Russia’s decision to unveil its latest 300mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), the Sarma, at the World Defense Show 2026 in Riyadh represents a carefully calibrated attempt by Moscow to reassert itself as a major exporter of long-range precision firepower at a moment when global artillery doctrines are being reshaped by high-intensity, drone-saturated warfare.
The Sarma’s international debut comes under extraordinary geopolitical pressure. Since 2022, sweeping Western sanctions have severely constrained Russia’s access to traditional European and Asia-Pacific defence markets, disrupting supply chains, financing mechanisms, and long-standing export relationships. In response, Rosoboronexport has pivoted aggressively toward politically flexible, capital-rich regions—most notably the Middle East—where defence spending continues to surge despite global economic uncertainty.
Images circulating from Saudi Arabia as early as 29 January 2026 showing Sarma systems arriving in Riyadh underscored the urgency behind Moscow’s push. The Middle East’s arms market is projected to exceed US$150 billion in annual defence expenditure by 2026, driven by persistent conflicts, regional rivalries, and the accelerating proliferation of missiles, drones, and long-range strike systems. For Russia, securing even a modest foothold in this environment could offset losses elsewhere and signal enduring relevance as a global arms supplier.
Mounted on a KAMAZ-63501 8×8 armored chassis, the Sarma is deliberately positioned as a lighter, faster, and more survivable alternative to Russia’s legacy heavy MLRS platforms, while simultaneously challenging Western systems—most notably the U.S.-made HIMARS—that have transformed expectations for precision strike artillery.
Bekhan Ozdoyev, Industrial Director of Rostec’s weapons, ammunition, and special chemicals cluster, framed the system’s tactical philosophy in blunt terms. “The Sarma boasts high mobility, capable of taking position in just three minutes and withdrawing in the same time frame,” he said, “allowing for rapid hit-and-run operations.”
Rostec further highlighted the crew-protection aspect, noting that the system enables operators to take up position, conduct all preparatory procedures, and fire without leaving the armored cabin. This design protects crews from shrapnel, small-arms fire, and armour-piercing incendiary ammunition—threats that have become routine in modern counter-battery and drone-dominated battlefields.
Ukrainian military journalist Alexander Yan placed the Sarma squarely within the context of Russia’s battlefield learning curve. “Under the influence of the firepower of the American HIMARS missile systems and their impact on the front,” he observed, “the Russian Ministry of Defense initiated its own project of a mobile high-precision missile system.”
Together, these statements frame Sarma not merely as another export product, but as a doctrinal response to the dominance demonstrated by Western precision artillery—now repackaged for foreign customers seeking long-range strike power without Western political strings.
The Sarma MLRS traces its conceptual lineage directly to Russia’s accelerated artillery modernisation drive following operational lessons from the war in Ukraine. There, mobility, survivability, and the ability to evade counter-battery fire have emerged as decisive factors in artillery effectiveness, often outweighing sheer firepower.
Developed by PJSC Motovilikhinskiye Zavody in Perm, the Sarma was first publicly revealed during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the facility in September 2025, signalling top-level political backing. The message was clear: this was not a niche system, but a cornerstone of Russia’s future export-oriented rocket artillery portfolio.
Unlike the tracked and significantly heavier Tornado-S MLRS, which weighs around 45 tonnes, the Sarma’s reduced mass of 24–25 tonnes offers clear advantages in strategic and operational mobility. This design choice aligns closely with Middle Eastern operational requirements, where rapid redeployment across vast desert theatres and extensive road networks is a priority.
Capable of highway speeds up to 95 km/h and an operational range of approximately 1,000 km without refuelling, Sarma is positioned as a flexible platform suitable for both territorial defence and expeditionary missions in geographically expansive states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
At its core, the Sarma integrates six 300mm launch tubes, capable of delivering a full salvo in just 18 seconds. This rapid firing cycle is optimised to minimise exposure in environments saturated with counter-battery radars, loitering munitions, and armed reconnaissance drones.
The system’s automated fire-control and guidance architecture allows the entire firing sequence—from navigation and target acquisition to launch execution—to be conducted from within the armored cabin. This significantly reduces crew vulnerability while compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline, a critical factor in high-threat engagements.
This level of automation reflects a broader Russian shift toward digitalised artillery command-and-control systems. While conceptually mirroring Western platforms, the Sarma emphasises ruggedisation and operational simplicity, characteristics deliberately tailored for export markets where maintenance infrastructure and training pipelines may be less elaborate.
By embedding these capabilities in a wheeled chassis rather than a tracked one, Russia is clearly targeting militaries that prioritise cost efficiency, logistical simplicity, and road-based mobility over the heavier protection of tracked systems.
Sarma’s munition compatibility draws directly from the Tornado-S ecosystem, enabling it to fire a broad array of 300mm rockets. These include high-explosive fragmentation warheads, cluster munitions, and precision-guided variants intended for deep-strike missions against high-value targets.
Russian sources claim operational ranges of 120 km, extending to 200 km with advanced guided or glide-assisted munitions. If validated, this would place Sarma well beyond the standard 80 km reach of U.S. HIMARS GMLRS rockets, fundamentally altering the operational calculus for potential buyers.
Such range enables deep interdiction strikes against air defence nodes, command centres, and missile launch sites without requiring air superiority—an especially attractive proposition for Middle Eastern militaries facing sophisticated missile and drone threats.
Russian media’s portrayal of Sarma as a “HIMARS-killer” is as much marketing rhetoric as technical claim. Yet the narrative resonates strongly in markets seeking alternatives to Western systems constrained by political conditions, end-user monitoring, and operational limitations.
Leaked procurement documents suggest the Russian Ministry of Defense ordered two full divisions of Sarma systems in 2024, comprising 12 launchers and 12 transport-loading vehicles. This early adoption signals institutional confidence and provides operational credibility for export customers.
Each launcher is reportedly priced at around 155 million rubles—roughly US$1.7 million—with transport-loading vehicles costing about US$700,000. This places Sarma far below the estimated US$5–6 million price tag of a single HIMARS unit.
This cost differential is a decisive advantage in markets where defence budgets, though substantial, must be spread across airpower, naval assets, missile defence, and internal security simultaneously.
Field trials reportedly began in early 2026, with operational feedback being rapidly incorporated into export configurations tailored for Middle Eastern climatic and tactical conditions.
Premiering Sarma at the World Defense Show in Riyadh reflects Rosoboronexport’s recognition that Saudi Arabia has become one of the world’s most influential defence procurement hubs under Vision 2030.
The Kingdom’s strategy of diversifying arms suppliers—balancing U.S., European, Turkish, Chinese, and Russian systems—creates a permissive environment for Moscow’s re-entry into a market where Western leverage is not absolute.
Saudi operational experience in Yemen has exposed the limitations of traditional tube artillery and unguided rockets, driving demand for precision fires capable of engaging dispersed, mobile, and hardened targets with reduced collateral damage.
Beyond Saudi Arabia, potential Sarma customers include the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, and Algeria, all of which have long experience with Soviet or Russian artillery and maintain a degree of strategic autonomy in procurement decisions. The UAE’s prior operation of Russian Pantsir air defence systems underscores its willingness to integrate non-Western platforms when operational value aligns with national needs.
The introduction of Sarma into Middle Eastern arsenals could significantly alter regional deterrence dynamics, particularly vis-à-vis Iran’s expanding missile and rocket forces. For Gulf states, long-range precision artillery complements missile defence by enabling pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes against launch sites and logistics hubs.
In Yemen, Sarma’s guided munitions could allow Saudi forces to engage Houthi missile infrastructure more precisely, potentially reducing civilian casualties that have drawn international criticism.
However, proliferation risks remain. The transfer of such systems—directly or indirectly—to Iranian-aligned non-state actors would raise escalation concerns. Israel, which closely monitors Russian arms flows into Syria and Lebanon, would likely view widespread Sarma adoption with caution.
The system’s digitalised architecture also introduces cyber and electronic warfare considerations, creating both operational advantages and new vulnerabilities in networked battlefields.
Despite its promise, Sarma faces structural challenges. Sanctions continue to constrain access to advanced electronics, navigation systems, and guidance components. Sustaining production at scale while meeting export standards will test Russia’s ability to substitute or domestically manufacture critical technologies.
Operational performance in extreme desert environments—marked by heat, sand, and extended deployment cycles—remains largely unproven beyond controlled trials. Political pressure from the United States on key partners could also complicate procurement decisions, echoing past controversies over Russian systems such as the S-400.
Yet Russia’s historical success exporting MLRS platforms like the BM-21 Grad and Smerch suggests that affordability, simplicity, and battlefield credibility often outweigh geopolitical concerns.
With unit costs far below Western equivalents and a concept aligned with modern high-intensity warfare, the Sarma occupies a competitive niche that is difficult for many buyers to ignore.
As demonstrations at the World Defense Show 2026 draw attention, early memorandums of understanding could quickly evolve into contracts—if political conditions allow.
Russia’s unveiling of the Sarma in Riyadh is therefore more than a product launch. It is a strategic declaration that Moscow intends to remain a serious player in a global arms market undergoing profound transformation.
