomat Bilahari Kausikan has warned that recovery will be harder this time, noting that while the strategic environment has changed dramatically, ASEAN itself has not adapted at the same pace.
The Philippines, for all its ambition, has limited leverage and finite capacity. In addition to managing inherited crises, it must also oversee the continued integration of Timor-Leste as ASEAN’s 11th member, a process that brings both promise and complexity.
Ultimately, the most realistic outcome of Manila’s chairmanship may be neither dramatic breakthroughs nor catastrophic failure. The best that the Philippines may hope for is to steer a steady course through another year of churn—preventing fragmentation within ASEAN, avoiding an escalation of US-China rivalry in the region, and keeping channels of dialogue open in an increasingly unforgiving strategic landscape. In a time of peril, mere steadiness may itself count as an achievement.
