As the United States pulls back from its decades-long leadership in foreign development assistance, a strategic vacuum is emerging—one that Russia is maneuvering to fill. With the recent shutdown of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a cornerstone of American soft power for over six decades, the Kremlin sees a timely opportunity to expand its geopolitical and geoeconomic footprint, particularly across the Global South.
The end of USAID, a $22 billion-a-year institution, marks a historic pivot in American foreign policy. Once present in over 146 countries and instrumental in post-disaster recovery, democratic institution-building, public health, and infrastructure development, USAID’s dissolution has caused ripple effects globally—leaving numerous governments, NGOs, and communities uncertain about the future of critical projects.
Into that void, Moscow is stepping forward.
Russia, historically a modest player in global development, is signaling an ambitious new direction. In a rare, in-depth interview this month, Yevgeny Primakov, head of Rossotrudnichestvo—a cultural and humanitarian arm of the Russian Foreign Ministry—unveiled plans to create a centralized foreign aid institution akin to the now-defunct USAID.
Primakov, a former journalist and grandson of a former prime minister, said Moscow is exploring “the next iteration of Russian foreign aid,” with the goal of building “a format analogous to USAID.” Though details remain vague, the proposed structure would streamline Russia’s fragmented aid efforts currently dispersed across more than a dozen ministries and agencies. A centralized body would likely combine humanitarian aid, educational exchange, disaster relief, infrastructure development, and possibly paramilitary assistance under one umbrella.
If successful, this would mark the first time since the Soviet era that Russia would have a comprehensive, strategic foreign aid policy designed to win hearts and minds far beyond its borders.
Russia’s motivations are both practical and ideological. On one level, Moscow sees an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of Western rivals. By stepping into regions where U.S. support is diminishing—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and parts of the Middle East—Russia hopes to reshape geopolitical loyalties and economic alliances.
“This isn’t about altruism,” said Maria Snegovaya, a Russian foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington. “It’s about influence, prestige, and access to resources. Moscow sees development aid not as charity, but as diplomacy by other means.”
For years, Russia’s foreign assistance has been narrow in scope and largely concentrated in the post-Soviet space—targeting countries like Armenia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. In 2021, analysts estimated Russia’s total annual foreign aid budget to be just over $1 billion, a fraction of what Western countries spend. However, since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has found itself increasingly isolated from Europe and the United States. It has since turned its focus sharply southward, hoping to court allies among developing nations through trade, military support, information campaigns, and now, development assistance.
“There’s been a notable uptick in Russian engagement in countries like Mali, Sudan, Nicaragua, and Myanmar,” said Daria Isaeva, a senior researcher with the Russian International Affairs Council. “This is about building alternative networks to the West.”
At the center of this new push is Rossotrudnichestvo. Originally created to promote cultural diplomacy and humanitarian outreach, the agency has expanded its activities since 2020 to include development-style work. Its global network of “Russia Houses” now numbers over 60 cultural centers abroad, often co-located with embassies. These outposts promote the Russian language, host exhibitions, distribute textbooks, and organize student exchanges. Recently, they’ve also begun implementing small infrastructure and education projects—particularly in Africa and Central Asia.
Rossotrudnichestvo’s transformation into something more akin to USAID is a bold leap. But it fits with the Kremlin’s larger strategy: wielding soft power where hard power is constrained.
“Development aid is the new frontier in Russia’s asymmetric foreign policy,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, a political analyst with the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Where Moscow can’t compete militarily or economically, it uses culture, education, and now aid to make its presence felt.”
Primakov noted that the Kremlin intends to double down on educational outreach, increasing scholarships for foreign students, building Russian-language institutions abroad, and expanding aid tied to ideological affinity. “It’s not just about money—it’s about worldview,” he said in the interview. “We want to help those who are ready to listen to us.”
Still, Russia faces steep hurdles in trying to emulate USAID.
For one, its budgetary capacity remains limited. While USAID once operated on a $22 billion annual budget, Russia’s entire aid apparatus barely crosses $1 billion—and that was before war-related costs, sanctions, and domestic austerity programs began to bite. Russia’s economy, though resilient in some respects, is under immense strain from Western sanctions, reduced access to global markets, and the costly war in Ukraine.
Additionally, Russia lacks the institutional infrastructure that made USAID effective: a large cadre of technical experts, partnerships with NGOs, accountability mechanisms, and decades of credibility in the development sector.
“Throwing money at the Global South without capacity or strategy won’t be enough,” said Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. “Development assistance is about long-term relationships, not just flashy announcements.”
Moreover, there is skepticism about Russia’s motives. In Africa, for instance, the Wagner Group—Moscow’s paramilitary contractor—has left behind a complex legacy of both support and violence. While some governments welcome Russian assistance, civil society actors remain wary of aid that comes with strings attached or veils a deeper geopolitical agenda.
In Latin America and Southeast Asia, where U.S. withdrawal has created gaps, Russia still faces competition from China, which operates the vast Belt and Road Initiative and commands hundreds of billions in global development finance.
Despite these limitations, Russia appears to be focusing its attention on several key zones:
- Africa: Russia has recently signed bilateral aid and cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Zimbabwe. These partnerships often blend development promises with military support, information operations, and energy deals. In 2024, Russia pledged to train over 10,000 African students annually at Russian universities—a sharp increase from previous years.
- Latin America: Moscow has re-engaged with Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba through disaster assistance, technology transfer, and health programs. After USAID’s departure from several Central American countries, Russia has begun offering basic health kits and digital learning materials through Rossotrudnichestvo.
- South and Southeast Asia: Russia is increasing its outreach in Myanmar, Laos, and Bangladesh, where anti-Western sentiment and a desire for multipolar partnerships provide fertile ground. Offers of scholarships, educational cooperation, and infrastructure development are central to this approach.
- Middle East: In Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Russia continues to offer reconstruction assistance, medical training, and food supplies. These efforts are often publicized in Russian media as evidence of the country’s commitment to regional stability.
The abrupt end of USAID operations has stunned many foreign governments and NGOs who had come to rely on its funding and technical expertise. Critics of the U.S. decision call it a self-inflicted wound that diminishes Washington’s ability to project influence in a world increasingly shaped by multipolar rivalries.
In some countries, USAID projects were the backbone of local development—funding HIV/AIDS treatment, literacy programs, agriculture innovation, and clean water systems. “The disappearance of USAID has left us scrambling,” said an education ministry official in Kenya, speaking anonymously. “There’s no clear replacement yet.”
Although Congress has vowed to redirect some of USAID’s functions through other departments or public-private partnerships, many experts see this as an erosion of America’s soft power toolkit at a time when global competition is intensifying.
The global development landscape is rapidly evolving. As Western donor fatigue grows and the U.S. retrenches, emerging powers like Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf states are seeking to reshape the rules of engagement. While China’s BRI remains the most expansive initiative, Russia is carving out its own niche—focusing on ideological allies, transactional aid, and symbolic gestures.
“Development is becoming more about geopolitics than poverty alleviation,” said Ksenia Ilchenko, an independent researcher on Russian foreign policy. “What matters now is who you help, and what you get in return.”
