China’s cutting-edge electronic warfare (EW) capabilities are transforming the balance of power in the South China Sea, as shown by a recent encounter between US and Chinese forces. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on China’s enhanced EW capabilities by shedding light on a December 2023 incident between a US EA-18 Growler carrier-based EW aircraft and China’s Type 055 cruiser Nanchang in the contested South China Sea.

Dismissal of US Commander and Recognition of Chinese Crew

SCMP says that in December 2023, the US Navy dismissed William Coulter, commander of US Electronic Attack Squadron 136 (VAQ-136), stationed on the USS Carl Vinson, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to command. The report says that a month later, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognized the Nanchang’s crew for their actions against a US carrier fleet. It also notes that Chinese media highlighted an encounter involving an EA-18G, believed to be from Coulter’s squadron, and the Nanchang cruiser.

Technological Advances in Chinese EW Capabilities

The report mentions that PLA scientists recently disclosed in a Radar & ECM journal article that AI-enhanced radar gave the Nanchang an advantage over the EA-18G’s jamming capabilities. It claims that the EA-18G, manufactured by Boeing, has been upgraded since 2021 for future warfare but faces new challenges from the PLA–Navy’s (PLA-N) integrated radar systems and communication strategies.

SCMP notes that these advancements allow PLA-N warships to form a “kill web” to counter the EA-18G’s attacks. It also says that the Nanchang’s reported proactive tactics and successful engagement with US forces illustrate a shift in the PLA-N’s EW approach. Much-improved Chinese EW capabilities developed after then-US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s controversial August 2022 visit to Taiwan may have enabled a feat.

SCMP noted that the PLA failed to track and surveil the US Air Force transport plane carrying Pelosi during her visit despite deploying Type 055 cruisers and J-16D EW aircraft. The source says that almost all of the PLA’s EW equipment failed to function because of electronic interference from Pelosi’s escorting aircraft force.

On Pelosi’s aircraft escort, John Tkacik says in an August 2022 article for Taipei Times that it could have been a massive force of US F-15s that flew out of Kadena Air Force Base in Japan supported by the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the USS Tripoli with embarked F-35s stationed in the Philippine Sea. From that experience, China may have improved its EW capabilities quickly by investing in new technologies and placing them in a more extensive kill web consisting of kinetic and non-kinetic elements. SCMP reported in February 2024 that Chinese scientists have invented a new class of EW equipment that can reportedly rapidly detect, decode and suppress enemy signals.

AI-Enhanced EW Equipment

The new system, SCMP says, allows the PLA to seamlessly monitor signals into the gigahertz zone, encompassing frequencies used by amateur radio and even Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites. It notes that the equipment includes innovative signal processing chips and AI integration, enhancing China’s ability to counter enemy jamming and maintain communication flow.

Furthermore, SCMP claims that in encounters with US Navy ships with EW activity, China has used electromagnetic-emitting equipment, including high-power phased array radars, to lock on to multiple targets including US carrier-based aircraft. Aside from developing new tech, China may already have elevated EW into a strategic capability, integrating it into its multi-domain operations alongside other kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities in a complex kill web. In a May 2023 article for the Mitchell Institute, Heather Penney describes a kill web as multiple, interconnected nodes that offer redundant paths for executing military operations, increasing the quantity and resilience of potential kill chains. A kill chain is the process required to identify and eliminate specific targets.

Penney says that unlike linear kill chains, which are easier to target and disrupt, kill webs provide a more adaptable and less predictable system, making it harder for adversaries to defeat. April 2024 that the rebranding of China’s PLA Strategic Support Force (PLA-SSF) into the PLA-Information Support Force (PLA-ISF) highlights China’s strategic shift towards technology-driven “intelligentized warfare.”

The PLA-ISF is designed to integrate emerging AI, quantum and other technologies into China’s multi-domain operational strategy against potential adversaries like the US and its allies. The rebranding reflects an evolution in Chinese military thought, transitioning from “informationized wars” to “intelligentized warfare” that includes EW, cyber operations and signals intelligence (SIGINT). EW is also a key component of China’s Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) concept, which leverages AI and big data to identify and exploit weaknesses in US operational systems.

China’s Multi-Domain Precision Warfare

China’s MDPW seeks to dismantle and destroy US kill chains by targeting critical information nodes such as aircraft and satellites through physical attacks and targeting information networks by using EW and cyberattacks. While the US arguably still has the edge in EW, near-peer adversaries like China and Russia may be closing the gap. A November 2022 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) defense primer says that the National Defense Strategy Commission mentioned that the US is losing its EW edge, hindering its capability to conduct operations against capable adversaries.

Army Technology reported in May 2024 that the US spent US$5 billion on EW capabilities in 2024, accounting for 45% of global EW spending from 2021-2023, compared to just 14% by Russia and 13% by China. However, Army Technology says that the US’ dominant position in the EW market is being challenged, as Russia, China and India’s share is projected to increase by the next decade.

The report notes that over the past two decades, Russia has exploited alleged US complacency in EW strategies, which have focused on counterinsurgency versus non-state actors. It notes that in Ukraine, Russia has used EW to disrupt adversary battlefield networks, support conventional assault forces through SIGINT and jamming attacks, and secure captured territory against counterattacks. The source also mentions that Russia has used EW to disrupt regional civilian services such as GPS and telecoms. Likewise, Army Technology mentions that China has mirrored Russia’s use of EW and has equated information dominance with electromagnetic dominance. It says that in addition to shipborne EW equipment, China has installed such equipment and more in its occupied features in the South China Sea.

China’s Expanding Presence in the South China Sea

In line with that, Matthew Funaiole and other writers highlight in a December 2021 CSIS article the expansion of China’s facilities on Hainan Island, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, which now includes satellite tracking, communication platforms, and systems potentially used in EW and SIGINT. Funaiole and others note that these developments aim to bolster the PLA’s ability to operate in contested electronic and cyber environments.

China’s rapid advancements in EW capabilities and strategic deployment of these technologies in the South China Sea represent a significant shift in regional power dynamics. The December 2023 incident involving the EA-18G and the Type 055 cruiser Nanchang underscores the growing sophistication of Chinese EW tactics and technology. As China continues to integrate AI and other advanced technologies into its military strategy, the balance of power in the South China Sea and beyond is poised to evolve, challenging US dominance and prompting a reevaluation of electronic warfare strategies on a global scale.