For the first time, the Philippines has staged a high-profile joint sail near the disputed Scarborough Shoal with two unlikely partners — Australia and Canada. The two-day maritime cooperation exercise, culminating on September 3, showcased not just military interoperability but also the growing willingness of so-called “middle powers” to directly challenge China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Led by the Philippine Navy frigate BRP Jose Rizal (FF150), and joined by Australia’s HMAS Brisbane and Canada’s HMCS Ville de Québec, the flotilla maneuvered within sight of one of the most politically charged features in the West Philippine Sea, as Filipinos call their portion of the South China Sea.
The shoal — called Bajo de Masinloc in Manila, Huangyan Dao in Beijing — has been under Chinese control since 2012, when a prolonged standoff ended with Philippine forces being pushed out. Just 232 kilometers from Luzon, the feature lies well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Yet despite a landmark international arbitration ruling in 2016 invalidating Beijing’s “nine-dash line” claims, China has continued to treat the shoal as its own.
The joint sail marked the boldest attempt in years by Manila and its partners to send a clear message: China’s claim to “historic rights” over almost the entire South China Sea does not confer legitimacy.
The drills highlighted a broader strategic shift. For decades, Manila relied heavily on the United States and its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty for protection against external threats. While Washington continues to reaffirm its commitment — even sending a P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft to support this week’s drills — the inclusion of Australia and Canada is a sign that a wider coalition is emerging.
Security analyst Chester Cabalza, head of the International Development and Security Cooperation think tank in Manila, described the event as “the boldest show of force on freedom of navigation.”
“Even without the United States in the equation, it conveys that every nation has the right to sail in Manila’s exclusive economic zone,” Cabalza told reporters.
Both Australia and Canada are often classified as “middle powers”: not great powers like the U.S. or China, but countries with enough economic and military weight to influence international norms. The Philippines, while smaller in scale, is increasingly acting like an “emerging middle power” — willing to take risks, assert rights under international law, and rally partners.
The two-day activities were not merely symbolic. They featured joint drills aimed at sharpening maritime domain awareness, ship-to-ship coordination, and even complex maneuvers such as a cross-deck troop transfer between Australian and Filipino vessels.
On Wednesday, the centerpiece exercise unfolded: an anti-submarine warfare drill. The Philippine Navy’s Lt. JG Prince Charles Bauyot, aboard the BRP Jose Rizal, explained that an Australian intelligence-gathering aircraft coordinated with the ships while a disarmed submarine drone was released into the water to simulate a hostile underwater target.
The aim was to “detect, localize, and recognize underwater threats,” Bauyot said. For Manila’s relatively young naval force, the exercise represented a rare opportunity to operate alongside far more technologically advanced partners.
While training, the flotilla was shadowed by two People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels — a destroyer and a frigate — which maintained a distance of around 20 nautical miles. At one point, one of the PLAN ships identified itself over radio as “Warship 163” and warned the participants to “maintain safe distance.”
Bauyot dismissed the Chinese presence as a nuisance. “We are monitoring them and we have challenged them multiple times,” he said. “But their presence did not hinder the exercises.”
Beijing was quick to criticize. The Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army confirmed that it had conducted a “routine patrol” in the South China Sea during the same period. But it accused the Philippines of “undermining peace and stability” by inviting “extra-regional forces” to meddle in disputes.
Chinese state media echoed the message, framing the drills as provocation orchestrated by the U.S. and its allies. Yet the involvement of Australia and Canada — countries with no territorial claims in the South China Sea — complicates that narrative. Both Canberra and Ottawa insist they are acting to uphold the international maritime order, not to escalate tensions.
For Filipinos, Scarborough Shoal is more than a maritime feature — it is a symbol of lost sovereignty. Before 2012, Filipino fishermen freely accessed its rich fishing grounds. Since China’s takeover, they have often been harassed, blocked, or forced to hand over catches.
The 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in The Hague was supposed to reset the balance. It concluded that Beijing’s nine-dash line has no basis under UNCLOS and that Scarborough Shoal lies within the Philippines’ EEZ. But China rejected the decision outright, calling it “a scrap of paper.”
Nearly a decade later, that ruling remains unenforced. The joint sail this week was designed, in part, to remind the world that Manila has international law on its side.
Cabalza argued that the drills serve another purpose: developing “customary practices” for regional cooperation.
“The coalition of middle powers to assert maritime rules-based order makes the action successful to tell the world to respect the sovereignty of the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal following the 2016 arbitral award,” he said.
For Manila, such habits of cooperation may be more valuable than symbolic gestures. In the past year, the Philippines has steadily expanded defense ties with Australia, culminating in the recently concluded Exercise Alon — the largest-ever bilateral drills between the two countries, involving 3,600 personnel. Canada, though less prominent in the Indo-Pacific, has been gradually increasing its naval deployments under its Indo-Pacific Strategy announced in 2022.
Even as Manila seeks more partners, the United States remains central. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty covers any armed attack on Philippine forces in the South China Sea. U.S. defense officials have underscored that commitment in the wake of repeated Chinese harassment of Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, another contested feature.
Still, analysts caution against assuming Australia or Canada would sign a treaty-level defense pact with Manila. “Australia carves its own unique identity in its strategic partnership with the Philippines,” Cabalza said. “Canberra has redefined its role as a reliable and close partner in the Indo-Pacific, but not necessarily as a treaty ally.”
The distinction matters. For Washington, deterrence is explicit: an attack on the Philippines is an attack on the U.S. For other partners, deterrence is implicit, conveyed through presence and political statements.
The latest drills occurred against a backdrop of intensifying Chinese activities. Just weeks earlier, a PLAN vessel reportedly rammed into a China Coast Guard ship while harassing a Philippine Coast Guard patrol near Scarborough. Though the incident was framed as an accident, it underscored the risks of increasingly aggressive maneuvers.
Over the past year, Manila has documented instances of Chinese ships firing water cannons, executing dangerous swerves, and even using military-grade lasers against Philippine vessels. Each encounter risks spiraling into a larger crisis, potentially dragging in the United States under the mutual defense treaty.
So far, Manila has avoided invoking the treaty, choosing instead to rally diplomatic and political support. But officials privately admit that if an armed clash occurs with fatalities, the calculus could shift rapidly.
Why do Australia and Canada care? Both countries see the South China Sea not just as a distant maritime flashpoint but as a vital trade artery. Roughly one-third of global shipping passes through these waters. For economies heavily dependent on open sea lanes, China’s assertion of “control” poses an existential risk to international commerce.
For Canberra, the stakes are also strategic. Australia is already part of the AUKUS security pact with the U.S. and the UK, which aims to counterbalance China’s military rise. Its closer ties with Manila further anchor its role in the first island chain — a geographic arc from Japan to the Philippines that is seen as crucial to containing Chinese expansion.
For Ottawa, the calculus is partly about reasserting global presence. Canada has struggled to translate its Indo-Pacific Strategy into concrete action. By joining the Philippines and Australia near Scarborough, Ottawa signals it is serious about playing a role in defending the rules-based order.
While the joint sail was hailed in Manila as a success, it carries risks. Chinese forces could have chosen to escalate — through aggressive maneuvering, mock targeting, or electronic warfare. That they did not suggests Beijing was unwilling to provoke a wider incident. But future exercises may not enjoy the same restraint.
Analysts warn of the danger of “creeping normalization,” in which both sides grow accustomed to shadowing and counter-shadowing until an accident triggers a crisis. “The danger is not intentional war but unintended escalation,” said one retired Philippine admiral. “All it takes is one collision, one misinterpreted signal.”
The Philippines’ decision to sail with Australia and Canada, so close to Scarborough Shoal, reflects a broader trend: the decentralization of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. While the U.S. remains the anchor, middle powers are increasingly taking the initiative.
For Manila, that is both a blessing and a necessity. China’s pressure is not easing. Harassment at sea continues. Fishermen remain displaced. And Beijing shows no sign of relinquishing its grip on Scarborough.
For Australia and Canada, joining hands with the Philippines is a way of reinforcing global norms — freedom of navigation, respect for EEZ rights, adherence to UNCLOS — while signaling to Beijing that coercion will not go uncontested.
The trilateral exercise near Scarborough Shoal is unlikely to be the last. Philippine defense officials have already hinted at future joint sails with Japan and possibly European partners such as France or the UK. Each new participant adds weight to Manila’s legal case and underscores the global stakes of the South China Sea disputes.
But the real question is whether these gestures will translate into deterrence. China remains the dominant naval power in the region, with a fleet far larger than those of the Philippines, Australia, and Canada combined. What Manila and its partners can do is raise the political costs of Chinese actions and keep international attention focused on the issue.
For now, Scarborough Shoal remains under Beijing’s control. But with every joint sail, every coordinated drill, and every multinational patrol, Manila chips away at China’s narrative of inevitability.
