On the night of April 22, residents of Odessa heard something unfamiliar in the skies. It wasn’t the low, droning buzz that has become all too common since Russia began deploying its Geran-2 kamikaze drones. Instead, witnesses described a louder, sharper, higher-pitched sound as drones descended rapidly toward their targets.
The altered acoustic profile immediately triggered speculation across social media and military analyst circles. Several influential Telegram and Twitter/X accounts, known for accurate tracking of battlefield developments, suggested the debut—or return—of a more advanced Russian drone: the Geran-3, believed to be a localized version of Iran’s jet-powered Shahed-238.
Yet, days later, no physical wreckage or forensic evidence has emerged to confirm those suspicions. Despite the hype, the case for a Geran-3 strike on Odessa remains unproven—hinging entirely on sound.
The distinctive “moped-like” noise of the Geran-2 (itself derived from Iran’s Shahed-136) has become a grim hallmark of Russia’s drone campaign. Its slow, droning engine gives ample warning—but also psychological dread. However, the drones over Odessa didn’t hum. They whined, sharply and loudly, during their terminal dives.
Military enthusiasts pointed to the Shahed-238, a jet-powered variant of the Shahed-236, as the likely culprit. First unveiled by Iran in November 2023, the black-painted drone was claimed to be equipped with radar or electro-optical seekers and a turbojet engine capable of propelling it at over 600 km/h—more than triple the cruising speed of the older propeller-driven Geran-2.
And there is some precedent. On December 29, 2023, Ukrainian officials reported an unusual wave of drone strikes. Descriptions from that night included black-colored kamikaze drones with unprecedented speed and radar-absorbing coatings. The speculation: Russia had received and deployed a small batch of jet-powered Geran-3 drones.
But the story faded quickly. There were no follow-up sightings, and for over a year, the supposed Geran-3 disappeared from both the battlefield and the headlines—until Odessa.
The origins of the Geran-3 trace back to Iran’s Shahed-238, which made its debut in a rare public military exhibition in late 2023. Displayed in matte black—likely to reduce visibility—the drone featured a turbojet engine and was designed to carry either electro-optical or radar-based guidance systems. Unlike its predecessors, which relied purely on inertial and satellite navigation to strike pre-programmed targets, the 238 was built for real-time engagement.
In February 2024, a cyber leak—corporate documents accidentally left exposed on a public Iranian server—revealed more. The drone was internally designated “M-237” by IRGC-linked defense firm Sahara Thunder. The leaked specs described it as possessing a Nasir anti-jamming satellite receiver, speeds exceeding 600 km/h, and even potential air-to-air capabilities for drone interception.
Then, on February 18, 2025, Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) dropped a bombshell: Russia had begun manufacturing the Geran-3 domestically, using the Iranian Tolou-10/13 turbojet engine. One intercepted drone was tracked flying at over 515 km/h. Ukrainian intelligence claimed Russia’s version had an estimated range of 2,500 km.
And yet, these revelations have not been matched with a visible deployment footprint. In fact, the most detailed photographic evidence—wreckage matching Shahed-238’s design—dates back to early 2024 and hasn’t been independently verified.
The mystery of the April 22 attack is twofold. First, the sound profile. Second, the absence of physical evidence.
According to the well-regarded Military Informant Telegram channel, the change in drone acoustics may not signify a new model at all—but rather a tactical evolution. The group cited a recent pattern: swarms of drones loitering at altitudes of 2,000 to 2,500 meters, then entering steep terminal dives. At descent speeds exceeding 90 meters per second (324 km/h), even propeller-driven drones can emit a loud, high-pitched whine due to airflow turbulence and mechanical strain.
This maneuver differs from earlier tactics, where drones flew at lower altitudes and speeds to avoid radar. The new approach, likely designed to outpace mobile air defense systems, alters the sonic profile dramatically—without requiring a new platform.
The Geran-2’s familiar engine may be muffled or even turned off during the final dive, with gravity and aerodynamics doing the rest. That change alone could explain the shift from a buzzing drone to what some described as a “screaming bomb.”
Despite the Military Informant’s plausible explanation, the suspicion lingers.
Part of the reason lies in the context: Iran’s known advancements, Russia’s extensive defense cooperation with Tehran, and Russia’s need to counter Ukraine’s rapidly evolving air defenses. The Shahed-238—or Geran-3—would represent a logical, albeit expensive, evolution: faster, harder to intercept, and potentially more precise.
And there is precedence. Russia has spent the past two years upgrading the Geran-2 platform in substantial ways.
Initially dismissed as primitive, the Geran-2 has matured into a more deadly and resilient system. Russia has steadily refined it, transforming the original Iranian design into a more adaptable platform.
Stealth Improvements: The airframe now incorporates carbon composites that reduce radar visibility and lighten the drone, allowing for a larger payload—up to 70 kg, compared to the original 40–50 kg.
Navigation Upgrades: A key vulnerability in early Geran-2s was jamming. That has changed. Russia replaced the basic GPS navigation with GLONASS-based SATNAV modules like the Kometa-M, featuring multiple antennas and hardened firmware for electronic warfare resistance.
Precision Strike Capabilities: In late 2024, a video surfaced online showing a drone strike through the lens of an onboard optical/thermal seeker—strong evidence of a guided variant. This was later supported by imagery of a Geran-2 outfitted with an EO seeker, reportedly displayed at Russia’s Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg.
Swarm Coordination: To exploit real-time imagery, Russia has also developed communication relay drones. These fly alongside seeker-equipped units, bouncing signals back to operators who can adjust targeting mid-flight.
Each of these upgrades makes the Geran-2 more versatile and, crucially, cheaper to deploy than the theoretical Geran-3.
The Shahed-238 is estimated to cost around $1.4 million per unit. That places it closer to cruise missiles than expendable drones. While capable of high-speed attacks and stealthier approaches, its high cost and relatively short endurance limit its role. It’s not a loitering munition—it’s a strike asset, one best used in high-value scenarios.
Its launch method, however, offers a unique advantage. Unlike cruise missiles launched from large bombers or ships, the Geran-3 can reportedly be fired from compact ground-based catapult systems. That makes preemptive strikes harder for Ukraine and its allies, who often rely on satellite intelligence to track mobile launch platforms.
Still, the Geran-3’s operational limitations likely restrict its role to selective use. And if Russia is struggling to mass-produce them—as suggested by the long gap since its initial reported sighting—it may have chosen to prioritize refining its cheaper, battle-proven Geran-2 fleet.
There’s also another possibility: Ukraine’s intelligence agencies are highlighting the threat of the Geran-3 for strategic reasons.
By amplifying concerns about jet-powered drones, Ukrainian officials may be seeking to underscore the need for advanced Western air defense systems—particularly those capable of intercepting fast, low-observable aerial threats. It’s not deception per se, but a form of strategic narrative shaping common in modern hybrid warfare.
Similarly, Russia benefits from ambiguity. By allowing speculation to flourish, Moscow keeps Ukrainian defenders guessing—unsure whether the next wave of drones will arrive at 180 km/h or 600 km/h.
The April 22 strike on Odessa—and a similar one the next day on Kharkov—highlight a broader trend: drone warfare is evolving fast, not only in hardware but also in tactics.
Whether or not the Geran-3 took part in the attacks, its existence is almost certainly real. Between Iranian exhibitions, Ukrainian intelligence leaks, and limited wreckage sightings, the evidence points to at least a prototype stage—and potentially small-scale deployment.
But in warfare, presence is power. And so far, the Geran-3 remains a ghost: rumored, discussed, feared—but not conclusively seen.
Its future remains uncertain. Russia may be stockpiling it for special strikes, struggling to produce it in volume, or simply continuing to test it in battlefield conditions. Whatever the case, its absence from consistent deployment speaks volumes.
