In a stark reminder of Cold War-era brinkmanship, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu has warned that Moscow could consider resuming nuclear weapons testing, depending on the actions of the United States. The comments, made in an interview with the state-run TASS news agency on April 24, mark the most direct public suggestion in years that Russia might abandon its longstanding moratorium on nuclear tests.
Shoigu’s remarks are being widely interpreted by analysts as a message to Washington at a time of rising global tensions, military modernization, and the erosion of arms control agreements.
“Russia may take reciprocal measures,” Shoigu said, referencing the potential for the U.S. to resume nuclear tests.
While stating that Moscow currently sees no immediate necessity to conduct nuclear tests, Shoigu emphasized that the Kremlin is prepared for such a scenario, should it determine that U.S. activity in this arena threatens the strategic balance.
Shoigu cited the aging components of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and ongoing development of new weapons systems as key indicators that Washington could soon break its moratorium. The implication is clear: if the United States crosses that line, Russia will not hesitate to respond in kind.
Shoigu’s words were carefully framed. Rather than declaring a new direction in policy, he positioned Russia’s stance as conditional—dependent on U.S. moves. Nonetheless, the warning carries serious implications for global arms control and nuclear stability.
“If they move, we will match,” said Shoigu, summing up Russia’s stance in stark, retaliatory terms.
He noted that both the Russian Ministry of Defense and Rosatom, the state atomic energy corporation, are technically ready to carry out nuclear tests if ordered. This assertion follows months of Kremlin messaging aimed at projecting readiness and resilience amid worsening relations with the West.
Russia’s last nuclear test took place in 1990, under the Soviet Union, at the Novaya Zemlya test site in the Arctic. Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia adopted a unilateral moratorium on testing—a policy it has adhered to for more than three decades.
That commitment, however, has always carried an asterisk. Moscow never ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), although it signed it in 1996. The United States, for its part, also signed the treaty but has not ratified it, leaving both countries outside the framework’s full legal obligations.
In recent years, Russia has significantly upgraded its strategic nuclear forces. This includes the deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), like the RS-28 Sarmat—capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—and hypersonic glide vehicles such as the Avangard, which can reportedly evade missile defenses.
Shoigu emphasized these developments, noting that Russia’s strategic forces have reached a new level of technological maturity. This modernization, he suggested, gives Russia a strong deterrent position even without new nuclear tests.
Still, the subtext of Shoigu’s comments is hard to ignore: if the U.S. decides to break the testing taboo, Russia wants the world to know it is fully equipped—and politically willing—to follow suit.
The timing of Shoigu’s remarks adds to their weight. They come amid a breakdown in the global arms control architecture that has held since the Cold War.
The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, followed by uncertainty over the New START treaty, has left both Russia and the U.S. without a comprehensive framework to manage their nuclear competition.
The New START treaty, which limits deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, is set to expire in 2026. Negotiations for a successor have stalled, complicated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the resulting rupture in U.S.-Russia diplomatic ties.
At the same time, both countries are pursuing extensive modernization of their nuclear forces. In the U.S., the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has launched a multibillion-dollar program to upgrade warhead designs, production facilities, and delivery systems. The Pentagon’s new Sentinel ICBM and B-21 stealth bomber are part of this generational renewal.
Against this backdrop, Shoigu’s reference to “expiring service life” in U.S. warheads may be seen as a nod to speculation that Washington could turn to underground testing to validate newer systems or novel warhead configurations—particularly if confidence in computer modeling or subcritical testing wavers.
Nuclear policy experts see Shoigu’s comments as both a warning and a political signal.
“Russia is essentially putting nuclear testing back on the table as a bargaining chip,” said Dr. Elena Kravtsova, a nuclear nonproliferation analyst based in Berlin. “This isn’t about technical necessity—it’s about strategic messaging to Washington and the broader international community.”
Others point to the domestic angle. With Russian nationalism on the rise and the country increasingly isolated, reviving talk of nuclear might serves as a way for the Kremlin to rally support and reaffirm Russia’s global standing.
“There’s a performative element here,” said Dr. Matthew Keegan, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “Shoigu is reminding everyone that Russia remains a nuclear superpower—and that it can still unsettle the global order with a few words.”
Yet, Keegan warned, these statements can have real consequences. “Even rhetorical moves like this erode the norms that have kept nuclear testing off the table for decades. They raise the risk of miscalculation.”
Were either Russia or the U.S. to resume nuclear testing, it would almost certainly trigger a domino effect. Other nuclear-armed states—particularly China, India, and Pakistan—might follow, arguing that renewed testing by the major powers undermines the global moratorium.
Such a scenario could unravel decades of nonproliferation progress. The CTBT, while not yet in force, has served as a de facto global norm, with only North Korea violating it in the 21st century. A return to testing by Russia or the U.S. would all but doom its future.
Beyond the strategic and political consequences, there are environmental and humanitarian concerns. Underground nuclear tests, even when contained, risk releasing radioactive materials and contaminating test sites. Regions like Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and the Nevada Test Site in the U.S. still bear the scars of past detonations.
Shoigu’s mention of Novaya Zemlya—the site of Russia’s last test and the infamous 1961 Tsar Bomba—serves as a reminder of the scale and power of past explosions. It also raises questions about whether the Arctic, already fragile due to climate change, could become a theater for new nuclear experimentation.
Despite the ominous tone, Shoigu was careful to stress that Russia currently sees no urgent need for testing. That ambiguity is deliberate. It leaves room for diplomatic maneuver while keeping pressure on Washington.
The message is clear: If the U.S. wants to avoid a renewed nuclear arms race, it must refrain from testing—and perhaps engage in new arms control talks. Whether Washington will view Shoigu’s comments as a threat or an invitation remains to be seen.
In the meantime, the world watches closely. A single underground test could shatter decades of restraint and reset the nuclear clock to an era many had hoped was long past.
