In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West began discussing its long-term strategy for winning over the global south. This idea had both symbolic and practical implications. If the non-Western world condemned Russia as wholeheartedly as the West does, Moscow would be isolated and may realize that it had reached a dead end. Additionally, if the non-Western world joined the West in imposing sanctions on Russia, this would soon affect Russia’s war-waging ability.
Russia is also trying to solicit the support of the non-Western world and rally it against the West. President Vladimir Putin has been criticizing the West and inviting the “global majority” to rise up against it. He believes that a new, fairer, and more democratic system of international relations is emerging that meets the needs of the world majority. However, Russia’s charm offensive will likely lead it to the same conclusion that the West is slowly reaching: this is not a battle of narratives.
The West’s attempt to explain why it should side with Ukraine has been met with a firm rejection in the global south, where countries do not want to be forced into cold war-style binary decisions that would limit their choices of partners and paths to growth. Each country has an agenda and agency of its own, and Russia has been successful in engaging with many countries across the global south through trade policy, security assistance, and diplomatic activities.
Russia’s relationship with the global south may offer the West hope for its efforts to reach out to the rest of the world if it can adapt its normative approach in favor of something more pragmatic. Russia’s relations with the non-Western world can be divided into three eras: 1992-2012, 2012-2022, and since February 2022.
For the first 20 years of independent post-Soviet Russia, most of Moscow’s international relationships were subordinate to its relationship with the United States and Europe. The blend of global power with Western values in the early 1990s left Russia with little choice. Moscow often used its leverage in third countries to please the West, such as allowing the US to establish military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during its ‘war on terror’. Russia also signed up to several Western-led peacekeeping missions and lent advice to the US military in Afghanistan.
Moscow was not always helpful to the West, but its guiding motives were rooted in its overarching conversation with them. For example, Moscow opposed the West’s approach to Kosovo, which was based on human rights and the responsibility to protect principle, and refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence.
The conceptual level of Russia’s relations with the global south is also important. Former foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov’s conception of a multipolar world in the mid-1990s focused on countering US hegemony and constraining the United States with the help of other major powers, rather than fruitful cooperation with non-Western countries.
In 2012, Putin returned to the Kremlin and redefined Russia as a non-Western country, aiming to achieve a satisfactory position in the Western-centric international system. This led to Russia’s relations with the rest of the world becoming ends in themselves, no longer used in Moscow’s dialogue with the West. Putin’s goal was to have as many equal partners as possible, both in the West and in the East, expanding their presence in regions where integration is on the rise, politics is not mixed with economy, and obstacles to trade, technology, investment, and free movement of people are lifted.
Russia’s involvement in Syria in September 2015 may have started as part of Moscow’s conversation with the West. Addressing the rebellion was not as swift as Moscow may have hoped, but it allowed Russia to deal closely with numerous regional actors, resulting in its return to the Middle East as a power broker. It soon became the only outside power that was on talking terms with all regional actors, including Israel, Iran, Turks, and Kurds. This resulted in financial bonuses for Russia, as Saudi Arabia began to view Russia as a relevant actor and became more open to hearing Moscow’s views when setting oil quotas and prices.
Emboldened in Syria, Russia began its forays into Africa, offering regime support to beleaguered leaders. These operations relied on private military companies (PMCs), often the Wagner group, rather than direct state involvement, and were likely steered by special services, rather than the Russian ministries for foreign affairs or defense. This offered Moscow considerable flexibility: an option to deny involvement should things go wrong while reaping the fruits of what went well.
By early 2022, it seemed that Russia’s decade as a ‘non-Western power’ had served it well, finding its feet in a world where it was no longer a superpower. Moscow had built up leverage in numerous corners of the world, learned to effectively use military force to achieve political ends, and even Ukraine’s neutral status outside NATO seemed within reach.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has led to a significant shift in its foreign policy, as it has become more dependent on China for diplomacy, investments, trade, and technology. This has resulted in Russia losing its ability to flex its military muscles elsewhere, and the mutiny of late Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin has severely hampered Moscow’s tool in Africa. Since February 2022, Moscow’s relations with the rest of the world have been strictly in service of its war needs, making it a one-issue country with few resources to devote to other agendas.
Moscow must assess whether its foreign policy can directly help or hinder its war effort and act accordingly, even if this neglects its other interests or reverses some long-term policies. For example, Russia did not intervene when Azerbaijan took Nagorno-Karabakh by force in September, despite its efforts to preserve the status quo and its pride in being loyal to allies. Moscow is now seeking military aid, trade, and political support from anyone willing to offer it.
In these relationships, Russia often finds itself reduced from a deal-maker to a deal-taker, forced to accept the conditions its partners set for lack of options and leverage. For example, Russia would benefit greatly from the planned Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which would allow it to export its western Siberian gas to China. However, Beijing is in no hurry to approve the deal, meaning that when it is eventually passed, it will likely carry higher prices and terms that strongly favor China, in ways that would have been unthinkable before the war.
Russia’s relationship with Iran has been shaped by various factors, including economic interests, regional issues, and the nuclear file. Before 2012, Russia’s relationship with Tehran was primarily influenced by its relationship with the West, particularly with the US. Russia’s relationship with Iran tended to move in the opposite direction to Russia-US relations, with Russia leveraging its links with Iran to shape its relations with Washington.
Russia’s 1995 agreement with US vice president Al Gore and Russia’s prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, which agreed to end military exports to Iran by 1999, caused significant bitterness in Tehran. However, the souring of Russia-US relations during the George W. Bush presidency saw a new upswing in Russian-Iranian cooperation that was abruptly halted in 2010, when Medvedev supported the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, leading to harsh international sanctions on Iran. In 2015, Putin overturned Medvedev’s cancellation of S-300 missiles to Iran, and when arms deliveries began in 2016, Iran received an upgraded S-300 PMU-2 model.
Russia’s involvement in Syria from 2015 intensified the two countries’ military cooperation, with Iran allowing Russia to use its Shahid Nojeh Air Base in Hamedan for attacks on Syria. Despite Iran’s doubts and misgivings, the cooperation remained harmonious enough. Since February 2022, the cooperation between Russia and Iran has reached unprecedented levels, with Iran becoming one of Russia’s most steadfast allies. Moscow is about to return the favor by increasing its military exports to Tehran, resisting Western sanctions and political isolation by trading sanctioned goods and circumventing the dollar.
Trade with Russia has skyrocketed, with the transit of goods through the International North-South Transport Corridor connecting Russia to India and the Asian market via Iran already increasing by 350 per cent in the first seven months of 2022. Moscow has turned a blind eye as Iran continues to expand its nuclear program at an alarming rate.
Before 2022, Moscow remained mindful not to antagonize the West or Israel through its relations with Tehran. Russia also benefitted from being part of the international cooperation formats on Iran’s nuclear issue, such as the P5+1 format. Now, Moscow no longer cares about upsetting the West or possibly even the nuclear issue.
Russia’s partnership with Iran has evolved significantly in recent years, with Moscow often acting as a demander for Iran’s Shahed drones and missiles. This shift in Russia’s relationship with Iran has allowed the country to benefit from its expertise in life under Western sanctions.
Russia’s engagement in Africa has also evolved over time. In the Soviet era, Russia provided economic and defense assistance to friendly regimes like Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Mali, as well as Marxist groups in countries with less Russia-friendly regimes. Russia also hosted thousands of African students at its universities, which was a potential resource of soft power. However, the newly free Russia of the 1990s lost interest in Africa and did not have the resources for development aid.
From the mid-2000s, Russian officials made high-level visits to Africa, such as Medvedev’s visit to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola in 2009. However, Russia’s return to the continent began after 2012, particularly after 2014, when its relationship with the West became strained following its annexation of Crimea. Africa saw an uptick in ministerial-level visits and trade with Russia, almost doubled from $9.9 billion in 2013 to $17.7 billion in 2021.
Russia has also become a major arms exporter to Africa, providing 40% of African imports of major weapons systems between 2012 and 2022. This is more than Africa’s total arms imports from the US (16%), China (9.8%), and France (7.6%) during the same period.
Russia had advantages in its engagement with African countries, such as its security assistance without human rights or political standards attached, cheap weapons, and a reputation for reliability. Politically, Russia presented itself as a friendly outsider, unlike Europe or China. Moscow has tried to promote itself as a pragmatic partner to Africa, with the agenda of the first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi featuring practical topics such as trade, development, digitalization, and climate change. Over the past decade, Russia has resumed hosting African students, with 35,000 currently studying in Russia.
Russia’s transactional approach to Africa seemed to be a winning ticket, often compared to Western policies that came with political conditionalities and were rooted in a normative worldview. However, since 2022, Russia has made its approach to Africa considerably more propaganda heavy, racing against the West in its attempts to win the hearts and minds of the “global majority”. In its rhetoric and stylistics, the Kremlin is borrowing unashamedly from the Soviet playbook. For example, in a speech at the second Russia-Africa summit in the summer of 2023, Putin stated that the ideals of freedom, independence, and sovereignty are important now in the difficult period of international turbulence.
For comparison, former general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, wrote similarly about Russia’s relations with African countries, saying that Moscow had built and continued to build its policies in accordance with the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and independence, noninterference in internal affairs, and the recognition of every nation’s right to determine its destiny and path of development.
However, in this new international context, Putin’s appeal to anti-Western rhetoric is unlikely to be successful. The number of heads of state attending the 2023 Russia-Africa summit dropped more than threefold, from 43 in 2019 to 17, making the summit “a relic of better times.” The West should not over- or misinterpret this as Africa’s loyalty to the Western position or a sign of a decline in Russia’s footprint in Africa when it comes to arms trade or security. It does suggest that African leaders are not keen to ally with Russia against the West in the way that Putin hopes.
Russia’s political austerity has led to new dilemmas, particularly in nuclear arms control and North Korea. North Korea has become an important arms supplier to Russia, with reports of shipping munitions at scale. This raises questions about Russia’s position on North Korea’s nuclear programme, as the UN has passed several resolutions sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear weapon development, which Russia has supported.
Russia’s approach to nuclear issues and strategic stability is changing as it tries to link other issues to its priority in Ukraine. The big question is whether Russia can separate the problems of strategic stability and non-proliferation from the war in Ukraine, sticking to some agreements despite western engagement in Ukraine. However, Russia’s decisions to freeze the START treaty in February and de-ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October make one pessimistic in this respect.
Iran’s nuclear deal is a case in point, as Moscow seems to acquiesce to Iran’s nuclear activities and be happy to spoil Western efforts to roll back Iran’s nuclear program, which would harm Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. In March 2022, amid Western hopes of nearing a revival of the Iran nuclear deal, Russia derailed the talks by demanding a written guarantee that new Western sanctions related to Ukraine would not impede Russian trade with Iran.
The war in Ukraine is also interfering with Russia’s relations in the Middle East, where it seems to be losing its unique position as the outside power that is on talking terms with all regional players. Its growing reliance on arms trade with Iran, as well as its desire to court “the global majority” and oppose Israel’s most powerful backer, the US, likely contributed to its decision to side with the Palestinians following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October. Putin’s initial comments about the war were measured, but he grew increasingly critical of Israel, and notoriously received a Hamas delegation in Moscow in late October.
While both Russia and Israel might be inclined to limit the damage to their cooperation, Moscow’s formerly unique position in the Middle East seems more fragile.
Russia’s rethinking of its policies in the former Soviet Union, particularly in relation to its relationship with Armenia, is likely due to the war on Ukraine. Moscow’s support for Armenia in its territorial dispute with Azerbaijan had already started to fracture before the full-scale war on Ukraine began. However, when Baku made a dash for full control of Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow was left with little choice but to choose the practical over its allegiance to Armenia.
Russia will also face a dilemma between urgent matters and important or strategic ones, particularly in its relations with China. Over the last decade, Russia has gradually upgraded and intensified its cooperation with China, selling it more sophisticated arms systems, increasing trade in energy, intensifying summitry, and reconciling regional projects. However, until 2022, Russia maintained some distance with areas where China was not welcome.
To balance its dependence on China, Russia could try to engage more with other non-Western actors like India and establish a stronger presence in the Asia-Pacific. However, Moscow has never been particularly successful at this, and the war in Ukraine makes it even harder. Russia now does not have sufficient diplomatic and economic resources to play a proper regional role, and its existential need to prioritize Ukraine makes it harder to develop a proper foothold in Asia.
The war has also had a drastic impact on Russia’s diplomatic ranks. Russian diplomats are exceedingly well trained, primarily at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), with advanced language skills and far broader country expertise than the average Western diplomat. However, since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, its decision-making center has been moving away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which by the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was firmly sidelined. The ministry’s increasingly top-down working culture has made the bottom-up flow of ideas and analyses all but a sacrilege, curbing Russia’s creativity and agility.
Putin’s recent doubling down on ideology and anti-Western narratives in his relations with the global south may be a sign of weakness more than strength. His reliance on ideology and narratives could betray the fact that Russia no longer has the capacity to engage with different regional agendas and build relations like it did between 2012 and 2022. Instead, Putin has to rely on negative mobilisation to convince the rest of the world that they still have a common enemy.
Russian and Western experts have realized that narratives alone cannot win over the rest of the world. A recent MGIMO paper found that the non-Western world, including China, India, and Turkey, disapproves both Russia’s war on Ukraine and the US-led West’s global actions against Russia. This finding aligns with research conducted by ECFR in China, India, and Turkey, which found that most people in these countries are not ready to join forces with those who oppose Russia. Instead, they prefer an “à la carte world” where they can choose different partners according to issues and needs.
The focus should be on how the non-Western world is engaged in practice and who offers them better. Russia has an advantage in this regard, as transactional relationships are easier for Moscow, particularly for Putin. The West has conditioned itself to think about the world in normative terms, and Western politicians are vulnerable to domestic audiences that may not forgive compromises with their agendas. However, the West has strengths that Russia lacks, such as its formidable trade bloc and wealthy internal market. When it channels its creative energy towards a practical solution to a problem, it can achieve miracles, as demonstrated in 2022 when the West reduced its gas overdependence on Russia. Europe needs to steer its conversation with the rest of the world in a pragmatic manner and play to its strengths.
Russian thinkers now acknowledge that Moscow’s priorities about ideological purity cost it partnerships that could have been fruitful if it had a more pragmatic approach. Putin expects the West to commit the same mistake and allow its normative notions about the world to get in the way of its real interactions with the world. He does not seem to expect the West to adapt to life in a world where it is no longer as absolute a hegemon as it was three decades ago.
