Russia has retrofitted the aging Soviet-era Yakovlev Yak-52 trainer aircraft into a crude, low-budget interceptor aimed at battling Ukraine’s expanding fleet of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The emergence of the Yak-52B2 underscores the intensifying technological tug-of-war in the skies between Moscow and Kyiv, as both sides attempt to outwit each other through rapid prototyping and battlefield innovation.
The first public images of the Yak-52B2 surfaced recently on Russian Telegram channel Milinfolive, known for its Kremlin-aligned military coverage. The aircraft, long relegated to training cadets and civilian pilots, has undergone a radical transformation to meet a novel challenge: defending Russian territory against cheap, improvised, yet strategically disruptive Ukrainian drones.
Ukraine’s drone strategy—cheap, long-range, and relentless—has hit deep into Russian airspace with growing success. Its use of converted light aircraft and improvised unmanned strike platforms has forced Russia to search for cost-effective countermeasures beyond its overburdened high-end air defense systems. The Yak-52B2 represents an attempt to fill that gap.
According to Milinfolive, the modified Yak-52 features a new digital flight display, a PEGRAM S400 electro-optical targeting turret beneath the port wing, and most controversially, a Saiga-12 semi-automatic shotgun affixed under the starboard wing. In short, it’s a flying shotgun platform aimed at taking down drones with bursts of scattershot rather than precision firepower.
The idea is reminiscent of counter-drone tactics used by special forces or police SWAT teams—except it’s now flying at several thousand feet. A trigger button linked to the flight stick allows the pilot to fire the shotgun mid-flight. This gives the aircraft a simple yet potentially effective anti-drone capability, as the widespread spray of pellets increases the chances of hitting small, agile UAVs.
According to Russian sources, the design was influenced by tactics used during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, where low-cost aircraft were occasionally armed for ground attack and close air support roles. The Yak-52B2, however, is a different animal—designed not for bombing insurgents, but for shooting down the modern equivalent of flying lawnmowers.
This strategy mirrors what Ukraine itself has done in recent years. In fact, Kyiv began repurposing its own Yak-52s for limited combat use before Russia, equipping them with small munitions or surveillance gear to augment its homegrown UAV fleet.
Now, the tables have turned, and Russia is following suit.
Interestingly, discrepancies in imagery have raised speculation over how many Yak-52s have actually been modified. A video shows a Yak-52B2 in flight, but it features a three-blade propeller and a prop hub fairing—unlike the two-blade version seen in static photos of a parked prototype. The aircraft registration was also deliberately blurred in the images.
This suggests that either multiple prototypes are under testing or the aircraft has undergone further modification since its initial upgrade. Either way, the program is evolving—and fast.
Russia’s decision to mount the shotgun externally instead of embedding a machine gun inside the wing structure highlights both speed and cost-effectiveness. An internal weapon would’ve required significant structural changes, while the shotgun solution leverages a weapon already widely used by Russian internal security forces, including SWAT units.
The Yak-52B2’s main weapon—while innovative—is also its biggest limitation. A shotgun, even one semi-automatic, has a relatively low ammunition capacity and limited range. Once a magazine is spent, reloading it mid-air is practically impossible unless the rear seat occupant takes on the role of aerial loader or secondary gunner with another firearm.
This opens the possibility for future variants to include larger magazine drums or alternate weapons such as belt-fed light machine guns. Until then, the aircraft would need to return to base frequently for rearming, drastically limiting its loiter time and utility.
Despite this, the aircraft may still serve as an effective “drone sweeper” in low-intensity or rural sectors, where Russian strategic assets are vulnerable to deep-penetration UAV strikes.
One of the more advanced additions is the integration of a computerized targeting and navigation system that includes day-and-night operation capabilities, as well as compatibility with ground-based radar and Electronic Warfare (EW) systems. The aircraft reportedly uses data from radars and jammers like the Pantsir CIWS, Tor-M2, and Krasukha to coordinate target acquisition.
This “flying shotgun scout” can then close in on specific drones that may have evaded ground defenses or slipped through Russia’s early-warning net. The aircraft’s PEGRAM S400 turret, commonly found on border patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, provides thermal and optical tracking for visual targeting—a key capability in drone hunting.
The Yak-52B2 wouldn’t exist without Ukraine’s aggressive drone warfare doctrine. Over the past year, Kyiv has demonstrated increasing capability to strike far into Russian territory, often with modified civilian aircraft or long-range UAVs such as the An-196 “Liutyi.”
Introduced by Ukroboronprom in 2022 and upgraded in 2024, the Liutyi can carry a 75 kg payload and fly over 1,000 km. It was reportedly involved in a March 2025 strike on Russia’s Engels Air Base, home to strategic Tu-160 bombers.
Another example is the Sky Ranger Nynja—a converted Aeroprakt A-22 light aircraft turned kamikaze drone. It was spotted in April 2024 carrying a high-explosive aerial bomb, likely the OFAB-100-120, and a small sensor turret. The aircraft crashed in Russian territory, suggesting it had either been intercepted or suffered a mechanical failure.
These systems, cobbled together from civilian designs and military-grade payloads, have become the backbone of Ukraine’s deep-strike capability, largely without NATO support.
One claim made by Milinfolive is particularly interesting: the existing Yak-52 fleet allows for scaling up production. But how many of these aging trainers does Russia have available? That remains unclear.
The Yak-52 was mass-produced in Romania and the Soviet Union from the 1970s through the 1990s. While thousands were made, many are now civilian-owned or have been cannibalized for parts. Whether Russia has enough airworthy frames left for a mass drone-hunting program is an open question.
Even if airframes are available, the retrofit process takes time. If it took nine months to complete a single prototype, the urgency of production needs to increase dramatically for this platform to become operationally significant.
Ultimately, the Yak-52B2 is a band-aid—not a breakthrough. Its value lies in its cost-effectiveness and adaptability, not its combat performance. It won’t stop high-speed cruise missiles or advanced UAVs, but it could blunt Ukraine’s ability to pepper Russian rear areas with converted light aircraft and hobbyist drones.
The question is whether this platform can be fielded quickly enough and in sufficient numbers to make a difference. If Ukraine escalates by launching large drone swarms toward key Russian cities or strategic bases, the Yak-52B2 may be overwhelmed by sheer volume alone.
What’s more, the rapidly evolving battlefield will likely render current systems obsolete within months. Ukraine’s drone engineers are already integrating AI, improved stealth, and decentralized control into their designs—threats the Yak-52B2 may be ill-equipped to handle.
The Yak-52B2 isn’t a game-changer, but it is a stark example of how modern warfare forces old machines into new roles. As Ukraine and Russia continue to experiment on the fly, both sides will increasingly rely on creativity over convention.
