Russian heavy transport aircraft entering Iranian airspace in early January 2026 are more than routine logistics movements—they appear to mark the operational phase of the long-anticipated Mil Mi-28 “Havoc” attack helicopter transfer to Tehran. Analysts say the pattern, tempo, and routing of these flights strongly indicate a deliberate military airlift operation, aimed at delivering disassembled combat helicopters, support equipment, and associated mission systems.
The activity comes after repeated official statements from Iranian defense authorities. Iranian Deputy Defence Minister Brigadier General Mahdi Farahi had previously confirmed that “plans have been finalized for Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Yak-130 jet trainers to join the combat units of Iran’s Army in the near future.” The recent Il-76 and Il-96 sorties into Iran’s airspace provide the clearest operational evidence that the Mi-28 acquisition is no longer theoretical but moving into execution.
Flight data analysts note that the concentrated routing and rapid tempo of these cargo sorties mirror prior Russian airlift patterns used for high-value military systems, including Yak-130 trainers and electronic warfare equipment. The flights appear to be following pre-planned corridors designed to minimize exposure to Western radar and surveillance systems while ensuring the safe and timely delivery of sensitive combat aviation assets.
The context of this delivery is geopolitically charged. Russia is engaged in its protracted conflict in Ukraine, while Iran continues to confront Israel and U.S. forces in the region. Both nations, heavily sanctioned, have developed a barter-driven military relationship: Tehran supplies unmanned aerial systems and ballistic missiles, while Moscow provides advanced conventional weapons that have historically been denied under international embargoes.
From a capabilities perspective, the Mi-28 represents a transformative upgrade for Iran’s Army Aviation. Replacing aging AH-1J SeaCobras, the Mi-28 offers all-weather, night-fighting capability, a heavily armored cockpit, and advanced sensor suites optimized for precision anti-armor and deep strike operations. Analysts suggest that the helicopter significantly enhances Iran’s ability to conduct high-tempo counterinsurgency operations and conventional maneuvers along its western borders, as well as to impose credible battlefield costs on potential adversaries such as Israeli or U.S. expeditionary forces.
“General Farahi’s confirmation of Mi-28, Su-35, and Yak-130 acquisitions aligns with a broader, sequenced modernization roadmap rather than an isolated transfer,” noted defense expert Rob Lee. While contract values remain undisclosed, comparable Mi-28 export packages suggest a unit price of $18–22 million. A limited initial batch of six helicopters could represent a transfer valued at $120–132 million (roughly RM565–622 million), excluding weapons, spares, training, and long-term sustainment.
Strategically, Moscow’s willingness to conduct sustained heavy airlift operations into Iran signals a calculated acceptance of diplomatic and sanctions exposure, prioritizing Tehran as a key rear-area industrial and munitions partner amid tightening Western export controls on Russia’s defense sector. The flights are now widely viewed as the most visible operational manifestation of a deepening Russo-Iranian security alignment.
The Mi-28 is a purpose-built attack helicopter, designed for high-intensity mechanized warfare rather than the counterinsurgency missions that characterized Iran’s older rotary-wing fleet. Unlike the AH-1J SeaCobras, the Mi-28 integrates a mast-mounted millimeter-wave radar, thermal imaging systems, and digital battlefield management tools. Armed with a 30mm Shipunov 2A42 autocannon and up to sixteen Ataka or Khrizantema anti-tank guided missiles, the helicopter can engage modern main battle tanks, hardened positions, and mobile missile launchers at ranges exceeding eight kilometers.
Twin engines, an armored cockpit, and redundant flight-control systems provide survivability against small arms, heavy machine guns, and near-miss fragmentation—a critical consideration given the proliferation of drones and loitering munitions in regional conflicts. Operational experience in Syria and Ukraine demonstrates the Mi-28’s effectiveness in hunter-killer formations, often paired with unmanned reconnaissance assets, a doctrine Iran is increasingly adopting across its land forces.
While vulnerabilities to advanced man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) exist—as evidenced by a UK-supplied Starstreak shootdown in April 2022—analysts believe Iran can mitigate these through altitude management, electronic countermeasures, and layered air defense. “Russia is rearming Iran in plain sight—because when you’re isolated, you don’t look for peace… you look for partners in chaos,” commented Stephen Mutoro, highlighting how the Mi-28 fits Tehran’s deterrence-by-capability strategy rather than a bid for air superiority.
Economically, the Mi-28 offers Iran a cost-effective modernization path. With an estimated unit cost of $22–25 million (RM103–118 million), the helicopters deliver near-peer attack capability at a fraction of Western equivalents, particularly when sustainment is bundled within existing Russo-Iranian cooperation frameworks. Tactically, the platform enables Iranian ground commanders to execute combined-arms maneuvers with speed, precision, and lethality, compressing adversary decision-making timelines.
The Mi-28 complicates Israeli and U.S. operational planning by introducing a mobile strike asset capable of exploiting terrain, masking, and surprise, especially in pre-emptive strike or rapid escalation scenarios. Its arrival elevates Iran’s battlefield aviation from a defensive adjunct into an offensive force multiplier embedded within a maturing, network-centric warfighting doctrine.
Operationally, the early January airlift involved multiple Il-76 and Il-96 sorties along Caspian Sea routes, designed to circumvent NATO radar coverage. The repeated flights suggest helicopters were partially disassembled for transport, accompanied by spare engines, avionics, ground test equipment, and weapons interfaces to accelerate assembly timelines. Each Il-76 sortie is estimated to cost $400,000–500,000 (RM1.88–2.35 million), indicating Moscow’s willingness to absorb substantial operational expenses for strategic benefit.
The choice of airlift over maritime shipment reflects heightened interdiction risks in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, where Western naval forces and Israeli intelligence could threaten discreet transfer of high-value combat assets. The compressed delivery timeline implies urgency, likely driven by regional escalations, including Israeli strikes against Iranian-linked targets and adjusted U.S. force posture across CENTCOM areas.
The Mi-28’s deployment fundamentally strengthens Iran’s offensive rotary-wing capability. It enables deep interdiction, rapid maneuver support, and battlefield shaping across multiple potential theaters. Its sensor fusion, thermal imaging, and hardened avionics allow operations in night or degraded visibility, expanding Iran’s options beyond asymmetric drone and missile warfare.
Integration of the Mi-28 complements Iran’s evolving combined-arms doctrine, coordinating drones, artillery, ballistic missiles, and manned aircraft within a single targeting architecture. This approach aims to overwhelm adversary defenses through tempo and saturation rather than sheer numbers, increasing Iran’s operational flexibility.
Farahi’s earlier statement that “plans have been finalized” for Mi-28, Su-35, and Yak-130 platforms now carries operational weight, as the Mi-28 serves as the connective platform linking ground maneuver forces and fixed-wing aviation. While the helicopters do not eliminate Israeli air superiority, they raise the cost of sustained ground operations and expand Tehran’s retaliatory options below strategic missile thresholds.
The introduction of Mi-28 helicopters into Iran represents a critical juncture in Tehran’s modernization efforts. By combining advanced Russian attack platforms with existing asymmetric capabilities, Iran is transitioning from compensating for sanctions to fielding conventional, high-lethality assets capable of influencing regional conflict dynamics. The Mi-28’s arrival reflects not merely an equipment upgrade but a strategic shift toward networked, high-tempo, and precision-oriented warfighting capabilities.
Mi-28 “Havoc” Key Specifications for Iran:
- Manufacturer: Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant (Russia)
- Type: Dedicated attack helicopter
- Crew: 2 (pilot + weapons systems officer)
- Length: 17.91 m | Rotor Diameter: 17.2 m | Height: 3.82 m
- Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW): ~11,700 kg | Empty Weight: ~8,090 kg
- Engines: 2 × Klimov TV3-117VMA / VK-2500 turboshaft (~2,200–2,400 shp each)
- Max Speed: 300 km/h | Cruise: 260–270 km/h | Combat Radius: 200–250 km | Ferry Range: ~1,100 km
- Service Ceiling: 5,700 m | Rate of Climb: 13.6 m/s
- Primary Gun: 30 mm Shipunov 2A42 autocannon
- Hardpoints: 4 | Max Weapons Load: 2,300 kg
- Air-to-Ground Missiles: 9M120 Ataka, 9M123 Khrizantema (up to 16)
- Rockets: 80 mm / 122 mm pods | Air-to-Air Missiles: Igla-V (short-range)
- Avionics: Integrated digital cockpit, helmet-mounted sight
- Targeting Sensors: EO/IR, laser rangefinder/designator
- Radar: Mast-mounted millimeter-wave (Mi-28N/NM variants)
- Survivability: Armored cockpit, redundant systems, crash-worthy seats
- Countermeasures: Radar warning, missile approach warning, flares/chaff
- Operational Capability: All-weather, day/night combat operations
As the Russian–Iranian airlift continues, the Mi-28’s arrival underscores a broader strategic trajectory: sanctioned powers transforming political agreements into tangible combat power. For Tehran, this represents not just modernization, but a recalibration of regional deterrence and offensive capacity—signaling a new era in the Persian Gulf’s evolving security environment.
