This weekend, the leaders of the Quad – the United States, Japan, Australia, and India – will convene in Wilmington, Delaware, the hometown of U.S. President Joe Biden. This summit will serve as a symbolic moment, marking the end of an era for two of the four leaders. For Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, this gathering will be one of his final major acts as Japan’s head of state before he steps down. Similarly, President Biden, whose term will end four months later, will also be participating in what may be his last Quad meeting.
The timing of this summit is significant, not only as a farewell to these leaders but also as a pivotal moment for the Quad itself. This geopolitical grouping, officially named the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, has grown rapidly in importance over the last half-decade. The Quad serves as a forum where its four members—often described as “like-minded” democracies—can coordinate on a broad range of issues, including security, technology, climate change, and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Quad’s Origins and Evolution: A Shifting Focus
The Quad, originally established in 2007, emerged largely in response to China’s increasing power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Its formation was driven by shared concerns about China’s assertive foreign policy. Initially, however, the Quad had a narrower focus, with its first iteration largely focusing on military cooperation and security.
In its early days, the Quad was mostly propelled by Washington and Tokyo, with Australia and India taking a more cautious approach. Both Canberra and New Delhi were reluctant to be seen as overtly participating in an anti-China coalition. This wariness, combined with China’s then-cautious foreign policy approach, led to the Quad’s quiet abandonment in 2008.
By 2017, however, the geopolitical landscape had shifted considerably. China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, was adopting a more assertive and ambitious foreign policy, alarming countries across the Indo-Pacific. This change prompted the revival of the Quad, with all four countries reassessing the strategic value of this grouping. The first formal meeting of the Quad 2.0 took place at the 2017 East Asia Summit, marking a turning point for the organization.
Since then, the Quad has held a series of high-level meetings. While initial gatherings focused on ministerial-level engagements, the first leaders’ summit was hosted by President Biden in 2021. During that summit, the group made a commitment to hold annual meetings, underscoring the Quad’s growing importance in the strategic calculus of its members.
Quad’s Expanding Agenda: Beyond Military Cooperation
While military concerns were central to the Quad’s initial formation, the group has since significantly broadened its scope. Today, it tackles a wide range of issues, from climate change to public health, technological development, and even space cooperation. One of the most important areas of collaboration has been in the realm of vaccination distribution, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Quad has also been active in the field of maritime domain awareness, especially in the Indian Ocean region. By enhancing surveillance and cooperation in this key strategic waterway, the Quad aims to protect the region’s open and free maritime routes from any disruptive influence, implicitly hinting at China’s increasing naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite this expanded agenda, the Quad remains largely focused on managing the geopolitical challenge posed by China. Although the grouping avoids directly mentioning China in official statements, it is clear that the rise of China’s military and economic power is the central concern of the Quad members.
However, the Quad’s scope still has notable gaps. For instance, economic collaboration, a vital aspect of countering China’s influence in the region, has been conspicuously absent from the Quad’s agenda. China’s use of geo-economics—deploying its economic strength to influence its neighbors and secure strategic advantages—presents a significant challenge that the Quad has yet to adequately address. The lack of economic coordination leaves a strategic gap in the group’s ability to present a comprehensive response to China’s rise.
The Quad has undeniably captured global attention, in part due to the high-level nature of its gatherings and its growing list of priorities. In diplomatic terms, the Quad has been an important exercise in signaling. Its existence sends a clear message: four major Indo-Pacific democracies are coordinating their efforts to ensure that the region remains stable, open, and free from coercion.
Yet, despite its symbolic importance, the Quad has struggled to translate its lofty declarations into concrete policy outcomes. While the group has held multiple summits and issued numerous communiqués, there have been relatively few tangible achievements in terms of practical cooperation. The Quad’s ambitious agenda—spanning everything from climate change to technology and security—has yet to produce substantial results on the ground.
This gap between rhetoric and reality is partly due to the Quad’s still-nascent stage of development. The grouping is only a few years into its revival, and bureaucratic capacity constraints among its members have slowed progress. Furthermore, the four countries involved have not had much experience working together in such a framework. As a result, their capacity to collaborate effectively is still evolving.
Challenge of Diverging National Interests
Another significant challenge for the Quad is the diverging interests of its member states. While all four countries share concerns about China’s rise, they have different priorities and approaches when it comes to regional security and foreign policy. This divergence is most evident in the case of India, whose relationship with Russia has caused some friction within the group.
India has long-standing ties with Moscow, which complicates its relationship with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, especially in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India’s reliance on Russian military equipment, as well as its neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict, sets it apart from the more critical positions taken by its Quad partners. This divergence on Russia highlights a broader challenge for the Quad: maintaining cohesion in the face of differing national priorities.
Economic differences also present an obstacle to deeper collaboration. While all four members have strong economies, their approaches to economic governance and trade policy vary significantly. This makes it difficult for the Quad to advance a coordinated economic agenda, particularly in countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure project that has bolstered Beijing’s influence across Asia and beyond.
Delaware Summit: What to Expect
As the leaders of the Quad gather in Wilmington this weekend, observers can expect a mix of high-minded rhetoric, ambitious new plans, and warm tributes to the departing leaders. Both President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida will likely receive praise for their roles in reviving and strengthening the Quad. However, the summit’s success will ultimately hinge on whether the group can move beyond symbolic gestures and start delivering on its promises.
The summit is expected to focus on several key areas, including climate change, technology, and maritime security. There may also be discussions about expanding cooperation on public health and disaster relief, building on the Quad’s earlier initiatives. However, the elephant in the room will remain China. While the Quad members are likely to avoid directly naming China in their official statements, it is clear that managing Beijing’s rise will continue to dominate the group’s agenda.
Another key issue for the summit will be the question of leadership continuity. With both Biden and Kishida leaving office in the near future, the Quad will face a period of uncertainty. Their successors will need to demonstrate the same level of commitment to the Quad if the grouping is to maintain its momentum.
The Quad remains an ambitious undertaking, and its members clearly view it as a vital part of their strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. However, if the grouping is to live up to its potential, it will need to overcome significant challenges. This includes addressing the gap between its ambitious agenda and the lack of concrete achievements, as well as managing the divergent national interests of its members.
The Quad’s success will depend on its ability to translate high-level meetings and diplomatic signaling into practical cooperation that can deliver real benefits for the region. While the Wilmington summit will likely produce more ambitious plans and declarations, the true test will be whether the Quad can follow through on these commitments in the months and years ahead.
Until the Quad starts to act decisively, its ability to influence the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited. In the meantime, China will continue to shape the region’s future, challenging the Quad to evolve from a platform for dialogue into a force for concrete action.
