In international geopolitics, however, a week can feel like an eternity—and a few months can alter the entire balance of power. In 2017, during his first term, it was none other than Donald Trump who revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—or the Quad—comprising India, Japan, Australia, and the United States. Often described as an “Asian NATO,” the Quad was envisioned as a strategic framework to counter China’s expanding influence and coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific.
The initiative became one of Trump’s signature foreign policy legacies. His successor, Joe Biden, elevated it further by holding the first-ever Quad leaders’ summit, framing it as a central pillar of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet, in an ironic twist of geopolitics, Trump’s second term—barely months old—now threatens to undo the very framework he helped resurrect.
Trump’s return to the White House began on a promising note for the Quad. Within 24 hours of his inauguration, his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hosted the grouping’s foreign ministers, signaling Washington’s continued commitment to the Indo-Pacific alliance. Another ministerial meeting followed in July, underscoring early optimism about renewed cooperation.
But the momentum has since dissipated. India was slated to host the next Quad summit in November, yet reports from diplomatic sources suggest that Trump is unlikely to attend. In his absence, the meeting may be canceled altogether.
The uncertainty reflects a deeper malaise: the deteriorating U.S.-India relationship. In the span of a few months, Washington and New Delhi have drifted to their lowest point in two decades.
The chill began after Trump hosted Pakistani military ruler Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House in June—barely a month after the India-Pakistan border clashes in May. The optics of welcoming Islamabad’s general so soon after a military conflict with New Delhi were interpreted in India as a calculated snub.
Then came the tariffs. At 50 percent, the Trump administration has imposed the highest duties on Indian goods of any nation. The two countries have yet to finalize a trade agreement, and the tariffs have crippled key sectors of India’s export economy, from pharmaceuticals to textiles.
Unless the U.S. reverses these measures and reaches a trade accord, the bilateral relationship appears unlikely to stabilize. And without that foundation, the broader Quad structure—dependent on U.S.-India cooperation—cannot thrive.
India and the United States are the twin pillars of the Quad, representing not only its largest economies and militaries but also its strategic rationale. Together, they form the Indo-Pacific’s northern and western anchors, bridging the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Rim. Losing India would mean the Quad loses its geographical balance and moral legitimacy.
Recent developments suggest that the U.S. might be exploring an alternate configuration—one that tacitly sidelines India.
On November 1, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth met with the defense ministers of Japan, Australia, and the Philippines in Kuala Lumpur. This was his second meeting with the same grouping this year. The joint statement issued afterward sounded strikingly similar to traditional Quad communiqués.
“The ministers reiterated their serious concern regarding China’s destabilizing actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and their strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion,” the statement read.
It further emphasized respect for international law and reaffirmed that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award is “final and legally binding.”
More importantly, the ministers announced the creation of a new framework—the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Cooperation Council—and endorsed joint military exercises, including BALIKATAN 2026, to be hosted by the Philippines with participation from all four nations.
While these countries have convened similar meetings before, the timing and tone of this latest gathering—at a moment when the Quad summit is uncertain—has fueled speculation that Washington is positioning Manila as a possible replacement or at least a signal to New Delhi that its presence is not indispensable.
Yet, such a pivot would carry enormous strategic risks. Replacing India with the Philippines would fundamentally alter the Quad’s identity—from a pan-continental coalition to a Pacific-centered bloc—undermining the U.S.’s decade-long vision of an “Indo-Pacific” order.
India’s significance to the Quad cannot be measured merely in demographics, economics, or military might—though those factors are formidable. With 1.4 billion people, the world’s fourth-largest economy, and one of its most capable armed forces, India’s inclusion gives the Quad both strategic depth and geographic coherence.
More importantly, India bridges the Indian Ocean and Pacific theaters, turning what was once the “Asia-Pacific” into a true Indo-Pacific framework. Without New Delhi, the very terminology loses meaning.
To appreciate this, one must revisit the evolution of America’s regional strategy. Around 2013, during the Obama years, U.S. policymakers began shifting from the “Asia-Pacific” label to “Indo-Pacific.” This subtle linguistic change carried deep strategic implications—it acknowledged India’s central role in balancing China and recognized the Indian Ocean’s growing importance in global trade and security.
The term gained traction under Obama but became institutionalized during Trump’s first term. In 2017, his administration formally adopted “Indo-Pacific” as the cornerstone of U.S. regional policy, replacing the earlier “pivot to Asia.” The same year, the Trump White House revived the Quad after nearly a decade of dormancy.
That dual evolution was no coincidence. The Quad’s rebirth and the Indo-Pacific narrative were intertwined—both hinged on India’s inclusion.
As C. Raja Mohan, one of India’s leading strategic thinkers, once observed, “The Indo-Pacific construct without India is a body without a soul.”
The Quad’s power lies in its balance: Japan and Australia anchor the Pacific side; India secures the Indian Ocean flank; the United States provides the connective tissue—diplomatic, technological, and military—that binds the alliance.
Without India, that symmetry collapses. The grouping risks reverting to a Pacific-only focus, resembling older Cold War alliances like SEATO—ineffective, fragmented, and lacking legitimacy in South and Southeast Asia.
Moreover, India’s absence would undermine the Quad’s normative appeal as a partnership of democracies spanning both oceans. It would reduce the grouping to a U.S.-led containment coalition rather than a shared vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
From maritime domain awareness to supply chain resilience, cyber cooperation, and disaster response, India’s participation brings both strategic weight and moral credibility. Its leadership in forums such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Global South amplifies the Quad’s reach and legitimacy.
Trump’s renewed emphasis on “America First” appears to be narrowing U.S. strategic focus to transactional gains. This approach may deliver short-term domestic political benefits but risks long-term erosion of regional partnerships painstakingly built over decades.
The current downturn in U.S.-India relations—and the potential sidelining of the Quad—illustrates the dangers of such unilateralism.
As Arzan Tarapore, a visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, wrote recently in Foreign Policy: “The Quad is dead, long live the Quad.” His point: the grouping’s raison d’être—ensuring regional stability amid China’s rise—remains as vital as ever. But for it to survive, the Quad must evolve beyond personalities and power politics.
For now, the Quad stands at a crossroads. If the November summit in India is indeed canceled, it will mark the first major setback in the alliance’s trajectory since its revival in 2017.
Yet, history suggests resilience. The Quad has survived dormancy before—it was shelved after 2008 and resurrected nearly a decade later. It can endure again, provided its members, especially the United States, recognize that India is not merely one of four partners but the linchpin of the entire Indo-Pacific construct.
In the end, the Quad’s fate will hinge not on slogans or summits, but on trust—trust that each member shares an equal stake in preserving a free, open, and balanced regional order.
If Washington forgets that lesson in its pursuit of short-term deals and geopolitical posturing, the “Indo-Pacific” might once again revert to being just the “Asia-Pacific”—a region without India, and an alliance without a future.
